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This study aims to empirically explore and evaluate the current state of cyber security 
management for small and medium-sized businesses in South Korea. As academic 
discourse relating to the cyber security management of businesses is relatively new, 
there is a clear lack of literature relating to this discipline. This study, therefore, looks to 
address this issue by taking an exploratory approach to the subject. Based on various 
sources in the UK, this study used the UK’s cyber security framework as a conceptual 
model against which conditions in South Korea were examined.  
 
Drawing on a mixed methods approach, this study employed three research methods: 
documentary research, quantitative questionnaires, and qualitative interviews. In the 
quantitative phase, current situations of the businesses in relation to cyber security were 
assessed and differences by business sectors and sizes were identified. In the qualitative 
phase, five themes were identified. Findings from the quantitative and qualitative 
research were triangulated with the existing literature, including the qualitative results 
describing the empirical field of enquiry, to present a holistic picture of cyber security 
management of South Korean businesses. 
 
It was revealed that small and medium-sized businesses did not have a structural 
mechanism to prevent or mitigate risks at the pre-breach stage. Rather, they focused on 
responses at the post-breach stage. This finding demonstrated that small and medium-
sized businesses were not prepared for the risks and threats from a preventative point 
of view. In addition, management of cyber security in businesses was not an isolated 
mechanism, but affected by external influences and initiatives. However, small and 
medium-sized businesses relied more upon private organisations than public 
organisations, which indicates that there was an insufficient role of public sector 
organisations in protecting small and medium-sized businesses. 
 
ii 
In conclusion, this research has proposed an integrated cyber security risk management 
model. The framework was based on the argument that cyber security management 
relates to three elements: risk assessment, organisational behaviours and external 
factors. It is here that the biggest gains can be made if businesses manage cyber security 
in a holistic manner and if national leadership is strengthened in the Korean cyber 
security governance. This empirical research has made a contribution to knowledge in 
relevant studies by presenting a comprehensive landscape of cyber security 
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GLOSSARY & ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Action Fraud is a centre for the national fraud and cybercrime reporting in the UK. It is 
a single point of contact for fraud and cybercrime.  
 
ANOVA is an abbreviation of ‘Analysis of variance’. It compares three or more sample 
means.  
 
Big data is loosely defined as large and complex data sets (structured, semi-structured 
and unstructured) that conventional software tools cannot efficiently process and 
analyse. Through computational analyses, the data sets may reveal behavioural patterns 
and social interactions of people.  
 
Biometrics are authentication tools that depend on the uniqueness of human 
characteristics, automatically checking physical characteristics. Biometrics are often 
used for identification and access control.  
 
Bonferroni is one of multiple-comparison procedures for carrying out the follow-up 
tests that compare each pair of means.  
 
Botnets are an army of connected computers which are used to commit coordinated 
attacks on the command of a control server. 
 
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) is a policy that allows employees to bring their own 
personal mobile devices to work so that they can access the corporate network and data 
for work via these personal gadgets. 
 
Children Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) aims to protect children 
from sexual abuse and violence. It identifies the threats to children and coordinates child 
protection activity with other partners across the UK and overseas. 
xiii 
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network 
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, 
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction (Definition from the NIST).  
 
COBIT 5 is a framework from ISACA for the cyber security governance and management 
of businesses.  
 
Correlation quantifies nature of the linear relationship between two variables.  
 
Cyber and Government Security Directorate (CGSD) is responsible for all aspects of 
government protective security as a policy and standards organisation.  
 
Cyber-Security Information Sharing Partnership (CiSP) is a UK government-led joint 
industry initiative, creating a forum to facilitate information sharing and increase 
awareness of cyber threats. 
 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) is the department for economic 
growth in the UK. The department is dedicated to raising skills and education and 
boosting innovation.  
 
End-point devices are hardware devices that can be connected to the Internet. The term 
includes computers, laptops, smart phones, tablets, etc. 
 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) is business process management software. This 
software supports an organisation to integrate and manage various business activities, 




European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is an agency of 
European Union. It was set up in 2004 to secure information technologies and computer 
networks of member countries.  
 
Firewall is a network security system that controls the incoming and outgoing network 
traffic based on present security rules. 
 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is a British intelligence agency 
responsible for defending Government systems from cyber threat and providing signals 
intelligence and information assurance to other government entities.  
 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is an independent entity that 
inspects and assesses police forces in England and Wales and their policing activities.  
 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) is an umbrella term that includes 
any communication devices and applications. The primary examples are a computer, 
mobile phone, television, broadband, Wi-Fi, network, and website, etc. 
 
Information Security Management (ISM) is a comprehensive framework to protect an 
organisation’s computing environment, including its people, activities, data, technology, 
and network (Definition from Raggad, 2010). 
 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 27001 is the best-known 
international standard which recommends a set of policies, procedures, documents and 
technology for managing cyber security. 
 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is an agency within the UN and deals with 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) internationally.  
 
xv 
Internet Data Centre (IDC) is a facility that is established when it is necessary to collect 
and concentrate servers that are the core of an Internet connection. 
 
Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of interconnected physical objects that are 
equipped with electronic identifiers. The identifiers have the ability to automatically 
send collected data over a network.  
 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are businesses that provide services to people for 
accessing the internet and related services.  
 
Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) is an organisation that consists of Internet Service 
Providers to eradicate obscene imagery online.  
 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a device or a software application that detects 
malicious activities to maintain network and data security.  
 
Kendall’s tau-b is one of measures of association on the strength of a relationship.  
 
Korea Federation of Small and Medium-sized Businesses (K-BIZ) is an interest group 
whose members include almost all SMEs in South Korea. 
 
Korea International Trade Association is a non-profit organisation that represents 
international trade community in South Korea.  
 
Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA) is a Korean public agency which governs 
cyberspace and ensures cyber security across the nation. This organisation also leads 
the computer emergency response team (KrCert).  
 
Major Projects Authority (MPA) evaluates major governments’ projects, working with 
HM Treasury and other government departments. It provides independence assurance 
xvi 
on the projects and aims to improve the way other government departments manage 
and deliver projects. 
 
Mayors Office for Policing (MOPAC) sets policing priorities and budget for the Met.  
 
Metropolitan Police Service (The Met) is a territorial police force for Greater London, 
excluding the City of London. It also has national responsibilities such as counter-
terrorism and protection of senior members of the Government.  
 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in charge of various space 
programmes along with aeronautics and aerospace research.  
 
National Audit Office (NAO) is an independent parliamentary body which audits central 
government departments, agencies and non-departmental public bodies. 
 
National Cyber Crime Unit (NCCU) takes the lead in the UK’s response to cybercrime. As 
a part of the National Crime Agency, this unit supports and coordinates other police 
forces to fight against the most serious cybercrimes. 
 
National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP) is managed by the Office of Cyber Security 
and Information Assurance and Cyber and Government Security Directorate, both in the 
Cabinet Office. This programme has a budget of £860 million and is running from April 
2011 to March 2016.  
 
National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) is a unit in the city of London Police whose 
mission is to gather and analyse intelligence in order to combat fraud and financially-
motivated cybercrime.  
 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) aims to support US public and 
private sector organisations by developing measurement science, standards and 
xvii 
technology. (NIST 800 Series is a collection of documents that include computer security 
policies, procedures, and guidelines of the US federal government.) 
 
National Intelligence Service (NIS) is an intelligence agency of South Korea. Major duties 
include security investigation, intelligence on North Korea, counter-espionage, 
industrial security, international crime, and cyber security.  
 
National Police Agency (NPA) is a national police force of South Korea which provides 
all policing services throughout the country.  
 
National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) is a non-profit organisation for chief police 
officers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland to coordinate policing strategies and 
practices. It has been replaced by the National Police Chief’s Council.  
 
Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA) is part of the Cabinet Office. 
This unit coordinates cyber security and information assurance programmes run by the 
UK government. It manages the National Cyber Security programme and delivers the 
Cyber Security strategy.  
 
Packet is a unit of data that is carried from an origin and a destination on the Internet. 
 
Pearson's chi-square test (χ2) is a statistical test that compares observed frequencies 
with expected frequencies under assumption of independence. It is a formal test of 
whether two categorical variables are statistically independent.  
 
Police Central e-Crime Unit (PCeU) was part of the Specialist Crime Directorate of the 
Metropolitan Police Service in London. In 2013 this unit has been merged into the NCCU.  
 
Reconnaissance General Bureau is an arm of Armed Forces in North Korea. This 
organisation is responsible for collecting overseas intelligence and ordering special 
military offenses against foreign countries including South Korea.  
xviii 
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) is an independent department that investigates serious fraud 
and corruption cases. 
 
Significance level refers to the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis, given that the 
null is true. Also, it is the possibility of committing a type I error, known as alpha (α). 
Type I error occurs when rejecting the null although the null is true. α = 0.05 is 
conventional significance level.  
 
Small and Medium Business Administration (SMBA) is a South Korean public body 
which provides Small and Medium-sized Enterprises with supportive policies to promote 
their businesses.  
 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) refer to companies with more than 9 and 
less than 300 employees in this research.  
 
Specialist, Organised and Economic Crime Command (SCECC) leads the investigation of 
all crimes related to economic gains. Types of crimes include economic crime, corruption, 
human trafficking, prostitution, etc.  
 
STATA is a widely used statistical software package from 1985.  
 
t-test is used when comparing two different groups on a variable of interest. The test is 
run by comparing the means of the two groups.  
 
UK-CERT is the UK National Computer Emergency Response Team that responds to 
cyber security breaches in the UK in alliance with public and private partners and CERTs 
of other nations.  
 
Virtual Global Taskforce is an international organisation that works with law 
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Using Information and communications technology (ICT) has become a pervasive 
phenomenon in much of both the public and private domains, and accordingly this has 
introduced cyber security risks and threats against individual and organisational users. 
As we develop and adopt new types of ICTs, associated problems emerge in spite of 
human efforts to stop them. The nature of the risks and threats is not static and develops 
over time, thus requiring continuous responses. Such concerns have led to a growing 
body of discourses and publications exploring these problems. Efforts to address risks 
and threats in cyberspace face some inherent challenges. Also, cyber security risks and 
threats are intertwined with deviant behaviours in the physical world. It is difficult to 
capture the nature and extent of the relationship between the ‘online’ and ‘offline’ 
worlds. 
 
In terms of managing cyber security risks and threats, a wide range of technical controls 
at operational level have been accepted as the most applicable and feasible solutions 
(Singh et al., 2013). Researchers from computer science and computing disciplines 
focused on developing technical measures to protect information systems. However, 
there is a growing consensus that cyber security problems cannot be mitigated by 
technical controls alone (Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Rhee, Ryu, & Kim, 2012; Safa et al., 2015; 
Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016). Instead, social science approaches to cyber security 
risks and threats have become increasingly prominent in understanding the nature of 
the risks and threats, drawing on non-technical aspects such as humans and managerial 
support as a solution (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Kayworth & Whitten, 2010; Singh, 
Gupta, & Ojha, 2014; Singh, Picot, Kranz, Gupta, & Ojha, 2013; Werlinger, Hawkey, & 
Beznosov, 2009; Young & Windsor, 2010).  
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This research will also take a social science approach in exploring how South Korean 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) approach cyber security risks and threats - 
for more details of the definition of SMEs (see: Section 3.2.3, p. 84). Taking an 
interdisciplinary approach, this research is expected to disclose interactions between 
humans and technology in the context of business management from a sociological 
perspective. This will shed light on the role of organisational behaviours such as 
leadership, communication, culture, decision-making processes, managerial roles and 
employees’ attitudes in the management of cyber security risks. Moreover, SMEs’ cyber 
security management will be explored within the wider national context in which they 
operate, including socioeconomic arrangements beyond organisational boundaries.  
 
1.2 Understanding the thesis  
 
1.2.1 Business opportunities and security risks from ICTs 
 
It was estimated that 3.2 billion people around the world and more than 80% of people 
in developed nations were using the Internet by the end of 2015 (International 
Telecommunication Union [ITU], 2015a). In particular, mobile-broadband penetration 
rates were expected to reach 47% in 2015, about four times as high as they were 5 years 
previously (ITU, 2015b). This growth of Internet and wireless communication has 
changed the behaviour of end users in terms of how people interact with one another 
and engage in social activities. The UK and South Korea have highly innovative ICT 
infrastructures and people in both countries have relatively advanced computer skills 
and knowledge compared to those in other countries (ITU, 2015b; United Nations, 
2014a). 
 
In a seminal book, Castells (2010) defined network society as the dominant social 
structure of the Information Age, relying on decentralised networks. Social networks are 
driven by electronic communication technologies, such as the Internet or mobile 
telephones. He acknowledged that the network society would not have existed without 
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a technological revolution. The way in which people interact with others has changed 
significantly as people embraced new types of technical devices. For example, a huge 
portion of social interactions occur via micro-electronic communication devices without 
meeting personally. 
 
Not only individuals, but also organisations, have had to adapt to a new environment 
dependent on internet-based communication networks. In order to maximize profits 
and reduce costs, companies of all sizes have attempted to take advantage of ICTs. As 
an increasing number of people use social networking services as a venue for 
communication and information sharing, the massive spread of virtual social 
interactions creates an opportunity for businesses to open up new markets. Additionally, 
ICTs help businesses manage themselves in a variety of ways, such as improving 
performance, sharing business information, and reducing costs. In this sense, ICTs have 
become increasingly essential in business operations on a daily basis (Soomro, Shah, & 
Ahmed, 2016). The adoption of ICTs is now one of the crucial prerequisites for increasing 
competitive edge in business (Harris & Patten, 2014; Hashim, 2015).  
 
The rise of cloud computing 1 , Internet of Things 2 , and social media platforms has 
contributed to a very great increase in data sets. Using Big Data3 analytics, companies 
carry out data-driven decisions rather than intuition-driven ones. McAfee and 
Brynjolfsson (2012) argued that management decisions based on data raise business 
performance, ultimately building a competitive advantage. Whereas Internet of Things 
and social media services are data sources, cloud computing is an underlying engine that 
enables users to access, save, and manage data (Hashem et al., 2015). 
 
                                                          
1 Cloud computing commits data to information systems handled by third parties on remote 
servers. 
2 Internet of Things is the network of interconnected physical objects that are equipped with 
electronic identifiers. 
3 Big Data is loosely defined as large and complex data sets that conventional software tools 
cannot efficiently process and analyse (Snijders, Matzat, & Reips, 2012). 
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The technological revolution has changed business communication and management. 
However, there is a downside to all this. The Internet - as the core part of ICT - has the 
potential to be a breeding ground for cybercrimes (Wall, 2007). In South Korea, the 
number of cybercrimes reported to the police increased significantly by about 31% from 
116,961 in 2011 to 153,075 in 2016 (National Police Agency [NPA], 2012, 2017a). In a 
similar vein, in the UK, the number of cybercrime offences and online fraud cases were 
estimated to be about, respectively, 2 million and 3.6 million in the 12 months (Office 
for National Statistics, 2017). The rapid growth of ICTs has provided grounds which 
generated new types of risks and threats. As far as businesses are concerned, an 
increasing reliance upon those devices has exposed SMEs to various cyber security 
threats (Moradoff, 2010). This has given rise to cyber security breaches (e.g., hacking, 
theft of business or customer information, and system disruption) which have caused 
major economic and social losses to companies, at least temporarily. 
 
1.2.2 Main targets from cyber security threats: Research gap 
 
Three main sectors are under attack by different kinds of cyber security threats. Those 
are government bodies, businesses, and individuals. According to a survey by the UK 
government (Cabinet Office, 2011a)4, the cost of cybercrime to the UK economy was 
estimated at £27 billion per annum, about 77.8% (£21 billion) of which fell on businesses. 
Globally, the cost of cybercrime against businesses has increased steadily. The Ponemon 
Institute (2017) suggested that the global average annualised cost per company was 
US$ 8.7million between 2013 and 2017, and the average percentage change of the costs 
over the five years was 62%5. These figures demonstrate that businesses are the main 
target of cybercrime justifying government efforts to protect business sectors. For 
example, the UK government sought to make London the most secure place in the world 
to do business.  
                                                          
4  Although this survey has been questioned of its reliability and accuracy of the types of 
estimates (e.g., Anderson et al., 2013), it was referred to here because this survey measured the 
costs by types of victims (i.e., the Government, businesses, and citizens, respectively). 
5 This analysis pertained to 254 companies with a minimum of over 1,000 employees. 
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Figure 1.1 Three main targets from cyber security threats 
 
When it comes to cyber security threats, there are two strands of concern in South Korea 
- for more details (see: Section 3.3.1). The first is cyber terrorism and the second is cyber 
financial fraud. Cyber terrorism is a great concern for any nation. South Korea has a 
different cyber terrorism concern derived from its unique historical background. 
Although South Korea in itself is a target of cyber-attacks from external states and non-
state entities, cyber terrorism perpetrated by North Korea has been a major problem 
for both the government and public (Chung, Lim, & Kwon, 2016; Kwon, 2016). It targets 
the government, military, and large companies which run critical national 
infrastructures. Similarly, the UK is always cautious of cyber terror attacks from other 
nations as well as non-state terrorists (Cabinet Office, 2011b; HM Government, 2016).  
 
Within general cybercrime, cyber financial fraud does serious harm to individuals (Kim, 
Kang, & Kim, 2015; Yoon, 2013). Fraudsters use hacking skills and social engineering 
techniques, targeting a disproportionately large number of people via automated 
machines. In 2013, the total damage of cyber financial fraud was estimated at £39.3 
million, with each case causing the loss of £2,520 (NPA, 2014). 
  
Due to these two concerns, the government, large companies, and individual citizens 
are well recognised as potential targets from cybercriminals in South Korea. Accordingly, 
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the government has provided protective measures based on this recognition. However, 
SMEs are left on their own. SMEs amounted to 99.9% of the total number of businesses, 
and they employed 85.7% of the total workforce in South Korea in 2016 (National 
Statistical Office, 2017). Despite the significance of SMEs in the national economy – for 
more details (see: Section 3.2.3), the government and academia have overlooked the 
exposure of SMEs to high levels of cyber-attacks. As a result, very little attention has 
been paid to cyber security risks and threats on South Korean SMEs.  
 
This tendency may also be replicated internationally. Holtfreter and Meyers (2015) 
noted that globally small businesses were not recognised as potential cybercrime victims, 
and contrasted this with the greater attention paid to individuals, large companies and 
governments. The lack of attention to SMEs indicates that SMEs’ cyber security 
management is an uncharted territory, requiring and meriting further investigation. This 
thesis therefore, seeks to address that gap with a clear focus on SMEs. 
 
Currently many of those cyber security risks and threats have been discussed under the 
big umbrella term, cybercrime. For example, cybercrime tends to be seen as generic 
across the social spectrum. However, Graham (2017) contends that cybercrime is about 
protecting families and individuals based on an understanding of the socio-psychological 
aspects of criminals and victims, while cyber security focuses on protecting government 
and corporate networks by mitigating security vulnerabilities. As reflected in research 
subjects and questions, the focus in this research is on security and risk. Since crime is a 
potential source of risk (Levi, Morgan, & Burrows, 2003), cybercrime will also be 
discussed in conjunction with cyber security risks and threats. Hence, this study will 
focus on cyber security management of risk, threats, and cybercrime from preventative, 
preparatory, and protective points of view.  
 
Given this uncharted territory, the research is intended to be exploratory, seeking to 
examine internal arrangements within businesses as well as their surrounding contexts 
as to cyber security. Researchers explore when there is little knowledge about the 
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research subject they are interested in and when it is worth investigating (Stebbins, 
2001). In social science exploration is defined as “a broad-ranging, purposive, systematic, 
prearranged undertaking designed to maximize the discovery of generalizations leading 
to description and understanding of an area of social or psychological life” (Vogt, 1999, 
as cited in Stebbins, 2001, p. 3). Such an exploration is expected to help to build a 
comprehensive picture of the landscape surrounding SMEs which has not been drawn 
before. Therefore, this exploratory research is driven by empirical data rather than 
testing pre-identified hypotheses.   
 
1.2.3 Research aim and objectives  
 
The aim of this study is to empirically explore and evaluate the current state of cyber 
security management of SMEs in South Korea. In order to undertake the assessment, it 
is necessary to have some ancillary objectives. 
 
The first objective is to identify cyber security risks and threats against SMEs. When it 
comes to SMEs’ cyber security, there is an obvious lack of risk and threat assessment. 
Considering the scale and importance of SMEs in the national economy, it needs to be 
understood which types of risks and threats SMEs face. The risks and threats are 
perceived differently depending on organisational characteristics and behaviours. 
Therefore, the extent and scope of the risks and threats can be better understood if the 
nature of those organisational characteristics and behaviour are made clear. This will be 
a basic diagnostic tool in assessing the overall cyber security context surrounding SMEs.  
 
The second objective is to examine whether SMEs are prepared to address the risks and 
threats they face. SMEs’ preparedness will be measured by the extent of organisation of 
cyber security management. This examination will include not only various aspects of 
cyber security management itself, such as its practices, structure and decision-making 
processes, but also external factors which influence the management of cyber security. 
The inclusion of external factors will expand the scope of this research by shedding light 
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on relationships between SMEs and external organisations. Furthermore, structural 
loopholes in SMEs’ cyber security management are expected to emerge through this 
examination.  
 
The third objective is to suggest policy recommendations to strengthen the cyber 
security management of SMEs. The process of identifying and selecting appropriate 
recommendations will be guided by the empirical data within considerations of the 
research context. The research undertaken to meet the first and second objectives is 
expected to reveal a full picture of SMEs’ cyber security management. This then will 
inform proper recommendations, which means they will emanate from empirical data. 
This process will allow the recommendations to be immediately applicable in the South 
Korean context.  
 
The fourth objective is to propose an effective framework for protecting SMEs from 
cyber security risks and threats. This data-driven research is expected to disclose 
unknown dimensions and factors that are associated with cyber security management 
in SMEs. Not only organisational factors but also influences from external organisations 
will be incorporated in the framework in order to present a comprehensive account of 
SMEs’ cyber security management.  
 
1.2.4. Research questions  
 
Research questions serve as the driver for carrying out a successful research project 
(Robson & McCartan, 2016). They help a researcher not only to advance a research 
project in a structurally organised way but also to achieve research goals, objectives, 
and purposes at the same time. Research questions are critically important because they 
govern research design as well as specific data analytic procedures (Onwuegbuzie & 
Leech, 2006). There are some criteria for good research questions, such as clarity, 
coherence, significance and purposiveness (Robson & McCartan, 2016). Above all, 
research questions should be formed as a coherent set to ensure the formality of the 
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research project. Five research questions developed to meet the objectives of this study 
are suggested:  
 
 (1) The extent to which South Korean SMEs are exposed to cyber security  
 risks? 
 (2) How serious are cyber security breaches for South Korean SMEs? 
 (3) The extent to which South Korean SMEs are prepared to prevent or 
 mitigate cyber security risks and breaches? 
 (4) What are the characteristics of external influences and initiatives in South 
 Korea? 
 (5) What is the nature of relationships in South Korea between SMEs and other 
 public or private sector organisations? 
 
These five questions are the fundamental guidance for an exploration of the research 
problem: ‘how is cyber security managed in South Korean SMEs?’.  
 
1.3 Explaining the approach 
 
This study uses a mixed methods approach as the research design - for more details (see: 
Section 4.3.2). The mixed methods approach draws on both quantitative and qualitative 
research strategies, generating various benefits such as triangulation and 
comprehensiveness (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007; O'Cathain, Murphy, & 
Nicholl, 2007; Robson & McCartan, 2016). This approach will both increase the validity 
of findings and the academic rigour of this research.  
 
In this mixed methods approach, three research methods are used in sequence: (1) 
documentary research (qualitative), (2) quantitative questionnaires and (3) qualitative 
interviews - for more details (see: Section 4.4). In this thesis, documentary research was 
undertaken by utilising public and private documents and records. These sources are 
mostly used to supplement Chapter 2, the Literature Review, and to construct Chapter 
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3, the Empirical Field of Inquiry. It was necessary to have some knowledge of the 
research context before embarking on data collection because cyber security in SMEs 
was such an unexplored area. Secondly, quantitative questionnaires were used to assess 
the cyber security context faced by SMEs. The questionnaires were self-administered 
and completed online for easier access. Thirdly, semi-structured interviews were carried 
out in a flexible manner to gain further information about issues and problems relating 
to cyber security management of SMEs. These three methods and their findings were 
employed in triangulation to enable a comprehensive and holistic pursuit of the research 
questions.  
 
Following the documentary research which provided preparatory information on cyber 
security conditions in South Korea, the quantitative questionnaires and qualitative 
interviews involved data collection and analysis. The table below is a summary of data 
collections:  
 
Table 1.1: Data collection methods and analysis of quantitative and qualitative 
research 
 Quantitative research Qualitative research 
Data collection 
method 
Online survey questionnaires Semi-structured interviews 
Data collection 
period 
28 Oct 2016–27 Dec 2016 02 Feb 2017–28 Feb 2017 
Samples 328 responses 25 interviewees 
Respondents IT managers/owners of SMEs 
- 16 IT managers/owners of SMEs 
- 9 government officials 




- Generic purposive sampling 











QSR NVivo programme 
(version 11.3) 
 
The survey questionnaires were collected across the nation which consists of eight 
provinces6 and nine self-governing areas7 (see: Figure 1.2). Of these, four provinces 
and five self-governing areas8 were selected for data collection.  
                                                          
6 These are Gyeonggi-do, Gangwon-do, Chungcheong buk-do, Chungcheong nam-do, Jeolla 
buk-do, Jeolla nam-do, Gyeongsang buk-do and Gyeongsang nam-do.  
7 These are one special city (Seoul), six metropolitan cities (Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju, 
Daejeon, and Ulsan), one metropolitan autonomous city (Sejong) and one special self-governing 
province (Jeju-do). 
8  These include Gyeonggi-do, Gangwon-do, Gyeongsang buk-do and Gyeongsang nam-do, 
Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Daejeon and Ulsan.  
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Figure 1.2 Administrative divisions of South Korea (from http://blog.investkorea.org) 
 
In terms of data analysis, quantitative survey data has been analysed by descriptive and 
inferential statistics via STATA programme (version 14). The findings also include 
analyses by business size and business sector. Qualitative interview data has been 
analysed via QSR NVivo programme (version 11.3). Thematic analysis is used to examine 
patterns or themes within the interview data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This analysis in 
turn generates descriptive codes, analytic codes and themes.  
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1.4. Mapping the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The first chapter has outlined the scale of the study 
and the research strategy used to accomplish its goal and objectives. Chapter 2 
addresses the theoretical literature on cyber security risks and threats as well as various 
dimensions of cyber security management. Also, the UK’s cyber security governance is 
explained to identify loopholes and weaknesses in the Korean cyber security governance 
- for more details (see: Section 3.4.4).  
 
Chapter 3 provides a socioeconomic overview of the empirical field of inquiry, or South 
Korea, to inform the research context regarding cyber security and cybercrime. This 
chapter is intended to help the reader to better understand the interpretation and 
discussion of research findings in later chapters.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology and the specific methods employed in 
this study: documentary research, quantitative questionnaires, and qualitative 
interviews. The research has been carried out in a rigorous and scientific manner. In 
order to establish this, the researcher provides justifications for the choice of the 
methodology and methods; and other procedural choices.  
 
Chapter 5 examines quantitative findings and delivers an assessment of SMEs’ current 
situation by using descriptive statistics, chi-square tests and t-tests.  
 
Chapter 6 explores qualitative findings and proposes five main themes emerging from 
the interview data.  
 
In Chapter 7 discussion focuses on a triangulation of the quantitative and qualitative 
findings with the existing literature. This triangulation is adopted as a strategy to 
increase research rigour by shedding light on agreements as well as conflicts between 
different sources. 
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The final chapter provides an assessment of whether the research goal and objectives 
are met, and questions how this study contributes to the field of cyber security 
management in South Korea. In addition, it includes a consideration of the limitations of 




Cyber security risks and threats have increased in recent years, causing significant 
economic and social losses to public and private organisations as well as individuals. 
Among multiple risks and threats, cyber terrorism from North Korea and cyber financial 
fraud are considered serious problems in South Korea. Discourses around these 
problems drove government initiatives and academic research to focus on protecting 
large businesses, the public and governments. In contrast, there has not been much 
attention to the impact of cyber threats on SMEs.  
 
Due to the relative lack of concern over SMEs, this thesis takes the form of exploratory 
research. In order to uncover an unexplored subject, a set of research questions are 
designed to be answered in a sequential order. Research methods are undertaken in a 
sequence to effectively map out a holistic picture with regard to the research problem.  
 
The increase in cyber threats against businesses and the associated economic impacts 
make research on cyber security management of SMEs imperative within the specific 
South Korean context. Recognising the need for such research, this thesis aims to 
investigate internal arrangements within SMEs, but also to illustrate the external 
interactions of SMEs with outside entities. The necessity to conduct an in-depth analysis 
of the cyber security management process calls for the use of a mixed methods 








This literature review provides a theoretical framework for cyber security management 
and a discussion which focuses on the research questions. This chapter starts by 
examining a definitional difference between information security and cyber security and 
theories of risk. Based on the theoretical underpinnings, this chapter goes on to outline 
various types of cyber threats and, more specifically, cyber security risks against SMEs.  
 
As main part of this chapter, cyber security risk management frameworks are presented. 
Although many frameworks were available at the time of the research, only four 
representative frameworks are suggested. The next section explores various aspects of 
cyber security management in businesses. Firstly, how cyber security management can 
be implemented is illustrated by examining – (i) related measures and practices, (ii) a 
balanced approach to security controls, (iii) the role of knowledge and (iv) role of 
managers and their leadership. Secondly, the significance of cyber security culture is 
discussed. To conceptualise cyber security culture, it is represented as an adaptation of 
organisational culture. As elements of culture, managerial roles and leadership are 
considered to take an important role in establishing a constructive cyber security culture.  
 
In the final part of this chapter, the UK’s cyber security governance is discussed. The UK’s 
framework is taken as a conceptual model as well as a conceptual lens against which 
conditions in South Korea are examined. Discussion of the UK’s cyber security 
governance begins by investigating the national cyber security structure and pays special 
attention to the specific schemes directly related to protecting SMEs. Based on 
descriptions of participating governmental and non-governmental organisations, the 
discussion centres around whether, and how, the UK governance reaches out to protect 
SMEs. As a vital part of the framework, a UK’s reporting mechanism is investigated. 
Critical analyses and evaluations of the UK situation are provided throughout this section.  
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2.2. What is cyber security? 
 
In this section, definitions of information security and cyber security are discussed. 
Without a clear definition of key terminologies, further discussions may have limited 
value as a subject of sustained empirical investigation. The two terms, cyber security 
and information security are frequently used interchangeably without much distinction 
(Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013; e.g., Öğüt, Raghunathan, & Menon, 2011). However, 
these are not entirely analogous concepts. It is of importance to look into ideas 
underlying the two concepts in order to fathom the views formed around them. 
 
Information security is “the protection of information resources against unauthorized 
access” (Raggad, 2010, p. 18). It means that only authorised people or ICTs should have 
access to information resources, such as data, hardware, software, and network. This 
definition is clearly related to a business management aspect because decisions on the 
authorisation should be dependent upon business objectives. When certain people are 
considered necessary for attaining a business objective, those people need 
authorisation to access a certain amount of information resources directly relevant to 
the business objective. By controlling unauthorised access, information security focuses 
on reducing business damage in a way that mitigates the probability and impact of 
security incidents. At this point, a fundamental question arises: what should be 
protected?  
 
As one of the most important international standards, ISO/IEC 27000 (2016) defines 
information security as the preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information. Integrity, availability, and confidentiality (Known as ‘CIA Triad’) are 
depicted as three aspects of information that should be protected to achieve security 
goals. It can be explained that only authorised persons should gain access (availability) 
to the accurately represented information (integrity) without disclosure to unauthorised 
persons (confidentiality). They are also called characteristics of information security. If 
one of those characteristics is compromised, it is said to be a security failure. There are 
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some other researchers (Raggad, 2010; Whitman & Mattord, 2011) who argue that more 
information characteristics need to be included to address adequately the constantly 
changing nature of ICTs. Whereas Whitman and Mattord (2011, pp. 11-12) suggested 
that accuracy and authenticity were two other critical characteristics of information 
which the value of information comes from, Raggad (2010) contended that 
authentication and non-repudiation need to be added to the ‘CIA Triad’, constituting 
‘the Security Star’. Authentication implies that the identity of human or system is 
verified before access permission is granted and non-repudiation is a mechanism 
designed to enforce the fulfilment of accepted obligations. Non-repudiation is based on 
the logic that the message sender cannot later deny that he or she sent the message. 
These five elements are interpreted as security goals that lead to the achievement of 
business goals (Raggad, 2010, pp. 20-22).  
 
Jung (2011) defined cyber security as protecting information and communication 
networks, and information from cyber-attacks or cyber threats that occur in the 
cyberspace or network. This definition emphasised protection from attacks and threats. 
The ITU (2008) defined this from a different angle as follows: 
 
“Cyber security is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security 
safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best 
practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber 
environment and organization and user’s assets.” (p. 2) 
 
This definition highlights elements of cyber security and a range of subjects which need 
to be protected. One commonality between information security and cyber security is 
that the two concepts both aim to maintain the security properties of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability (ITU, 2008; Jung, 2011). However, the ITU’s definition contains 
a broad aspect of safeguarding technical and non-technical elements. The expanding 
nature of the Internet allows cyber security to have unique traits (see: Table 1).  
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Table 2.1: Unique traits of cyber security (ITU, 2011, p. 13) 
 While information security initially worked on segregated systems, cyber 
security addresses global threats which engage jurisdictional problems. 
 Cyber security competes with an Internet architecture that makes attribution 
of an attacker very difficult. 
 While information security stresses confidentiality, cyber security mainly 
involves integrity and availability.  
 
Due to these traits cyber security faces various extensive issues, such as jurisdictional 
uncertainty, global threats and attribution difficulties. There is another difference in 
terms of asset protection. In cyber security, both human and non-human entities are 
considered assets which should be protected. Von Solms and Van Niekerk (2013) argue 
that cyber security protects various assets such as humans and society as well as their 
information resources, while information security aims to secure information-based 
assets only. This argument represents that cyber security considers impacts of 
information technologies on humans and society. Therefore, cyber security is capable of 
addressing socio-legal issues regarding cyber threats which are not dealt with by 
information security. This indicates that cyber security is a broader concept than 
information security, encompassing additional dimensions (Safa et al., 2016).  
  
It was a tradition that organisations implemented security controls from the information 
security perspective (Reid & Van Niekerk, 2014). However, the boundaries of 
information are not confined to the border of an organisation any more due to 
communication networks such as internet and extranets (Chang & Ho, 2006). In 
particular, Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) and cloud computing services are widely 
adopted by individuals and organisations. These technological advances surpassed 
geographical and jurisdictional boundaries and changed traditional working hours. 
Nowadays, it is usual that an organisation’s information is retained and monitored by 
third parties. However, these technological changes brought with them associated risks. 
Businesses have to think beyond the organisational context, considering business 
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partners, customers, and their environments. Business environment and relevant 
organisations need to be taken into consideration when they engage in protecting assets 
from the risks in cyberspace. As a consequence, this changing landscape is better 
captured by the concept, cyber security, rather than information security.  
 
In this thesis, the researcher will use the term, cyber security, rather than information 
security, because cyber security can cover the broad scope of this research. This 
research encompasses inside management processes in relation to securing assets from 
cyber threats as well as external influences and relationships with public and private 
organisations. Organisational arrangements within a business will be examined first, but 
it will extend the examination beyond the organisational borders by incorporating 
outside entities.  
 
2.3. Cyber security risks, threats, and cybercrime 
 
2.3.1. Theories of risk 
 
Nowadays, risk is a constantly encountered term. There are virtually no human activities 
which do not involve any risk (Borodzicz, 2005, pp. 1-2). In the seminar book, Risk Society, 
Beck (1992) posits that complex technologies humans have invented gave rise to 
unprecedented uncertainty. Understanding of the uncertainty and risks is extremely 
challenging. It is impossible for humans to predict hazards and future consequences 
from the uncertainties. Because risk is embedded in every aspect of society, the author 
diagnosed contemporary society as a risk society. However, there is no widely accepted 
definition of the term. In academia, scholars in a variety of disciplines approach this topic 
to understand how risk involves and develops in their own disciplines. Due to a wide 
range of theoretical positions, interpretations of risk concepts are based on their 




Table 2.2: Formal definitions of risk (Vlek, 1995, p. 566) 
 Probability of undesired consequence 
 Seriousness of (maximum) possible undesired consequence 
 Multi-attribute weighted sum of components of possible undesired 
consequences  
 Probability x seriousness of undesired consequence (‘expected loss’) 
 Probability weighted sum of all possible undesired consequences (average 
‘expected loss’) 
 Fitted function through graph of points relating probability to extent of 
undesired consequences 
 Semivariance of possible undesired consequences about their average 
 Variance of all possible consequences about mean expected consequences 
 Weighted sum of expected value & variance of all possible consequences 
 Weighted combination of various parameters of the probability distribution 
of all possible consequences 
 Weight of possible undesired consequences (‘loss’) relative to comparable 
possible desired consequences (‘gain’) 
 
In terms of understanding risk, three approaches are mainly identified: (1) realist 
approach (2) psychological approach, and (3) sociological approach. The first approach 
conceptualises risk in an objective manner based on the assumption that risks are real 
events or dangers. In natural sciences, risk is quantitatively measured to find out discrete 
time points as well as a proper scale of intervention. For example, National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (2007, p. 139) defines risk in a measurable manner as having 
two elements: (1) the probability of failing to achieve a particular outcome and (2) the 
consequences/impacts of failing to achieve that outcome. It can be denoted as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑓(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠) 
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In conceptualising terrorism risk, Willis (2007) asserts that risk is the intersection of 
three dimensions: threat, vulnerability and consequences (Figure 2.1), defining risk as 
the consequences of potential attacks on assets with vulnerability. Risk from an attack 
can be quantified as the unconditional expected value of damages from the attack. The 
greatest advantage of this approach is high application. As risk is denoted through 
probabilistic terms, risk can be understood in line with business management activities. 
Quantitative measures therefore are frequently used to communicate risks to non-
security managers. As quantitative measures, metrics are effective in enabling constant 
risk assessment (Button, 2008) as well as informing business’ decision-making (Aleem, 
Wakefield, & Button, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 2.1. A risk definition by Willis (2007, p. 599) 
 
The second approach is psychological one. This approach is concerned with how people 
perceive risk. Risk perception has been a great concern in social sciences. For example, 
in criminology and psychology risk perception is a major focus of interest. Two influential 
risk perception approaches are psychometrics and cognitive/behavioural decision-
making (Borodzicz, 2005. p. 14). 
 
The leading contender of risk perception studies, the psychometric model, aims at 
measuring psychological concepts of individuals in relation to hazards and risk. 
Psychometric studies attempt to develop measurements for human perception on risk 
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from sociopolitical, natural, and man-made events. The psychometric model is of 
importance as it produced a great body of empirical data regarding risk perceptions 
(Royal Society, 1992). 
 
Risk perception is also closely associated with cognitive decision-making process of 
individuals (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Historically, risk perception research originates 
from the nuclear debates in 1960s (Sjöberg, 2000). The research from the nuclear field 
attempted to propose a set of reasonable choices for decision-makers. The decision-
making process has been widely studied from a multidisciplinary approach, including 
mathematics, economy, and psychology. Among them, a psychological approach 
addresses how cognitive factors influence the risk-related decisions. For example, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) showed that humans rely upon mental shortcuts, 
heuristics, which significantly influence the decision-making process. Individuals may 
make some irrational choices for their behaviours (e.g., risk-taking or risk-avoidance), 
depending upon the way, and the extent to which, they perceive particular risk. Risk 
perception studies hugely influenced the development of behavioural theories not only 
in politics, but also in business management.  
 
The third approach postulates that risk is a socially or culturally constructed concept. 
Cultural theory postulates that risk perception is a reflection of the social context to 
which a person belongs (Sjöberg, 2000). More specifically, risk perception reflects 
aggregate values in sociocultural contexts along with individuals’ values and beliefs of 
risk (Royal Society, 1992). It considers risk is an outcome of social processes, which 
means that risk can be controlled by managing social factors. Although the cultural 
theory expanded risk perception discourses, it was not widely welcomed due to an 
abstract nature of the concept, social context (Sjöberg, 2000).  
 
There are more approaches beyond these three. Some take more nuanced positions, 
while some others incorporate elements of more than two approaches. It is a recent 
development that those approaches have merged by integrating several theoretical 
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perspectives (Royal Society, 1992; Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006). In particular, the 
converging process was found in sociology and psychology. While psychological thinking 
recognised social and cultural factors on framing risk perception, sociological work put 
more emphasis on individualist accounts of perceiving risk (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006). 
Recently, Grant, Edgar, Sukumar, and Meyer (2014) explored the impact of risk 
perceptions of key stakeholders in SMEs on decision-makings. In the study, the authors 
posited that risk estimation is predicated on an amalgamation of personal exposure, 
social, demographic, cultural and organisational contexts. 
 
As this research takes an interdisciplinary approach, all the three approaches toward 
risk are relevant. Firstly, the realist approach leads to security management concerns on 
risk prevention and mitigation, which reflects the research problem. In addition, one of 
the main underlying frameworks in this research, risk management frameworks 
suggested below (see: Section 2.4), are from computer science and computing 
disciplines. These disciplines are based on the realist approach. Secondly, it is important 
to understand cognitive processes of individuals within a business. SMEs’ employees and 
managers in a company have their own personal accounts on risk recognition and 
response. Lastly, aggregate risk perception on the organisational level is conditioned by 
the surrounding contexts. SMEs in general are susceptible to external influences and 
relations with outside entities. How those contextual factors shape their risk perception 
on cyber security is to be considered. The compounding approach to risk in this research 
could add some complexities, but it is necessary to have an in-depth understanding of 




Figure 2.2 Triangle of risk in computer/cyber systems (Raggad, 2010, p. 292) 
 
2.3.2. Cyber security threats and typologies 
 
2.3.2.1. Threat sources and origins 
 
Cyber threat sources include disaffected employees, investigative journalists, 
cybercriminals, extremist organisations, hacktivists, organised crime groups, and foreign 
intelligence services (ITU, 2011). Among them, sources that attempt to target SMEs are 
employees, cybercriminals and organised crime groups. These sources engage in their 
cybercriminal activities to pursue economic gains or to express their hatred against an 
employer. Compared to them, other sources (i.e., investigative journalists, extremist 
organisations, hacktivists, and foreign intelligence services) are motivated to attain 
political or social causes.  
 
Cyber security threats can be divided into two types depending on origins of threats: (1) 
internal threats and (2) external threats. Previous research on cyber security did not pay 
much attention to insider threats compared to external threats (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 
2014). Internal threats refer to an intentional misuse of information systems by 
employees who have authorised access rights. This type of threat is based on the 
assumption that humans are the weakest link in cyber security management (Guo, Yuan, 
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Archer, & Connelly, 2011; Ifinedo, 2014; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). Employees have 
malicious intentions for various reasons, such as disgruntlement at an employer, 
pecuniary motives or antagonism of corporate values. Misuse behaviour includes pure 
sabotage, stealing business or customer information, and knowingly participating in the 
outsiders’ commission of a cybercrime. It is challenging to defend against insider attacks 
in that insiders take advantage of their access privileges already acquired for legitimate 
uses (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). These are a form of deviant behaviour in the 
workplace, which provides a reason why criminology theories can be useful in 
understanding insider threats (Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda, & Kiountouzis, 2005). 
Theories, such as general deterrence theory, social bond theory, and social learning 
theory, have been suggested to explain insider misuse of information systems.  
 
Secondly, external threats are posed by an entity outside the security perimeter. Outside 
attackers refer to all groups of cyber attackers after excluding insiders. Gehem, Usanov, 
Frinking and Rademaker (2015) noted that most cyber-attacks derive from outside the 
organisation. IBM (2014) reported that in 2013 over half (56%) of attacks came from 
outsiders and less than a fifth (17%) of attacks emanated from insiders. They use various 
threat tools and techniques9  to infiltrate targeted computer system. Among them, 
malware (e.g., worms, spyware, and ransomware) has been found as one of the 
prevalent cyber threats to individuals, businesses and public sector organisations (Choo, 
2011; Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). In 2016, 357 million unique malware variants were 
detected for the first time and a large volume of malware was distributed via email 
(Symantec, 2017). However, clear division between insider and outsider threats gets 
blurred. Around a fifth (22%) of cyber-attacks is committed through cooperation 
between outsiders and insiders (IBM, 2014). This malicious cooperation has a potential 
for exacerbating victimisation situations by expediting an attack process or raising its 
success rate.  
 
                                                          
9 Frequently used tools and techniques are malware, spam phishing, (D)Dos, theft and physical 
damage, espionage, defacement, targeted attack, ransomware, and web app attacks (Gehem et 
al., 2015). 
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2.3.2.2. Typologies of cyber threats 
 
Threats in cyberspace can be classified by various formats depending on perpetrators, 
victims, modus operandi and damage. A researcher with different research orientation 
tends to use a different typology. There are no unified sets of typologies which are 
accepted by the majority of cyber security researchers. Nye (2010) suggested four types 
of cyber threats to national security: cyber terrorism, cyber war, cybercrime and 
economic espionage. Cyber war is an array of hostile activities in cyberspace against an 
enemy state by a nation or its agents by using information technologies. Defending 
against cyber war is related to international law, being different from criminal 
investigation and prosecution by domestic law. Unlike the other three types, cyber war 
is out of the purview of this research.  
 
Cyber terrorism was first termed by Barry Collin (1997) in the 1980s. The term has been 
commonly used by various entities in society, such as academics, policy makers, and 
media. Mass media is considered the main driver of the popular usage of the term, using 
this term to capture any sort of large scale cyber-attack cases (Conway, 2008). Mass 
media tends to overhype stories and events to create media sensation. In this respect, 
the term, terrorism, is preferred by media due to a high level of fear and violence 
attached to it. These days, cyber terrorism has become an overused term without 
consideration of the attributes and characteristics it carries. Hoffman (2006, p. 40) 
suggested five major criteria of terrorism: (1) political aims and motives, (2) violence or 
threatened violence, (3) planned to entail long-term psychological repercussions 
beyond the immediate victim or targets, (4) executed by an organisation with a chain of 
command or conspiratorial cell structure or by (a small collection) of individuals 
influenced by ideological aims, and (5) committed by a subnational group or non-state 
entity. If these traditional criteria are applied to cyber terrorism, it can be defined as 
illegitimate attacks or threats to violence against computers, electronic networks and 
digital information by a non-state or subnational group for its political or social aims. 
However, cyber terrorism is a form of abusing information technologies and it can be 
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understood as a subset of cybercrime. Criminal justice departments deal with cyber 
terrorist attacks not as a new type of cyber-attacks, but as part of cybercrime (Jang, 2014, 
p. 34). It is of importance to note that cyber terrorism and cybercrime are not mutually 
exclusive concepts.  
 
The proliferation of electronically stored information has created more opportunities to 
steal digitised information. Economic espionage refers to the act of acquiring trade 
secrets from domestic companies or government entities to benefit a foreign state 
(Danielson, 2009). It is carried out to satisfy a nation’s economic interests, which are 
considered a crucial dimension of its national security. As opposed to this, industrial 
espionage is a misappropriation of trade secrets, perpetrated by private entities for 
economic gain. However, there is some overlap between these two concepts and their 
usage by researchers is not consistent (Nasheri, 2005, p. 13). In reality, it is not easy to 
distinguish these two in that attribution of any cyber-attacks is extremely difficult. Both 
types of espionage escalate tensions between nations and discourage business 
motivation for technological innovation. Therefore, there are serious reasons that 
government has to intervene. It is predominantly the US corporations that are targeted 
most because they invest more resources in Research and Development (R&D) (Tucker, 
1997). Due to the damaging effects of espionage, the US set up the Economic Espionage 
Act of 1996. This Act criminalises two forms of trade secret theft: theft for the benefit 
of a foreign entity (economic espionage) and theft for pecuniary gain (industrial 
espionage) (Doyle, 2016).  
 
Cybercrime has been used as a generic term for describing crimes that occur in 
cyberspace. The term refers to “criminal or harmful activities that involve the acquisition 
or manipulation of information for gain” (Wall, 2007, p. 10), focusing on activities related 
to information. Due to its abstraction this definition is able to include a wide array of 
deviant behaviours in cyberspace, but it lacks cyber or technical concepts. In other 
words, what differentiates cybercrime from offline crime is not clearly touched upon.  
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Compared to the Wall’s definition, Robinson et al. (2012) defined cybercrime as “a broad 
range of activities that involve the misuse of data, computer and information systems, 
and cyberspace for economic, personal or psychological gain” (p. 17). This definition 
points out the nature of activities in cyberspace in detail, incorporating cyber and 
technical elements. However, the term, misuse, is vague. This term needs to be defined 
clearly for application to real cases. In addition, this definition includes intentions of a 
perpetrator, but does not consider criminological perspectives involving criminogenic 
nature of activities and impact on victims. This can lead to a failure of a distinction 
between economic espionage and cybercrime. Understanding cybercrime varies greatly 
depending on the person who wants to define it. Policy makers, researchers or 
practitioners will have different approaches to comprehend cybercrime.  
 
Table 2.3: Typology of cyber threats 



























































A useful way of understanding cybercrime is categorising it. Due to its complex nature, 
it is difficult to identify categories of cybercrime by a single approach. The Council of 
Europe Cybercrime Convention (2001) suggested three categories, which are ‘offences 
against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems’ (Title 
One), ‘computer-related offences’ (Title Two) and ‘content-related offences’ (Title 
Three). The first category considers offence objects (i.e., computer data and systems), 
while the other two categories focus on the modus operandi of the offence (United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013). Based on this categorisation, specific acts 
which belong to each category are presented below (Table 2.4). However, cybercrime 
categories and acts which constitute cybercrime do not exist in a fixed format. They are 
changeable over time as newly developed information technologies reshape social 
interactions and human behaviours.  
 
Table 2.4: Typology of cybercrime (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013) 
Categories Acts 
Acts against the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of 
computer data or systems 
• Illegal access to a computer system  
• Illegal access, interception or acquisition of 
computer data  
• Illegal interference with a computer system 
or computer data  
• Production, distribution or possession of 
computer misuse tools  
• Breach of privacy or data protection 
measures 
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Computer‐related acts for 
personal or financial gain or 
harm 
• Computer-related fraud or forgery  
• Computer-related identity offences  
• Computer-related copyright or trademark 
offences  
• Sending or controlling sending of Spam  
• Computer-related acts causing personal harm  
• Computer-related solicitation or 'grooming' of 
children 
Computer content‐related acts 
• Computer-related acts involving hate speech  
• Computer-related production, distribution or 
possession of child pornography  
• Computer-related acts in support of terrorism 
offences 
 
2.3.3. Cyber security risks against SMEs 
 
Mobile devices, such as smartphones, laptops, and tablets are widely used in businesses. 
According to Osterman Research (2012), the use of personally owned mobile devices at 
work is a widespread phenomenon in organisations of all sizes. This movement is 
referred to as BYOD. BYOD allows employees to access corporate network and data for 
work via personal gadgets. Examples are accessing corporate e-mail accounts, systems, 
and internal documents. As employees are already familiar with the functionalities of 
their personal devices, BYOD enhances work efficiency and flexibility of users (Gajar, 
Ghosh, & Rai, 2013). For companies, allowing employees to use them for business is a 
good way to save costs and increase productivity (Gupta, Dhiman, & Sangroha, 2013). 
Small companies which lack enough resources are the main beneficiaries. Therefore, 
they are more likely to allow employees to use their personal mobile devices at work.  
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The sheer number of devices used at work represents the extent of connectivity in 
business environments. The widespread adoption of mobile devices at work gives more 
challenges to businesses, posing new security threats to the safety of businesses and 
their customer information (Gajar et al., 2013). As an increasing number of end-point 
devices are connected to the corporate network, it is a new challenge for a company to 
control all the operating systems and applications of employees’ mobile devices. An IT 
team needs to ensure that the connected devices are secure in order to protect data 
assets and network integrity. Small companies are vulnerable to security risks from 
BYOD due to their unpreparedness (Madzima, Moyo, & Abdullah, 2014), whereas large 
companies have resources to adopt mobile device management and corresponding 
policies and procedures.  
 
It is true that the adoption of new ICTs provides small companies with business 
advantages along with challenges mentioned above (Baek & Sohn, 2011). However, 
there is little research on the causes of security risks that they face. Questions such as 
“Are SMEs more vulnerable than large ones?” and “Where does the vulnerability 
originate from?” need to be addressed. Trim and Lee (2015) cautioned against applying 
the same assumptions about cyber security to businesses of all sizes, demanding a 
differential approach to small businesses. Although virtually all organisations house a 
risk and security function in any form, there is a discrepancy from each other based on 
organisational context (Borodzicz, 2005, p. 51). It is therefore of great importance to 
examine the organisational context of SMEs. Some studies (Gupta & Hammond, 2005; 
Truong, 2010) attempted to identify organisational factors which contribute to the 
vulnerability of SMEs in relation to cyber security. 
  
Firstly, the size of an organisation is associated with various aspects of cyber security 
(Organ, 2015). In most cases, the number of employees and the volume of assets 
increase proportionately. When it comes to cyber security, a large company is more 
likely to use risk assessment tools (Bauer & Dutton, 2015) or to accept cyber security 
management (Chang & Ho, 2006; Kwon & Kim, 2017) by tapping into its specialists and 
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financial resources. On the contrary, small companies do not have sufficient supportive 
resources (i.e., IT specialists, budgets, software and hardware) to address cyber security 
threats (Bauer & Dutton, 2015; Harris & Patten, 2014; Kwon & Kim, 2017; Singh et al., 
2013; Truong, 2010). This makes small companies unequipped and unprepared. Gupta 
and Hammond (2005) asserted that there was a significant difference in 
countermeasures between large companies and small ones. For example, in the case of 
cloud computing, a large company is capable of managing cloud-related risks with the 
support of sophisticated risk management and experienced IT teams (Brender & Markov, 
2013; Organ, 2015). Some small owners who are aware of these risks are hesitant to 
adopt cloud computing in spite of its potential benefits due to privacy, security, and data 
integrity reasons (Truong, 2010).  
 
Secondly, decision-making dynamics in small companies are highly leveraged by the 
owners (Blackburn, 2012; Herbane, 2010). Large companies have a hierarchical 
structure with several layers of management to manage resources efficiently 
(Ghobadian & Gallear, 1997). Their decision-making is undertaken through functional 
departments (e.g., marketing, finance, accounting, human resource, and IT). Though 
top-level strategic decisions are conducted by a CEO or board members, most of the 
functional and operational decisions derive from managers. Therefore, decision-making 
is carried out via known, formal, and hierarchical channels. However, small companies 
have a relatively flat organisational structure with an absence of bureaucracy (Levy & 
Powell, 2005). Their management structure is not formalised and changeable based on 
organisational and external influences. This structure may bring in more flexibility, but 
the downside is that this can produce overly reactive and short-term decisions (Grant et 
al., 2014). In fact, SMEs’ decision-making mechanisms are dominated by few decision-
makers (Ghobadian & Gallear, 1997). Decision-making mechanisms are centralised and 
dependent upon the owners (Blackburn, 2012). In this case, knowledge and attitude of 




However, SME owners and managers had an insufficient understanding of the security 
risks and were not aware of possible measures to mitigate the risks (Harris & Patten, 
2014). The owners therefore were not capable of undertaking an intensive evaluation 
of cyber security decisions. This can pose a serious challenge against SMEs in that 
professional competencies are not available to them. Herbane (2010) stated that when 
it comes to risks, small owners were more concerned about financial risks or profits, and 
that risk assessment itself was subjective because of the strong influence of ownership 
over management. He also asserted that the framing of risks was not research-based or 
data-driven, but based on the owner’s experience and knowledge derived from informal 
networks. In addition, preoccupation with daily issues made owners demonstrate a lack 
of concern towards security issues (Bhattacharya, 2011). These justify why business 
owners need to be educated on cyber security risks. Dojkovski, Lichtenstein, and Warren 
(2007) argued that external initiatives such as awareness programmes and scenario-
based approaches were needed to foster business owner support. 
 
For businesses, cybercrime is a potential source of security risk that could have a 
disruptive impact. Cybercrime can be a reliable proxy measure of cyber security threats 
although cybercrime rates cannot represent all potential risks. In the UK, cybercrime has 
been measured recently due to the growing concern of increasing criminal activities in 
cyberspace. The Office for National Statistics published the first estimates of the UK level 
of cybercrime in June 2015. In the following year, the crime survey estimated that the 
number of cybercrime offences was about 2 million and the number of online fraud 
cases was about 3.6 million in the 12 months (Office for National Statistics, 2017). The 
survey also highlighted that traditional or offline crimes were about 6.2 million total 
offenses10 and this figure was on the downward trend. All these figures represented 
that online crimes occurred on the similar magnitude with offline crimes (5.6 million 
versus 6.2 million cases). The sheer volume of the estimated online fraud and computer 
misuse figures were staggering. The scale and severity of cyber fraud were significantly 
larger than expected. Common types of cyber fraud were bank and credit account/card 
                                                          
10 This figure did not include cyber fraud and cybercrime, which were published separately.  
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fraud, theft of personal information on bank accounts, misuse of credit card details, 
along with online shopping scams. 
 





(per 1,000 adults) 
Fraud 3,617 79 
Bank and credit account fraud 2,452 53 
Non-investment fraud 939 20 
Advance fee fraud 118 3 
Other fraud 108 2 
Computer misuse 1,966 43 
Computer virus 1,300 28 




According to the Cyber Security Breaches Survey (Department for Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport, 2018), nearly 47% of small businesses and 64% of medium businesses in the 
UK suffered a security breach in the past 12 months. The survey also suggested a large 
discrepancy in breach cost by business size. The average breach cost estimates were 
higher among medium and large businesses compared to small businesses. Across all 
breaches, micro/small businesses’ mean cost was estimated to be £894, while medium 
businesses’ mean cost was calculated as £8,180. These UK survey results indicate that 
SMEs were targeted by cybercriminals and that the damage was serious enough to merit 
further attention. A security breach could cause problems including minor 
inconvenience, reputational damage, loss of customer data, fines, and, in the worst case, 
company closure. Damage from a breach may have more serious consequences on SMEs 
than large corporations because SMEs generally have no emergency recovery plans and 
capacity to mitigate the damage.  
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2.4. Cyber security risk management frameworks 
 
Risk management is referred to as a series of activities of controlling risk within its 
acceptable level (Raggad, 2010). Cyber security management is not just a selection of 
security controls. A one dimensional process posits that there is a simple causality or 
relationship when it comes to decision-making. However, cyber security management 
involves a series of decision-making processes to select, implement, and maintain the 
proper controls. Security threats change over time and supportive resources are limited. 
Therefore, there is no hard and fast rule regarding an evaluation of effective security 
activities. In this respect, cyber security management is seen as a multi-dimensional 
decision-making process rather than the one-dimensional process in this study. 
 
There are a wide range of variations of risk management frameworks and how they 
should be defined. Such frameworks are proposed by government organisations (e.g., 
National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST] and National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration), international organisations (e.g., European Union Agency for 
Network and Information Security [ENISA]), or international professional associations 
(e.g., ISACA 11 ) as well as prominent scholars (e.g., Raggad). In this section, four 
representative risk management frameworks are suggested.  
 
Raggad (2010) suggested a risk management life cycle which consists of:  
 
(1) risk planning,  
 (2) risk analysis,  
 (3) risk treatment and  
 (4) risk monitoring.  
 
                                                          
11 It was recently announced that ISACA uses its acronym only, although it was previously 
known as the ‘Information Systems Audit and Control Association’. (see: http://www.isaca.org 
/about-isaca/Pages/default.aspx) 
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Risk planning involves developing a preparatory strategy which covers identifying risk 
and assets involved and determining a set of available responses. Secondly, risk analysis 
includes risk identification and risk assessment. Risk can be identified via various 
methods such as vulnerability or threat analysis, event tree analysis, and attack trees. 
These methods intend to identify risk, but using different concepts (i.e., vulnerability, 
threat, or attack). Upon identification, risk is assessed through determining the level of 
risk and the potential impact of the risk. A technique that is widely used is a risk matrix. 
It calculates risk criticality of each asset by measuring the likelihood and impact of the 
risk involved. Risk assessment is useful to prioritise treatment efforts and to measure 
expected benefits resulting from the treatment against the risk impact. These two sub-
stages refine the nature of risk events and consequences of them. Thirdly, risk treatment 
involves the implementation of security controls. Decisions on what sort of security 
controls will be taken, how, and when to take them depend on the risk involved because 
this phase aims to maintain the identified risks to acceptable levels. The last phase is risk 
monitoring. Risk needs to be continuously monitored as existing risks change and new 
ones appear. This process evaluates whether risk is properly under control by revisiting 
the prior phases. The whole phases constitute an iterative process as is described as ‘life 
cycle’. This life cycle is a continuing process that needs to reflect the internal and 




Figure 2.3 Raggad’s risk management life cycle (Raggad, 2010) 
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A COBIT 512 framework from ISACA (2013) consists of similar phases to the Raggad’s risk 
management life cycle. It includes:  
 
 (1) risk identification,  
 (2) risk assessment, 
 (3) risk response and  
 (4) risk monitoring and reporting.  
 
Techniques and methods from the Raggad’s framework can also be used in most of the 
phases here. However, there are some subtle differences. One is an emphasis on risk 
reporting. Risk analysis needs to be reported to managers and owners in order to 
support their decision-making. From practitioners’ point of view, internal reporting of 
risk is a crucial reflection of whether senior management accepts cyber security as a 
priority.  
 
The third phase, risk response, is the same concept with risk treatment in the Raggad’s 
framework. It refers to acting upon the identified risks, aiming to align the residual risks 
within acceptable tolerance. There are four strategies: (1) acceptance, (2) transfer, (3) 
mitigation, and (4) avoidance. Risk appetite is the amount of risk that an organisation is 
willing to accept without acting upon it. If risk is below risk appetite, the risk will be 
accepted. Risk can be transferred to or shared with a third party organisation (e.g., 
purchasing insurance, outsourcing to other organisations, or using cloud computing). 
Also, risk can be mitigated by deploying security controls (e.g., access control policies, 
firewall or recovery plans). The most drastic strategy is risk avoidance. Risk can be 
avoided by shutting down a part of IT system which exposes vulnerabilities or risks in 
question. Although these strategies are explained in the book by Raggad (2010, p. 305), 
they are not indicated as strategies for risk treatment. 
 
                                                          




Figure 2.4 ISACA’s risk management life cycle (ISACA, 2013) 
 
NIST’s framework is also based on a risk approach. It involves the management of 
organisational risk in relation to information system. It consists of six steps (NIST, 2017, 
pp. 9-10):  
 
 (1) it starts by categorising information and its system based upon an impact  
 analysis,  
 (2) select a set of control baseline and adjust it based on risk assessment and  
 organisational conditions,  
 (3) implement the security controls and document how the controls are 
 deployed, 
 (4) assess the security controls using appropriate procedures, 
 (5) authorise the information system operation based upon a determination of 
 the risk and 
 (6) monitor the selected controls in the information system on a regular basis. 
 
This framework is constructed as part of an organisation-wide risk management 
approach (NIST, 2017), putting emphasis on strong engagement of organisational 
resources. Risk concerns are dealt with at three levels: (1) organisation level, (2) 
mission/business process level, and (3) information system level. This approach requires 
risk management to be combined into organisation management. In contrast to other 
frameworks which predominantly focus on aspects of risk, this framework extends the 
scope of risk management. First and foremost, it involves a successful execution of risk 
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management. Methods and processes of undertaking risk management are developed 
in line with organisation management aspects, such as cost-effectiveness, business 
missions, business success, and organisational structure. Secondly, this framework aims 
to protect not only information assets, but also individuals. Impacts or consequences of 
risks against individuals are concerned in this framework.  
 
 
Figure 2.5 NIST’s risk management framework (NIST, 2017, p. 10) 
 
A risk management framework by ENISA (2006) is quite similar to the first two 
frameworks aforementioned in terms of constituting phases. However, it is distinctive 
in that this framework acknowledges risk assessment as a significant part of risk 
management. Risk assessment is perpendicular to several risk management phases (see: 
Figure 2.6). This shows that risk assessment is carried out at discrete time points (e.g., 
quarterly or yearly) to evaluate current risk (ENISA, 2006). One important common 
feature of all the frameworks is that they are presented as iterative processes without 




Figure 2.6 ENISA’s risk management framework (ENISA, 2006, p. 6) 
 
2.5. Management of cyber security and organisational behaviours  
 
2.5.1. Cyber security management measures  
 
Cyber security risk originates from the deep infiltration of IT systems and devices into 
business activities. This creates a management environment in which cyber security is 
no longer confined to an IT department, but requires senior management attention (Lee, 
2013). It implies that cyber security should be accepted as one of the management 
priorities that senior managers are aware of. In this respect, it is highly recommended 
for cyber security professionals to have competent business and management skills 
(Rainer Jr, Marshall, Knapp, & Montgomery, 2007). This approach argues that cyber 
security should be considered in a management context (Chang & Ho, 2006; Singh et al, 
2013; Soomro et al., 2016), becoming core part of business management. This argument 
is in line with Borodzicz and Gibson’s (2006) claim that management of risk and security 
ought to be considered as part of mainstream business management. It is therefore 
worth looking at how cyber security can be intermingled with business management.  
41 
2.5.1.1. Security policy 
 
Security policy outlines what kind of security controls a company adopts and how they 
should be implemented, providing a direction and support to cyber security activities. 
Security policy theorists argue that cyber security policy should be established, 
implemented, and maintained (Hong, Chi, Chao, & Tang, 2003). Creating a policy that 
reflects both internal and external contexts is just the start of cyber security 
management. Establishment of policy requires management concern and support 
toward cyber security. Policy should be formulated first, but implementation of it cannot 
be overemphasised. It is of importance for employees to realise the significance of 
abiding by the policy. Once security policy is adopted, execution of the policy is in the 
hands of employees. One keen interest is how to encourage employees to increase their 
compliance with cyber security policies.  
 
It is argued that cyber security awareness and training are significant factors to raise 
policy compliance (Soomro et al., 2016). Siponen, Mahmood, and Pahnila (2014) argued 
that awareness of employees positively influenced their compliance with security policy, 
and it is also noted that a training program had a positive impact on employees’ 
compliance behaviour (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). 
Siponen et al. (2014) further emphasized the role of senior managers in that they were 
primary facilitators for raising employee awareness. At the same time, senior managers 
need to ponder over how to communicate the policy to end users in a company in order 
to properly implement it. Managerial intervention is an effective measure to make 
employees perceive vulnerability and severity of cyber security threats. Several scholars 
(Doherty, Anastasakis, & Fulford, 2009; Singh et al., 2013) claimed that an existence of 
policy had a causal impact on the effectiveness of cyber security. 
 
As new technologies are introduced, a policy needs to be changed accordingly. It is 
important to review the policy regularly with the changing business environments (Singh 
et al., 2013). This is because every new technology has its own security weaknesses 
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along with business benefits. For example, BYOD and cloud computing have gained 
widespread adoption by SMEs quite recently. Once adopted, they need to be included 
in the scope of the policy. In addition, companies need to ensure that their 
subcontractors and consultants are covered by the policy. It is especially true when 
computer servers of the subcontractors and consultants are foreign-based. Companies 
need to make sure of two things: (1) the servers are physically safe from natural and 
man-made disasters; and (2) they are embedded in secure network environments. The 
same argument can be applied to cloud computing services. How to control new 
technologies and services provided by third parties is a continuous challenge when it 
comes to a cyber security management policy.  
 
2.5.1.2. Senior management support and responsibilities 
 
It is of vital importance to ensure that senior managers in the business support an 
agenda (Aleem et al., 2013), and this is also the case with cyber security management. 
Cyber security management cannot be effective without support from senior 
management (Choi, Jeong, & Kim, 2014). In a business, plans and policies are 
manifestations of various aspects of cyber security management. It is senior 
management that can launch those plans and policies in a balanced and comprehensive 
way (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002). It is important for senior management to accept the 
idea that cyber security is not a technical issue any more but a business one (Kayworth 
& Whitten, 2010). A prerequisite for gaining this support is the change of viewpoint 
regarding cyber security, which means that cyber security strategies are required to be 
aligned with business objectives and needs. If cyber security is not adequately 
interpreted in business terms, it is hard to elicit support from senior managers who are 
familiar with business language. In this respect, cyber security risks should be quantified 
to measure their effects on corporate assets and share price. This is a good way of 
demonstrating that cyber security contributes to business performances. As evidence of 
this, a Korean study argued that perceptions of top management on cyber security 
increased business performances and competitiveness (Choi et al., 2014).  
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One way to institutionalise senior management support is to make some members 
responsible for cyber security. Assigning responsibility to a person or group is generally 
known to elicit more effective results in business management (Mitchell, 1993). It is an 
official announcement of an organisation which conveys its willingness to address 
associated situations. Likewise, designating cyber security responsibility to senior 
management will be recognised as a strong declaration for its focus on cyber security. 
In the hacking case of Hyundai Capital in South Korea, a lack of senior management 
support was pointed out as one of the crucial loopholes (Lee, 2013). A UK survey by 
Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (2017) found that less than a third 
(29%) of UK businesses had board members with responsibility for cyber security. Also, 
there was a large gap across business sectors. Board-level responsibility was most 
common in the finance and insurance sector (54%).  
 
2.5.1.3. Staff training / awareness programme 
 
Internal training and education aim to achieve two objectives: (1) How to prevent and 
minimise insider threat (i.e., human deficiencies) and (2) How to encourage employees’ 
positive attitude and behaviour (i.e., human efficiencies). This perspective posits that 
security breaches stem from employees’ either intentional or unintentional attitudes 
(e.g., ignorance, resistance, apathy, and negligence). Thus, to attain behavioural change 
among employees, their attitude must change first. Considering that insiders can 
normally have access to the entire network from their end devices, their malicious 
activities pose a greater threat to cyber security (Warkentin & Willison, 2009) (see: 
Section 2.3.2.1).  
 
Recent literature considered whether training and education had a causal impact on the 
increase of attitude and behaviour of employees. Albrechtsen and Hovden (2010) 
argued that small-scale workshops effectively improved security awareness and 
behaviour of employees. Continuing in this vein, Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius, 
Pattinson, and Jerram (2014) reported that both training and education positively 
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influenced employees’ attitude and behaviour regarding cyber security policy. Using the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour, Safa et al. (2015) pointed out that training improved 
employees’ awareness. Sequentially, awareness improvement changed their attitude 
and, in turn, the attitude affected security care behaviour in a positive manner. 
International/national standards, such as ISO 2700113, COBIT 5, and NIST 800 series14 in 
a similar vein put emphasis on staff training. However, staff training was not widely used 
as a cyber security practice among SMEs in the UK. Only a quarter (25%) of small firms 
had staff attend training over the year, and the provision of training was commensurate 
with firm size (43% of medium firms and 63% of large firms) (Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport, 2017).  
 
2.5.1.4. Risk management tools 
 
As seen in Section 2.4, risk management aims to maintain risk at acceptable level, and 
measuring risk involves threats, asset values, vulnerabilities and security controls. Risk 
management theory posits that cyber security threats and vulnerabilities can be 
estimated and assessed (Hong et al., 2003). Assessment results inform what sort of 
security requirements and controls need to be adopted. Risk management is an iterative 
process which requires extensive resources.  
 
Identifying risk is a first step. There are various ways of identifying risk, such as business-
as-usual or ad-hoc health checks, internal audit, and threat intelligence (Department for 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 2017). Among the management process, risk 
assessment is recognised as a core part of risk management (ENISA, 2006). To assess risk, 
lots of information is required in advance. Which assets are the threats against? What 
sort of vulnerabilities does a business have? What are values of assets? What is the 
current level of risk? Is it acceptable or not? Based on risk assessment results, a company 
                                                          
13  This is the best-known international standard which recommends a set of policies, 
procedures, documents and technology for managing cyber security. 
14  This series is a collection of documents that include computer security policies, procedures, 
and guidelines of the US federal government.  
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makes a choice for efficient responses. Risk responses for mitigation include technical 
(e.g., access control, encryption, and intrusion detection system), managerial (e.g., 
policies and staff training), and operational controls (e.g., segregation of duties and 
limitation of permissions). Popular security controls that businesses chose are software 
updates, malware protection, firewalls, and data backup (Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport, 2017). There are a wide range of practices for the 
establishment of risk management processes. Therefore, it is of significance for 
businesses to find the most suitable form as they have different business structure and 
operate in a different sector.  
 
International standards (e.g., ISO 27001 and COBIT 5) provide useful guidelines for 
preventing a business from security threats. ISO 27001: 2013 is the most widely 
accepted standard for cyber security management. It is claimed that this standard can 
be adopted in all types of businesses, irrespective of business size, sector, and nature 
(Candiwan, 2014). However, adopting an international standard requires devotion from 
business management because of high costs and the lengthy process involves.  
 
2.5.1.5. Cyber insurance 
 
Insurance is accepted as a means of hedging against potential risks. Businesses 
traditionally have relied on insurance to protect against economic, sociopolitical and 
natural risks. As modern businesses operate on a basis of the Internet or electronic 
networks, they are exposed to another risk, which is called cyber security risk. Cyber 
security scholars (Böhme & Schwartz, 2010; Bolot & Lelarge, 2009) approach insurance 
as a tool to address residual risk after business’ risk reduction efforts. Internationally, 
there are a handful of insurance companies (e.g., American International Group, Lloyds, 
Fidelity, and J.S. Wurzler) which have put cyber security insurance on the market. 
Providing cyber-related insurance policies invokes different concerns from traditional 
ones (Gordon, Loeb, & Sohail, 2003). In particular, setting a realistic price for insurance 
products and high-risk businesses is difficult. Since only known risks are covered by 
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insurance (Borodzicz, 2005, p. 4), a lack of historical records involving cybercrime is a 
great problem (Gordon et al., 2003). In addition, technological elements add more 
complexities. How to consider ever-evolving technologies when creating actuarial tables 
is not a straightforward process; this may explain why academic research on cyber 
insurance is so limited (Öğüt et al., 2011).  
 
A business survey by Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (2017) found that 
around two fifth (38%) of firms said they had insurance which covered a cyber security 
breach or attack. However, only two among 671 businesses filed a claim on this policy. 
The low claim rate compared to a higher breach rate (46%) indicates whether firms were 
not aware of their victimisation or whether they were not well acquainted with the 
insurance policy. A qualitative study in the survey revealed that it took over a year for a 
micro business to make a cyber insurance claim and a senior director from the business 
described the claiming process as stressful.  
 
2.5.2. A balanced approach to security controls 
 
Technical solutions at operational level have been emphasized in dealing with the cyber 
security challenges (Singh et al., 2013). In the early era of research, researchers from 
computer science focused on developing and configuring technical security measures to 
improve operational levels of detection and protection. This trend was reasonable in 
that technical elements are the core parts when it comes to cyber security. As the 
literature on technical aspects of cyber security management increased, deploying 
technical controls for detection and mitigation became the suitable solution. Technical 
controls, such as network security (e.g., firewall, Intrusion Detection System), data 
protection (e.g., encryption), and access controls (e.g., biometrics), were proposed as 
feasible measures to prevent security breaches. Thus far, companies adopted 
technology-oriented security strategies in designing safe business environment, 
stressing the principal role of technology (Siponen, 2005). However, despite the 
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advancement of technical controls, the frequency and severity of cyber security 
breaches continued to rise.   
 
The complexity of technology is one of the biggest challenges not only for security 
practitioners but also for senior managers who make decisions on cyber security 
management (Werlinger et al., 2009). Without proper knowledge of technology, it is 
very hard to understand the nature of cyber threats. To make matters worse, if senior 
managers do not have enough understanding of technology, management decisions 
might be misaligned with the configurations of technical systems.  
 
Against this backdrop, a broader approach was needed. Recent studies (Baek & Sohn, 
2011; Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Herath & Rao, 2009; Parsons et al., 2014; Rhee et al., 2012; 
Safa et al., 2015; Safa et al., 2016) reported that technology alone could not deliver 
satisfactory solutions to security breaches. Along with technical controls, managerial 
support and human behaviour were proposed to be taken into consideration, and these 
are now examined in more detail. 
 
How much a company values management agendas is reflected in resource allocation 
and organisational structure. If cyber security is deemed as one of management 
priorities, a reasonable amount of resources needs to be appropriated for it and there 
needs to be an IT team or professional staff. Employees with IT expertise are needed to 
handle technical security measures. Their training needs to be refreshed on a regular 
basis to keep track of ongoing cyber security issues. In the same way, technological 
systems and gadgets also need to be regularly updated. From the business management 
point of view, it is not straightforward to decide how much resources need to be 
provided for efficient cyber security management. Furthermore, SMEs do not have 
sufficient resources to put into cyber security management. Considering the importance 
of SMEs in the economy, the lack of available internal resources necessitates other 
forms of support such as business-wide initiatives, cooperation between companies, 
and government support.  
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There are two schools of thought in regard to human factors in an organisation. The first 
one considers people a significant part of a security problem or the weakest link (Guo et 
al., 2011; Ifinedo, 2014; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). It is the human behaviour that 
leaves computer systems vulnerable from malicious viruses and worms. This perspective 
evolves around how to efficiently control both intended and unintended human 
behaviours. On the other hand, other studies (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; 
Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Spears & Barki, 2010) recognised that people were not a cause 
of the problem, but one of the most important controls in an organisation. Rhee et al. 
(2012) argued that it was necessary to include human factors in cyber security 
management along with technical dimensions. This perspective is based on the 
assumption that humans actually deploy, configure, and maintain technology systems 
after an organisation adopts technical controls through managerial decisions. Thus, it is 
of vital importance to understand employees’ attitude and behaviour on cyber security 
for successful implementation of policies and procedures. However, it is not reasonable 
to take a dichotomous approach to human factors. In fact, humans make errors, but also 
correct problems at the same time. It is equally important to understand the advantages 
and disadvantages of human factors. How to view the role of humans in relation to cyber 
security management is dependent upon the perspective of a researcher.  
 
Numerous studies have been carried out to comprehend human-computer interactions 
in relation to cyber security. Improving individual attitude and behaviour was recognised 
as one of the effective methods of enhancing cyber security (Baek & Sohn, 2011; Crossler 
et al., 2013; Li, Zhang, & Sarathy, 2010). The primary concern was to identify determining 
factors that have a positive impact on compliant perceptions and behaviours of end 
users (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Safa et al., 2015; Safa et al., 2016). 
Safa et al. (2015) found that security awareness, policy, experience and involvement, 
attitudes, subjective norms, threat appraisal, and self-efficacy positively influenced 
users’ behaviour. Based on social bond theory and involvement theory, Safa et al. (2016) 
argued that knowledge sharing, collaboration, intervention, experience, commitment, 
and personal norms had a significant influence on employees’ attitude. In relation to risk 
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perception, Johnston & Warkentin (2010) found that fear appeals had a positive impact 
on changing end users’ behavioural intentions. This study provided security managers 
with the practical insight that fear-inducing communications could be customised based 
on perceptions of end users. Unlike these studies, Baek and Sohn (2011) studied the 
impact of security awareness and behaviour on security performance in Korean SMEs, 
and identified a positive influence.  
 
Some studies (Kayworth & Whitten, 2010; Young & Windsor, 2010) approached cyber 
security through integrating managerial and technical processes. Kayworth and Whitten 
(2010) argued that a combination of technical competence and socio-organisational 
factors made it more possible to ensure effective cyber security, while Young and 
Windsor (2010) found out that integrating cyber security and business planning 
processes efficiently and effectively protected information assets. 
 
Taking a more holistic approach, some studies (Singh et al., 2013; Singh et al., 2014; 
Werlinger et al., 2009) suggested that management and human aspects are crucial 
elements, along with technology, in establishing a cyber security management system. 
Those studies took a different perspective on technological, managerial, and human 
factors. First, Singh et al. (2013) viewed them as controls that could be managed by a 
company. Secondly, Werlinger et al. (2009) and Singh et al. (2014) regarded them as 
challenges that created difficulty implementing security controls. Despite the different 
perspectives, a commonality is that those studies took an integrated view of 
technological, managerial, and human factors in cyber security management.  
 
The balanced approach has become important as people have realised that technical 
aspects cannot be the sole solution to security breaches. Technical, managerial, and 
human controls are indispensable elements to form an effective system. However, 
finding an optimum point in the combination of these controls may vary according to 
the context in which a company is positioned as well as the goals and strategies of the 
company. Regardless of circumstantial differences, the adoption and maintenance of 
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cyber security management, based on the balanced approach, could be the fundamental 
basis of ensuring survivability of a company. More studies need to be performed 
concerning the relationships and interplay of these controls.  
 
 
Figure 2.7 Three components of a balanced approach to cyber threats 
 
2.5.3. Knowledge for risk reduction 
 
Knowledge is “the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject, fact, information, 
value, or skill achieved through education or experience” (Safa et al., 2016, p. 72). It is 
an invaluable asset that can bring a competitive edge to businesses by supporting cost 
reduction, asset distribution and decision-making processes. In knowledge management, 
making the best use of knowledge is to share it (Wang & Noe, 2010). Knowledge sharing 
needs to be emphasised in cyber security in that any employee without a proper 
knowledge can be a weakest point from cyber threats. Cyber security knowledge sharing 
is of significance in raising users’ awareness as well as reducing cyber security risks (Safa 
et al., 2016).  
 
There is a great body of studies which address the relationship between knowledge and 
risk mitigation (Arachchilage & Love, 2014; Asgharpour, Liu, & Camp, 2007; Ben-Asher 
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& Gonzalez, 2015; Cranor, 2008; Han & Yoo, 2016; Parsons et al., 2015). Several studies 
noted that knowledge had a positive impact on various dimensions of cyber threats. 
Arachchilage and Love (2014) found that the combination of conceptual and procedural 
knowledge positively influenced phishing threat avoidance behaviour. Evaluating the 
role of knowledge on threat detection, Ben-Asher and Gonzalez (2015) found that cyber 
security knowledge increased correct detection of malicious attacks. They argued that 
threat detection was the dimension that knowledge could be taken advantage of. 
However, there is another aspect which requires consideration. The causal relationship 
between knowledge and risk mitigation is facilitated through decision-making processes 
(Ben-Asher & Gonzalez, 2015). In other words, risk mitigation is a desirable result of the 
decision-making process which is conditioned by knowledge. For example, more 
knowledge of security policies is related to behavioural compliance to those policies 
(Parsons et al., 2014). This is why knowledge is recognised as an indispensable element 
in making risk-reducing decisions (Cranor, 2008). From a slightly different aspect, it was 
argued that cyber security knowledge by top management could mitigate risks by 
changing perceptions and behaviours of employees (Han & Yoo, 2016). 
 
Other studies focused on a disparity between individuals with knowledge (e.g., cyber 
security experts) and those without knowledge (e.g., business managers and general 
employees). Cyber security experts in general are aware of the nature of risks and 
threats and technical elements of their IT environments. Therefore these experts are 
expected to make better decisions than inexperienced ones (Ben-Asher & Gonzalez, 
2015).  
 
Asgharpour et al. (2007) studied psychological aspects of the relationship between 
computer security knowledge and risk management. The authors suggested that 
individuals with knowledge had different mental models from non-experts. Furthermore, 
they went on to argue that the gap between mental models of experts and non-experts 
caused risk miscommunication, which led to ineffective risk management. A mental 
model is a cognitive conception on real interactions and events around a person 
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(Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom, & Atman, 2002). Knowledge governs a formation of a 
mental model, which in turn influences decision-makings. If an input-output analysis is 
applied, an extent of knowledge as an input will generate different outcomes (e.g., 
security controls or policies) though the mental model and decision-making process.  
 
The studies above imply that there is a considerable gap between cyber security 
professionals and laymen on the level of knowledge, decision-making, and approaches 
to risk management. This knowledge gap has led cyber security professionals and 
business managers to become concerned with a different set of important issues. Rainer 
Jr et al. (2007) found that business managers focused on managerial-oriented issues, 
such as backup and recovery, business continuity planning, and access controls, whereas 
cyber security professionals attended to technological-oriented issues, such as firewalls, 
layered defence, and risk mitigation. The authors pointed out the importance of moving 
toward each other for effective cyber security management.  
 
This raises a pressing question for cyber security management: What sort of cyber 
security management strategies or practices would be efficient to address this problem? 
To bridge the gap, cyber security management practices, such as awareness 
programmes and training, need to be provided to employees. However, these practices 
in reality are neither widely adopted nor well-structured for the long-term 
implementation. In the UK, a fifth of businesses (20%) have provided internal or external 
training on cyber security in the last 12 months and the provision of training centred on 
senior management (75%) and IT staff (43%) rather than general staff (31%) 
(Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 2017). More training for IT staff 
rather than general staff is not expected to reduce the knowledge gap. An existence of 
the gap gives a profound implication on cyber security management. The knowledge gap 
can lead to inefficient risk communication (Asgharpour et al., 2007), and this can be a 
cause for conflict between professionals and laymen.  
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2.5.4. Cyber security culture as an adaptation of organisational culture 
 
It is argued that an effective cyber security culture has a significant influence on the 
management of cyber security (AlHogail & Mirza, 2014b; Mahfuth, Yussof, Baker, & Ali, 
2017; Parsons et al., 2015). In a study by Knapp, Marshall, Rainer and Morrow (2004), 
organisational culture was identified as 7th key issue by 874 certified information 
security professionals. Cyber security culture is a certain form of organisational culture. 
Before examining the theoretical foundation of cyber security culture, organisational 
culture needs to be understood. There is a lack of consensus on the definition of culture 
as a concept (Pfeffer, 1997). Organisational culture has been attempted for 
conceptualisation from various aspects. Organisational culture can be seen as a set of 
criteria that distinguish one organisation from another (Robbins & Judge, 2013, p. 512) 
and as a mechanism that binds old and new members of the organisation together 
(Stroh, Northcraft, & Neale, 2002, p. 297). The organisational culture not only influences 
perceptions, behaviours, and decision-makings of employees (Parsons et al., 2015), but 
also it is shaped by them along with organisational visions, goals, and strategies.  
 
Schein (2010) describes organisational culture as: 
 
“a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as 
the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.” (p. 18)  
 
This definition emphasises patterning, integration, and shared learning experiences. 
What does culture imply? Culture has several characteristics, such as structural stability, 
depth, breadth, and integration (Schein, 2010, p. 16). Culture develops through a 
socialisation process and social learning over time. It is not a static concept, but rather 
a dynamic phenomenon (Borodzicz, 2005, p. 39). If shared assumptions exist in an 
organisation, culture can act as a mechanism of social control as new comers will be 
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taught through social interactions with older members. O’Reilly and Chatman’s 
definition (1996, p. 160) is based on managerial perspectives, viewing culture as a form 
of organisational control. They define organisation culture as “a system of shared values 
(that define what is important) and norms that define appropriate attitudes and 
behaviours for organizational members (how to feel and behave)” (p. 160). They argue 
that a strong culture is maintained if the norms and values are “widely shared and 
strongly held throughout the organization” (p. 166).  
 
A better way to understand culture is to decompose it into three levels: artefacts, values, 
and underlying assumptions (Schein, 2010, p. 24). Level one is artefacts, which are 
observable manifestations such as structures or processes. Language, technology and 
products are examples. Level two is espoused values. These are shared values which an 
organisation wants to uphold and pursue. Artefacts are visible manifestations of these 
values. Level three is underlying assumptions, which are based on unconscious 
perceptions and thoughts. Underlying assumptions are closely linked to one’s cognitive 
and interpersonal worldview. These are formulated when a certain strategy or solution 
proves to be successful (Schein, 2010, p. 28). Upon the success of the strategy, related 
values behind the strategy are to be taken for granted, which become shared tactic 
assumptions. 
 
As a subset of organisational culture, cyber security culture mirrors fundamental 
elements of organisational culture. As such, it is reasonable to theorise cyber security 
culture in relation to organisational culture. A cyber security culture evolves based on 
social interactions of employees as well as perception and behaviour that employees 
show within the context of cyber security. This is why most cyber security culture 
frameworks are adapted from organisational culture. In this research, a definition from 
Da Veiga and Eloff (2010) will be adopted for two reasons: (1) this reflects cyber security 
needs within the context of the organisational culture and (2) this is comprehensive 
enough to cover the large scope of this research. The following is the definition:  
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 “the attitudes, assumptions, beliefs, values and knowledge that 
 employees/stakeholders use to interact with the organisation’s systems and 
 procedures at any point in time. The interaction results in acceptable or 
 unacceptable behaviour (i.e., incidents) evident in artefacts and creations that 
 become part of the way things are done in the organisation to protect its 
 information assets.” (p. 198) 
 
2.5.5. Cyber security culture frameworks 
 
A cyber security culture framework has not been studied much by researchers. Among 
62 papers from 2003 to 2013 which involved cyber security culture (Alhogail & Mirza, 
2014a), only 14 papers presented the frameworks (AlHogail, 2015). The Table 2.6 shows 
the main thesis of the studies with regard to the frameworks. This reveals that the 
frameworks touched on different aspects of the culture and shed light on various 
associations of the culture with other factors.  
 
Table 2.6: Summary of papers which presented a framework in security culture (2003-
2013) (adapted from Alhogail & Mirza, 2014b) 
Study Main thesis of the framework presented by the study 
Chia, Maynard, & 
Ruighaver (2003) 
An adaptation of an organisational culture framework by Detert, 
Schroeder, and Mauriel (2000) to a security culture framework 
Schlienger & Teufel 
(2003) 
An analysis of information security culture based on the model by 
Schein (2010) 
Zakaria (2006) 
Identifying data collection techniques in information security 
culture research 
Koh, Ruighaver, 
Maynard, & Ahmad 
(2005) 
Analysing how security governance changes the security culture 
Chang & Lin (2007) 
Quantifying the impacts of organisational culture traits on the 
effectiveness of implementing information security management 
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Ruighaver, Maynard, & 
Chang (2007) 
Defining the concept of information security culture using Detert 
et al. (2000) 
Dojkovski et al. (2007) 
Developing an information security culture in SMEs in a national 
setting 
Lim, Chang, Maynard, 
& Ahmad (2009) 
Determining to what extent the information security culture is 
embedded into organisational culture 
Alnatheer & Nelson 
(2009) 
Understanding information security culture in the Saudi context 
Alfawaz, Nelson, & 
Mohannak (2010) 
Classifying and organising the characteristics of organisational 
subjects involved in information security practices 
Da Veiga & Eloff (2010) 
Comprehensive framework to establish information security 
culture 
Van Niekerk & Von 
Solms (2010) 
Developing an information security culture in SMEs by 
emphasising the important role of business owner support. 
 
Among these studies, three studies (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Dojkovski et al., 2007; Van 
Niekerk & Von Solms, 2010) will be reviewed. These three are chosen because of 
comprehensiveness of their frameworks. The remainder of these studies failed to 
provide a holistic view which incorporated the human, managerial, and technical 
dimensions (Alhogail & Mirza, 2014b).  
 
Drawing on the three levels model by Schein (2010), Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2010) 
added an additional level, which was knowledge. The authors argued that cyber security 
knowledge was the fundamental basis for the three layers to be created. A clear benefit 
of adding knowledge is that this allowed a deeper understanding of culture and 
interactions among its underlying layers. The conceptual framework in the study can be 
quite useful in diagnosing whether the security culture is stable or secure. The authors 
also emphasised creation and transfer of knowledge to build a constructive security 
culture. As a good method for this, they suggested awareness campaigns to educate 
employees to attain a good understanding of cyber security itself as well as 
environmental settings.  
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Da Veiga and Eloff (2010) proposed a comprehensive framework based on two 
propositions: (1) cyber security component categories such as leadership, governance, 
policies influence cyber security behaviours on individual, group, and organisational 
tiers and (2) the behaviours cultivate the levels of cyber security culture (i.e., basic 
assumptions, values, and artefacts). It is important to note that this framework links 
behaviour on the three tiers to the security culture. This brings a practical implication. 
Despite its complexity, this framework can provide a clear indication which component 
category needs to be strengthened to change the behaviour or which cyber security 
behaviour is influential in cultivating the culture.  
 
However, these two frameworks limited the scope of research within their 
organisational settings, overlooking the national environment. Dojkovski et al. (2007) 
explored cyber security culture of Australian SMEs in a national context in which they 
operated. A major difference of this framework from the two is that this framework 
factors in external influences and initiatives such as national culture, government 
initiative, and vendors. Cyber security culture is considered as an output of interactions 
between external influences and organisational ones. In other words, the security 
culture is shaped by organisational influences which are conditioned by the national 
influences and initiatives. The scope of this conceptual framework fits into the scope of 
this research.  
 
Cyber security culture aims at protecting information assets by influencing employees’ 
perceptions and behaviour (Alhogail & Mirza, 2014b). There has been a predominant 
consideration that fostering cyber security culture is a requisite for addressing insider 
threats (Dhillon, 2001; Dojkovski et al., 2007; Magklaras & Furnell, 2004) or a viable 
countermeasure to threats incurred by human factors (Reid & Van Niekerk, 2014). 
However, does security culture deal with insider misuse threat only? What about 
external threats? Employees are willingly or unwillingly engaged in risky behaviours 
which expose vulnerabilities of information systems to external threats. Some good 
examples are clicking unknown e-mail attachments, downplaying formidable threats, 
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and ignoring security policies or protocols. Most hackers and cybercriminals rely on 
social engineering techniques. Social engineering refers to “the use of social disguises, 
cultural ploys, and psychological tricks to get employees of a company to assist hackers 
in their illegal intrusion or use of computer systems and networks” (Erbschloe, 2004, p. 
61). A vital communication tool, e-mail, is seriously abused by cybercriminals for 
breaching computer systems. In 2016, one in 131 emails was found to contain malware 
(Symantec, 2017). As a primary source of external threats, e-mail attachments need an 
insider’s engagement (e.g., clicking) for execution. This example shows that insiders’ 
behaviour can be either a facilitator or inhibitor of external threats. In this respect, 
security culture can take a role in motivating insiders to be vigilant to external threats. 
This is not reducing human errors, but strengthening positive human behaviours which 
can prevent or mitigate threats.  
 
2.5.6. The role of managers and their leadership  
 
A growing body of cyber security studies addressed the role of senior managers. The 
role of senior management has been examined in relation to various organisational 
factors. Many studies found that senior management support was a significant factor in 
fostering cyber security culture within a business. Knapp, Marshall, Rainer, and Ford 
(2006) found that top management support had a positive causal impact on both cyber 
security culture and policy enforcement. The authors achieved the credibility of the 
study by using a mixed method strategy. Firstly, they used open-ended questions to 
develop a survey instrument, and secondly, tested hypotheses with survey results. In 
line with this study, Dutta and McCrohan (2002) argued that senior management had a 
key role in providing the leadership which contributed to nurturing cyber security 
culture. Hu, Dinev, Hart, and Cooke (2012) extended the scope of research on this topic. 
Their conceptual model included organisational culture as having mediating effects. Top 
management participation had a positive impact on cyber security compliance 
behaviour of employees and the impact was mediated by organisational culture.  
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Some studies concerned the impact of top management structure on cyber security 
management. Kwon, Ulmer, and Wang (2012) asserted that the involvement of an IT 
executive in top management and the amount of his/her compensation were negatively 
associated with the likelihood of cyber security breaches. In a similar vein, Higgs, Pinsker, 
Smith, and Young (2016) contended that creation of a board-level technical committee 
was effective in mitigating cyber security breaches. These studies indicate that better 
treatment of IT staff and managers within an organisation is expected to have risk 
mitigation effects.  
 
Leadership is the ability to influence a group in order to attain a set of goals (Robbins & 
Judge, 2013, p. 368). It can be displayed by any member in a group and is not an exclusive 
province of a few members at the top (Bass & Riggio, 2006, p. 2). Not all managers are 
considered leaders. While managers focus on business affairs from management 
aspects, such as budgeting, staffing, and problem solving, leaders motivate and inspire 
employees for an organisational change by presenting achievable visions (Stroh et al., 
2002, pp. 250-251). Based on formal positions, however, managers are more likely to 
become leaders due to their managerial roles within an organisation. Cyber security 
managers are responsible for safeguarding IT systems and employees of an organisation 
from cyber security threats. To accomplish this goal, cyber security managers need to 
urge and persuade employees to partake in maintaining cyber security. However, they 
do not have an authority to order and discipline general employees, but they can reveal 
leadership in order to inspire and motivate those employees to change their attitude 
and behaviour (Choi, 2016). The most crucial moment when leadership is needed is crisis 
situations. Since modern crisis involves complex threats and contexts, effective crisis 
leadership should not be one-dimensional, but should take multiple features into 
consideration. For example, Devitt and Borodzicz (2008) proposed interwoven 
leadership by balancing significant features, such as interpersonal skills, personal 
attributes, stakeholders’ awareness, and task skills in any response. 
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Using a survey data of Korean SMEs, Yoo (2014) found that the leadership of senior 
management had a significant influence on the implementation of cyber security 
controls. However, the operational definition of leadership was problematic because it 
did not adequately reflect the concept. The author used ‘degree of importance that top 
management thinks about information security’ as operational definition of leadership 
of top management. However, this operational definition does not capture the nature 
and components of leadership. Instead, it can be better captured by another concept, 
‘priority’ rather than ‘leadership’. 
 
Among various leadership styles, transformational leadership has been applied to the 
context of cyber security in a company. Transformational leadership inspires and 
motivates followers to attain unexpected outcomes, emphasising intrinsic motivation, 
positive development, and satisfaction of followers (Bass & Riggio, 2006, p. xi). This 
leadership is comprised of four components: (1) idealised influence or charisma, (2) 
inspirational motivation, (3) intellectual stimulation, and (4) individualised consideration 
(Bass, 1985). In the context of cyber security, a transformational leader suggests a clear 
vision of cyber security management and shows followers how to achieve related goals 
(Flores & Ekstedt, 2016). Transformational leadership is found to be effective in various 
aspects of cyber security management. Flores and Ekstedt (2016) contended that 
transformational leadership had a positive impact on both security culture and 
employee’s security awareness. Drawing on data from public institutions in Korea, Choi 
(2016) asserted that transformational leadership by cyber security managers increased 
the effectiveness of cyber security. It was also revealed that the enforcement and 
relevance of cyber security policies had mediating effects in the causal relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables.  
 
2.6. The UK cyber security governance  
 
It should be noted that this research drew on multiple sources within the UK to reflect 
its cyber security context. This was because the UK’s cyber security framework was 
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taken as a conceptual model as well as a conceptual lens against which conditions in 
South Korea were examined. The UK’s framework was used as a tool which was adapted 
to fit South Korean context. The relevance of the UK’s framework to South Korea is fully 
expressed in Section 3.4.4. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, as this research was 
carried out in the UK, and for the UK audience it would be more understandable if the 
UK context is presented to explain this emerging phenomenon. Secondly, in South Korea, 
the UK’s cyber security governance is praised for its high standard. The UK’s governance 
is often referred to as a benchmark against which cyber security governance of South 
Korea could be assessed (e.g., Kim, 2017; Kwon & Seok, 2016). Thirdly, the questions in 
the survey questionnaire were built upon a set of questions that HM Government 
(Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 2016, 2017, 2018) used to investigate 
the cyber security situation in the UK – for more details (see: Section 5.1). 
 
2.6.1. The cyber security structure 
 
Taking a top-down approach, the UK’s cyber security structure exhibits a logical 
consistency from the Cabinet Office to operational law enforcement agencies. The 
whole structure is derived from the National Security Strategy which selects cyber-
attacks as one of the six highest priority (Tier One) risks alongside terrorism, 
international military conflict, public health, major natural hazards, and instability 
overseas (HM Government, 2015). The next stage concerns cyberspace. Lying within the 
National Security Strategy, the National Cyber Security Strategy focuses on securing 
cyberspace to stimulate growth as well as protecting society (HM Government, 2016). 
Both of the strategies are administered by the Cabinet Office. When establishing a 
strategy or expecting a possible cyber-attack, it is a higher entity that renders the 
decision whether to take a law enforcement or national security approach (Clark, Berson, 
& Lin, 2014). In the UK, the higher entity is the Cabinet Office. The alignment of the two 
hierarchical strategies is also found in other countries in Europe. In a comparative study, 
Guitton (2013) found that the UK, France and Germany adopted the national cyber 
security strategy which was in line with their national security strategy.  
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The National Cyber Security Strategy goes down to cybercrime level, which is diverted 
into two streams. Whereas the National Cyber Crime Strategy / Serious and Organised 
Crime Strategy deal with general online crimes, the National Fraud Strategy specifically 
targets online fraud. The latter is an independent strategy which only handles fraud 
because it does serious harm to the public and business. Fraud is exacerbated by their 
scale and reach because of the use of networked computers and other ICTs. The UK 
statistics (Office for National Statistics, 2017) supported this argument by presenting 
that in 2016 cyber fraud accounted for about two-thirds (64.8%) of the total cybercrime 
in the UK. Finally, a framework for internet investigations was set up to implement 
cybercrime strategies at local forces on an operational level (National Police Chiefs’ 
Council, 2015).  
 
 
National Security Strategy 
(Cabinet Office) 
 
 ↓  
 
National Cyber Security Strategy 
(Cabinet Office - Cyber and Government Security Directorate) 
 
 ↓  
National Cyber Crime Strategy / 
Serious and Organised Crime Strategy 
(Home Office) 
 
National Fraud Strategy 
( City of London Police) 
↓  ↓ 
 
Framework for internet investigations 
(National Police Chiefs’ Council) 
 
Figure 2.8 The UK’s cyber security structure 
 
2.6.2. Related government departments and agencies 
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Firstly, the Cyber and Government Security Directorate (CGSD)15 in the Cabinet Office 
takes the lead in building a national cyber security governance framework. This unit is 
responsible for all aspects of government protective security, including the delivery of 
the National Cyber Security Strategy and the management of National Cyber Security 
Programme (NCSP) (Cabinet Office, 2018). As a policy and standards body, the CGSD 
prioritises cyber security agendas and provides strategic direction for the related 
departments and agencies.  
 
Secondly, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) under Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is an organisation which provides advice and 
support for the public and private sector organisations on cyber security as well as the 
management of cyber security incidents (House of Commons, 2017). The NCSC was 
established in October 2016 as a result of amalgamating several government 
organisations, such as Communications-Electronics Security Group (i.e., the information 
security arm of GCHQ), the Centre for Cyber Assessment, and Computer Emergency 
Response Team UK (UK-CERT). As the UK’s technical authority on cyber security, the 
NCSC is aimed at reducing the cyber security risk to the UK by raising cyber resilience 
(NCSC, 2017). 
 
Thirdly, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) is a government 
authority made responsible for protecting the national infrastructure 16  from cyber 
terrorism, national or industrial espionage. This centre offers security advice to 
stakeholders, such as other government organisations and business enterprises. 
Because much of the national infrastructure is owned and managed by the private sector, 
it is vital to create a trusted environment with businesses (Cabinet Office, 2011b).  
 
                                                          
15 The Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance was superseded by Cyber and 
Government Security Directorate (CGSD) from 2016 (National Audit Office, 2016). 
16 UK’s critical national infrastructure includes communications, emergency services, energy, 
financial services, food, government, health, transport, water, defence, civil nuclear, space, and 
chemicals (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, n.d.). 
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Fourthly, the main goal of the BIS is to boost economic growth. Its main role is to support 
businesses, consumers and students in developing their innovation and skills in various 
ways. When it comes to cyber security, the BIS is positioned as a conduit for linking 
strategic levels of government organisations such as the NCSC and CPNI to SMEs. 
Compared to the NCSC and CPNI, the BIS keeps a close relationship with SMEs as to 
cyber security, based on interactions with and better understanding of SMEs. Therefore, 
the BIS takes the lead in the creation of detailed information on security schemes such 
as Cyber Essentials and SMEs: What you need to know about cyber security with the 
help of other government organisations.  
 
Fifthly, police organisations, in principle, maintain order in cyberspace and enforce law. 
They are supposed to be first responders to cybercrimes, providing frontline services to 
citizens. However, the effectiveness of the police response to cybercrime has been 
seriously questioned (Loveday, 2017). As evidence of this, Yar (2013, p. 13) argued that 
under-reporting and under-recording of cybercrimes are serious issues (see: Section 
2.6.5). Most regional police forces in the UK either have their own cybercrime units or 
unite with neighbouring forces to provide these services (Wall, 2007/11). This shows 
that the police try to tackle cybercrime on a regional basis. A report from Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC; 2015) questioned the effectiveness of that 
approach, mentioning that cybercrime was not the exclusive domain of a specialist unit 
any more. As cybercrime is on the rise, frontline police officers’ capability of handling 
cybercrimes becomes more important. However, it is noted that frontline officers still 
have insufficient knowledge or skills to deal with cybercrimes (HMIC, 2015).  
 
These main government units can be categorized into three groups: the strategic, 
functional and operational level. The first, the CGSD, concentrates on determining 
priorities and coordinating the cyber security programme on the strategic level. 
Secondly, the NCSC under the GCHQ, and the CPNI are dedicated to achieving their own 
functional missions. These two agencies have a specialised mission, respectively, 
securing cyberspace and protecting national infrastructure. Regardless of the 
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differences in their own duties, their functional goals are aligned with strategic goals. 
Thirdly, the role of the BIS is more tuned to businesses, acting as an advocate for SMEs. 
It ponders what SMEs need and how SMEs can be protected from security disruptions.  
 
2.6.3. Initiatives to implement national strategies 
 
In order to implement the national strategies, the UK government took a program-based 
approach in the long term. The government carried out two very important initiatives: 
National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP) and Cyber-Security Information Sharing 
Partnership (CiSP). 
 
2.6.3.1. National Cyber Security Programme 
 
The Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance in the Cabinet Office oversaw 
the five-year NCSP from April 2011 to March 2016, which amounted to £860 million 
investment to upgrade the online business environment (National Audit Office [NAO], 
2014). The government-driven programme intended to reach all primary stakeholders. 
One of the priorities of the project was to have a positive impact on perceptions and 
behaviours of commercial organisations and private individuals in relation to cyber 
security by educating and informing end users. A practical version of services such as 
Cyber Essentials and Ten Steps to Cyber Security guidance was launched as part of the 










Table 2.7: Four objectives of the NCSP (NAO, 2014, p. 4) 
 Tackling cybercrime and making the UK one of the most secure places in the 
world to do business 
 Making the UK more resilient to cyber-attack and better able to protect 
interests in cyberspace 
 Helping to shape an open, vibrant and stable cyberspace which the UK public 
can use safely and that supports open societies 
 Building the UK’s cross-cutting knowledge, skills and capability to underpin all 
cyber security objectives 
 
The public audit report by NAO (2014) showed what percentage of budget was allocated 
to private sector engagement and awareness. The program has spent about £19.3 
million from 2011 to 2014 (Years 1 to 3) and £21.1 million from 2014 to 2015 (Year 4). 
Considering that the annual amount for Years 1 to 3 was about £6.4 million on average, 
the allocated expenditure for private sector during Year 4 was approximately 220% more 
than the average amount in the previous 3 years. There is no official document that 
suggests a reason behind this abrupt surge. However, in general, a greater budget 
allocation for a particular purpose comes from the realisation of the importance of the 
purpose. It is likely that the huge increase of expenditure for private sector reflects the 
growing importance of protecting private sector.   
 
Evaluations on the NCSP were carried out separately by Major Projects Authority and 
NAO. These recognised the progress that the NCSP has achieved. As a body that provides 
independent assurance on major projects, the Major Projects Authority has rated the 
Programme as ‘green’17 (Cabinet Office, 2015), the highest rating out of five levels. In 
line with this, the NAO (2014) found that “The Programme’s financial management and 
                                                          
17 According to the description of Delivery Confidence Assessment ratings in the repot (Cabinet 
Office, 2015), green rating is defined as “successful delivery of the project on time, budget and 
quality appears highly likely and there are no major outstanding issues that at this stage appear 
to threaten delivery significantly” (p. 28). 
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governance mechanisms are strong, and have improved over the Programme’s life to 
date” (p. 5). These recognitions represent the overall performance of the NSCP.   
 
The report from the NAO (2014) showed a more detailed picture on how the programme 
made progress in different subcategories. The evaluation was based on a survey from 
respondents across government, industry, and academia. The respondents ranked 
performance in five areas of the NCSP with a score between 1 and 5. The five areas were: 
(1) government’s understanding of the threat, (2) government’s encouragement of 
business to mitigate cyber risk, (3) government’s support to trade and exports, (4) 
government’s efforts in reducing the skills gap, and (5) overall value for money of the 
programme. The results of the survey showed that the second category or 
‘government’s encouragement of business to mitigate cyber risk’ was slightly over 3.0. 
This rating score was lower than the scores of three other areas, and only higher than 
that of ‘government’s support to trade and exports’. This survey result questions the 
argument that the NCSP and its derivatives were effective in supporting businesses with 
respect to cyber security. In addition, moving more towards this research topic, the 
report acknowledged that the NCSP has not provided enough guidance to meet the 
demands from SMEs, therefore “having a limited impact with SMEs” (NAO, 2014, p. 5).  
 
2.6.3.2. Cyber-Security Information Sharing Partnership 
 
As a crucial strand of the NCSP, the CiSP was launched in March 2013. This is a 
government-led joint industry initiative, creating a forum to facilitate information 
sharing and increase awareness of cyber threats. When it was set up, only 80 companies 
and 750 individuals joined to participate. However, the number has increased 
significantly since then. As of February 2016, over 1,700 companies and 4,400 individuals 
registered for this service (UK-CERT, n.d.). The core part of the CiSP is the Fusion Cell 
which is composed of an analytical team from both industry and government agencies 
(Cabinet Office et al., 2015). The analysts examine cyber information from various 
sources and produce up-to-date intelligence that benefits stakeholders. Once becoming 
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a member of the CiSP, they cooperatively provide and receive the latest feeds of 
information, contributing to the accumulation of collective knowledge as a result.  
 
The CiSP has changed the scope of its initiatives. In the first place this forum aimed to 
protect critical national infrastructures in the UK, but secondly it has broadened its 
mission into supporting SMEs (Ring, 2013). This change was based on the realisation that 
SMEs were not properly protected even though they were the next target of 
cybercrimes. In order to meet the needs from SMEs, the CiSP needed to change its 
operating strategy because SMEs are scattered across the nation. Working with Regional 
Organised Crime Units, UK-CERT has launched 10 regional nodes of the CiSP (UK-CERT, 
2016). As a continuation of the national CiSP platform, the localisation strategy intended 
to support local businesses in a way that promotes the information sharing of cyber 
security on the regional basis. It represents how the UK government tries to extend 
coverage for local businesses. 
 
The primary expectation from the CiSP is information sharing between government 
organisations and private enterprises. However, the growth in membership does not 
necessarily indicate that the intended information sharing is actually happening. Based 
on the interviews of corporate managers, Ring (2013) argued that information sharing 
occurred in a one-way direction. This argument suggested that government agencies got 
necessary information from private sector partners, but they were unwilling to share 
their information with business people. It is the inherent nature of government 
organisations that they are accustomed to collecting information, but not sharing that 
information.  
 
Another expectation from the CiSP is information diffusion among private companies. 
The participation of companies of all sizes has opened the gate for information diffusion 
from large ones to small ones. Large companies normally have a more structured cyber 
security management with professional staff and knowledge than smaller companies. 
The CiSP provides an opportunity for business people to form informal networks 
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through socialisation. Information diffusion is expected to occur via the networks. 
However, there is a crucial factor that works as an inhibitor of the information diffusion. 
Due to an ongoing escalation of cyber threats, having a stable cyber security 
management system within a company is considered an invaluable business asset. If 
some participating companies in the CiSP are found to be competitors, information 
sharing is the last thing that they do voluntarily. This inhibiting factor can be a challenge 
to sustain information diffusion atmospheres in the CiSP.  
 
2.6.4. Specific schemes on the operational level 
 
There are four large government schemes that directly target SMEs. These are Ten Steps 
to Cyber Security, Cyber Essentials, Innovation Vouchers, and Project FALCON (Fraud 
and Linked Crime Online). These schemes are intended to raise awareness of cyber 
threats and encourage businesses to carry out cyber security management practices.  
 
Firstly, the guidance, Ten Steps to Cyber Security, was published by GCHQ at first in 2012 
to provide concrete advice on how to secure a company’s personal data, networked 
services, and intellectual property (Cabinet Office et al., 2015). Since then, GCHQ has 
continuously updated this guidance to make sure that it kept close relevance to the fast-
changing climate of cyber security.  
 
Secondly, the BIS produced Cyber Essentials working with Information Assurance for 
Small and Medium Enterprises18 and Information Security Forum19 (BIS, 2014). Cyber 
Essentials covers basic hygiene measures of cyber security in corporate IT systems. The 
BIS had worked with the private sector to come up with a preferred organisational 
standard in cyber security. As the response to feedback from businesses, the BIS 
concluded that the next stage after the Ten Steps to Cyber Security guidance was to 
                                                          
18 This is one of five businesses appointed as Accreditation Bodies for certifying against the UK 
Government's Cyber Essentials Scheme.  
19 This is an independent information security organisation with a membership comprising lots 
of the world’s leading companies. 
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make businesses adopt an organisational standard (BIS, 2013). Clearly, this scheme was 
the outcome of continuous cooperation between the government and businesses.  
 
The government’s flagship scheme consists of two parts, requirements for basic 
technical protection from cyber-attacks and assurance framework. While the former 
contains a set of basic technical controls, the latter provides security professionals with 
guidance to carry out different levels of assessment. The problem is that the scheme 
addresses only technical aspects, and does not consider managerial and human controls. 
For example, senior management support and staff education can be principal controls 
to successfully implement technical controls. Without addressing other types of controls, 
it is hard to guarantee the effectiveness of Cyber Essentials.  
 
One distinctive feature of this scheme from others is that it has a certification process. 
The Cyber Essentials certification costs between £200 and £400 at a basic level, which is 
quite affordable for SMEs. The government clearly encourages SMEs to go through the 
certification process. Since October 2014, any government suppliers applying for 
contracts related to handling of personal information and provision of certain ICT 
products and services are required to adopt Cyber Essentials (Crown Commercial Service, 
2014). Although this policy incentivises government suppliers to implement, to a certain 
extent, security controls suggested in the Cyber Essentials (Bauer & Dutton, 2015), no 
information is provided as to what kind of incentive structure is offered to SMEs. An 
appropriate framework regarding incentives should be given to SMEs so that small 
business owners can seriously consider applying for getting a certificate.  
 
Thirdly, Innovation Vouchers worth up to £5,000 are provided to SMEs by the BIS 
(Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport & Vaizey, 2015). The vouchers can be 
used to get advice from external experts to improve business strategies ranging from 
cyber security to intellectual property. Considering that SMEs do not have enough 
budgetary resources to beef up computer systems (see: Section 2.3.3), it is seen as one 
of the tailored schemes of the UK government. Another benefit from this scheme is that 
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it also helps cyber security industry to grow by making SMEs form partnerships with 
cyber security specialists. 
 
The last one is a regional-based programme in London. The Metropolitan Police Service 
initiated Project FALCON in January 2014 within the Specialist, Organised and Economic 
Crime Command for combating fraud and cybercrime through cooperation with other 
key agencies such as National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB), National Cyber Crime 
Unit, and Mayors Office for Policing. Working with the business sector, the Met regularly 
participates in business forums to encourage cybercrime reporting. The whole purpose 
is to build public confidence in a policing capability so that they are confident to carry 
out their business in London. Basically this is aimed at attracting investors and business 
people from around the world. Despite spatial boundedness of the programme within 
London, it has a nationwide effect as cybercrime is not confined to local boundaries.  
 
As derivatives of the NCSP, the four schemes mentioned above intend to improve 
security situations of SMEs in the UK. These governmental measures are not just 
sporadic initiatives to deal with separate cyber threats, but coordinated efforts to 
formulate a set of structures that handle constantly changing cyber security risks. From 
the policy point of view, they can be analysed as the UK government’s ongoing process 
of embedding cyber security values in SMEs.  
 
There are two positive features of these schemes. Firstly, they are aligned with national 
strategies from the higher level. It implies that goals and values of National Security 
Strategy and Cyber Security Strategy are incorporated into these operational schemes. 
Starting to defend critical infrastructures and government organisations, the UK’s cyber 
security structure has broadened its scope into protecting SMEs. On the national scale, 
the proper alignment of a set of strategies and schemes is the most vital element to gain 
expected outcomes. Secondly, they are intended to raise awareness of SMEs without 
mandating security standards through legislation and regulation. If the government 
attempted to use regulative measures, this must have given SMEs managerial and 
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financial burdens. Considering that cyber security is a relatively new risk to SMEs, the 
government’s focus on raising awareness corresponds to what SMEs actually need. 
However, there is a weakness in non-regulatory measures. Whether to implement 
suggestions from the schemes is left to the discretion of SMEs depending on their 
business situations. It gives more flexibility to SMEs, but at the same time it decreases 
the certainty of the implementation of the schemes. In fact, the UK Cyber Security 
Breaches Surveys (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 2017, 2018) found 
that the government’s schemes and standards were not widely known in SMEs. In 
particular, SMEs had low awareness of Cyber Essentials and Ten Steps to Cyber Security 
which were directly launched as part of the NCSP. The surveys also indicated that 
medium firms tended to be more aware of each of these schemes than small firms.  
 
A great challenge worth noting is that quantifying and measuring the effectiveness of 
these schemes is difficult. This limitation is generally applied to most government 
policies. Without rigorous evaluation of government policies, no one can confidently say 
that they have a significant impact on targeted groups. In reality, embarking on empirical 
research on the schemes on a national scale requires commitment of time and cost. This 
may be why there have been few empirical investigations into the performance of the 
NCSP and its schemes.  
 
2.6.5. A reporting mechanism 
 
Cybercrime is divided into three categories. These are crimes in the machine (e.g., 
obscene or racist material), crimes using the machine (e.g., fraud related), and crimes 
against the machine (e.g., hacking) (Wall, 2007/11). The first category, crimes in the 
machine, is reported to Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), an independent organisation 
created in 1996 by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to fight against obscene imagery. 
The IWF assesses the reports and chooses whether to act upon them or pass them on 
to the UK Police, IWF equivalents, and Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre. 
The second category, crimes using the machine, is related to cyber fraud. Action Fraud 
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is the central reporting system20 which receives online fraud reports as well as other 
types of cybercrime reports, and transfers the reports to the NFIB. The NFIB uses a 
scoring system which decides whether a report should be reviewed or not (NFIB, 2013). 
If an aggregate value of a report reaches the predetermined critical value, the NFIB will 
review the report and, if necessary, disseminate it to appropriate local police force for 
further action21 (Action Fraud, n.d.). The last category, crimes against the machine, is 
reported to UK CERT. Cybercrimes of this category, particularly hacking, consist of 
technical elements and its consequences can be nationwide or international. Therefore, 
it requires responses from national agencies, such as National Cyber Crime Unit, Serious 
Fraud Office, and security services. 
 
It is noticeable that the UK reporting mechanism includes private organisations and 
international partners such as IWF, Interpol, and Virtual Global Taskforce. This 
mechanism corresponds with the notion of Wall (2007, p. 183) that the role of the public 
police should be understood within internet governance. Providers of the internet 
governance include ISPs, governmental non-police agencies, corporate entities, non-
government/non-police hybrids, and so on (Wall, 2007, p. 168). Though the reporting 
mechanism is part of internet governance, the mechanism and internet governance 
share the important assumption that policing cyberspace cannot be solely secured by 
the public police. The broad range of partnerships with non-public entities will ensure 
that policing the internet will be more feasible. The networked nodes will enable them 
to take preemptive measures (e.g., shutting down child abuse websites) as well as to 
clamp down on cybercriminals beyond their jurisdictions.  
 
In terms of the scale of participating nodes, the cybercrime reporting mechanism is quite 
similar to the ‘fraud justice network’ which encompasses the multiple public and private 
systems of justice as well as criminal justice system (Button, Tapley, & Lewis, 2013). 
                                                          
20 Even when online victims go to local police stations for cybercrime report, they are referred 
to Action Fraud.  
21 The NFIB sends organised cybercrime or high-profile cases to Regional Organized Crime Units 
and individual or minor cybercrime cases to local police forces.   
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Individual victims of fraud could depend on not only public but also private and 
voluntary sectors at the reporting, reported, and criminal justice stage. Because fraud 
covers a wide range of illegal and immoral behaviours (Button et al., 2013), it is hard to 
pin down and categorise all relevant behaviours. Therefore, it seems reasonable to have 
this complex network to address the very diverse offence. One downside from the 
complexity of the network is that fraud victims could have difficulty in deciding who to 
report to. This is different from the cybercrime reporting mechanism. While dozens of 
report receiving bodies exist in the fraud justice network (Button et al., 2013), each 
category of cybercrime has a single point of contact for the public (i.e., IWF, Action Fraud, 
and UK CERT) (Downing, 2011). In the cybercrime reporting mechanism, other public, 
private, and international organisations have a different role as a participating node, but 
not as a report receiving entity.  
 
Receiving cybercrime reports by a single channel will give an advantage of developing 
its expertise in three aspects: (1) information gathering, (2) data analysis, and (3) 
information diffusion. The single point of contact can provide a clear guidance to victims 
and this will be a factor that encourages victims to make a report. From the victims’ 
point of view, the ease of contacting is of great benefit. Secondly, the analysis of a 
massive volume of cybercrime reports in one node has more chances to generate 
meaningful intelligence that other organisations may be interested in. For example, 
collected information can be analysed by Big Data technologies, which increase the 
possibility of identifying large-scale patterns in human activities (Boyd & Crawford, 
2012). Thirdly, this can lead to an effective diffusion process. Once the data analyses are 
undertaken, some results need to be shared with other organisations. Rather than 
diffusing information from multiple nodes, information diffusion via a single node 
ensures this happens in a structured manner. Considering that crime-related 
information may contain sensitive data, the diffusion process should be managed and 
controlled with great caution.  
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The reporting mechanism presented by Wall (2007/11) is the broad architecture 
concerning how cybercrime reports are transferred via participating nodes. However, 
the mechanism does not indicate whether they work well in practice, and few empirical 
investigations have been carried out to date. Though the structure of the reporting 
mechanism seems quite organised in a way that facilitates cybercrime reporting, under-
reporting and under-recording are still recognised as serious issues (Yar, 2013, p. 13). 
Individuals and companies may not know whether they are victimised or may be 
reluctant to acknowledge their victimisation. Another explanation may be that victims 
do not expect the police to solve cybercrimes (Wall, 2007, p. 165). The under-reporting 
and under-recording are contributing factors that give rise to “dark figures" of 
cybercrime (Yar, 2013, p. 13).  
 
In terms of police responses to cybercrime reports, a challenge emanates from an 
unfavourable working environment and a lack of adequate skills. The impact of 
cybercrime spreads over various jurisdictions, which requires the attention of several 
local forces. However, local forces have their own local priorities set by an elected 
Commissioner (Wall, 2005/15). In general, the police work in two ways: (1) capacity-
building to follow a recent crime trend and (2) cooperation with international and 
private organisations to increase their readiness. The normative role of the police apart, 
actual performance of police activities is often questioned. According to Hunton (2010), 
cybercrime investigation requires the combination of technical and non-technical 
disciplines and investigative skills. His argument indicates that cybercrime investigators 
need to have higher levels of qualifications. However, the police lacked responses to 
cybercrimes (Sommer, 2004) and professional skills (Leukfeldt, Veenstra, & Stol, 2013). 
In recent years, these problems have been exacerbated by budget cuts of the 
Conservative led Coalition government (Loveday, 2017). When online victims try to get 
help from the local police, they are referred to Action Fraud first and have to wait for 
months until the police investigation ends. This is why police officers who deal with 
cybercrime should be regularly trained to comprehend the current nature of cyber 
threats. On a more radical change, recruiting IT skilled citizens by direct entry can be an 
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effective way to catch up with cybercriminals more quickly (Loveday, 2017). Designing 
an efficient reporting mechanism is only a first step. To run the mechanism successfully, 
it is of significance to have the reporting mechanism which is supported by effective 




In this chapter, a wide range of theoretical considerations were examined under the 
central theme of cyber security management. Drawing on the nature of the risks and 
threats, various aspects of cyber security management, such as risk management 
frameworks and organisational behaviours, were investigated in order to understand 
the management processes. This investigation is expected to lay the foundation for the 
effective and efficient implementation of cyber security management. Cyber security is 
an emerging area and resolving cyber security problems requires an interdisciplinary 
approach (Trim & Lee, 2015). This means that it is a challenging area in which technical, 
human, and managerial factors should be taken into account. Integrating these factors 
requires attention to multiple aspects of organisational behaviours, such as culture, 
leadership, managerial roles, decision-making, and group attitudes and perceptions. The 
literature review suggests that an understanding of human-computer interaction, 
decision-making, cyber security culture, and the role of management is a core part in 
safeguarding a business from cyber threats.  
 
This chapter also introduced the UK’s cyber security framework to identify loopholes 
and weaknesses of the South Korean cyber security governance. The distinctive aspect 
of the UK’s conceptual framework is its consistent and logical structure which benefits 
SMEs. There needs to be an acknowledgement that the conceptual lens has not been 
empirically investigated by academic researchers, but the importance of the 
investigation should not be underestimated. Therefore, the critical analyses of the UK’s 
cyber security governance in this chapter should be of value not only to this study but 
also to future studies.  
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In this chapter, a socioeconomic overview is carried out in order to relate basic 
information about South Korea. The widespread adoption of ICTs and the importance of 
SMEs in the economy are discussed to give a better understanding of the South Korean 
context. Crime trends and comparisons with traditional crimes are analysed to give an 
overall view of cybercrime. How cyber security strategies and a reporting mechanism 
are formulated is also explained in order to identify the environment in which SMEs 
operate. Finally, focusing on the cyber security of SMEs, the extent of the problems and 
vulnerabilities of government strategies and policies are discussed.  
 
3.2 Understanding the sociocultural context 
 
3.2.1 General background 
 
South Korea encompasses a total of 100,210 square kilometres, making it approximately 
half the size of the UK. As of the end of 2015, the total population was estimated at 51.5 
million with a density of 505.1 people per square kilometre. This means it is the 12th 
most densely populated country in the world, which implies that the government needs 
to build high-rise apartment complexes in major cities to alleviate housing shortages. 
The International Monetary Fund (2015) showed that South Korea had a GDP per capita 
of US$ 27,513, ranking it 29th internationally.  
 
From a socioeconomic standpoint, South Korea is a society divided between the rich and 
the poor, and the cities and the countryside. These divisions can be traced back to the 
1950s. After World War II, South Korea was left in ruins, with high levels of poverty and 
hunger. From the 1960s, the government undertook substantial measures to develop 
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heavy industries such as shipbuilding, coal mining, and car manufacturing. In the 1990s, 
South Korea was one of ‘Four Dragons’22 in the Asian economy, along with Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Strong government intervention has been considered as the 
primary source of the rapid economic growth in the short span of 30 years.  
 
Rapid industrialisation, spurred on by national initiatives, has accompanied drastic 
changes in the spatial distribution of human settlements. The urban population, which 
accounted for only 27.7% of the total population in 1960, tripled to 82.5% in 2015 
(United Nations, 2014b). In particular, over 40% of the total population is currently living 
in Seoul and its satellite communities. 23  The increase in the urban population is 
primarily due to rural-to-urban migration for job opportunities and education. Even 
though government-led initiatives effectively brought the country into the modern era 
as quickly as possible, there remains a big discrepancy between cities and rural areas.  
 
Initiated by a military regime24 after it took control in a coup in 1961, the economic 
measures were forced through in a military style rather than a democratic manner. 
Centralised and hierarchical approaches were taken in most government initiatives. 
From then on, strong government leadership and a hierarchical approach have been 
applied to every aspect of South Korean society. Due to this political background, a few 
top controllers manage most public organisations. This sociopolitical feature is also 
reflected in the policing system.  
 
South Korea has a centralised national policing system, consisting of 252 police stations 
(NPA, n.d.). There are local police forces, but none of them are independent. All police 
officers are directly hired by the NPA. In addition, all police stations adhere to strategies 
                                                          
22 This term that describes the four most rapidly developing economies in Asia before the 
1990s.  
23 Seoul’s satellite communities are within the jurisdiction of ‘Kyonggi-Do’, which includes 
several cities. ‘Do’ is equivalent to a county in England and Wales.  
24 The military regime effectively governed the nation for about 18 years, from 1961 to 1979.   
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and policies from the headquarters. This national system allows for citizens to receive 
standardised services across the nation.  
 
This also gives officials at headquarters substantial power over all the local forces 
through the hierarchical command structure. This is an example. A policy that concerns 
the working conditions of police officers will be initially formulated at headquarters. As 
the policy passes down to the local forces, it, theoretically, can be changed. However, 
there is no room for substantial change because the policy was formulated in detail from 
the outset. Local police officers complain that policies from headquarters are detached 
from the reality in which they work. This hierarchical system does not allow much 
discretion to local forces, including both their managers and rank-and-file. In many cases, 
headquarters directly investigates and manages high-profile cases. Local forces think of 
interventions from the central authority as unnecessary measures that cannot meet 
local demands. For this reason, there is a distrust between headquarters and local police 
forces.  
 
3.2.2 Infiltration of ICTs and dependence on mobile devices 
 
South Korea has experienced rapid technological innovation. Correspondingly, most 
people in South Korea have proactively accepted technological changes. In fact, 
technology is deeply embedded in the daily lives of citizens. The technological advance 
brought about different patterns of human behaviour and social interaction on the 
individual level and social changes on the macro level.  
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s broadband 
statistics (2017b) show that fixed broadband penetration (i.e., subscriptions per 100 
inhabitants) in South Korea was 40.9, ranking it 7th and mobile broadband penetration 
were 111.1, taking 8th place internationally. Only 11 countries25 surpassed the 100% 
                                                          
25 These are Japan, Finland, Australia, Denmark, the USA, Estonia, Sweden, Korea, Iceland, 
Ireland, and New Zealand (in descending order of mobile subscriptions). 
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penetration threshold, which means that some people have more than two mobile 
devices. In terms of high-speed access to the Internet, virtually all fixed broadband 
subscribers in South Korea have internet connections with speeds greater than 10 
Mbit/s (ITU, 2014). This implies that South Korea has one of the fastest average internet 
connection speeds in the world. High levels of connection to the Internet and the fast 
speed demonstrate that the telecommunication infrastructure is well established in 
South Korea (Bae, Park, & Kim, 2015).  
 
Government-led initiatives were the driving force in building national networks for 
internet-friendly environments. From the administrative point of view, the South Korean 
government has taken the initiative to achieve technological advances. The United 
Nations’ e-government survey (2014a), which is conducted every two years, found that 
the South Korean government took the global lead in the e-government rankings three 
times consecutively from 2010. This survey measured three things: (1) the availability of 
online services, (2) telecommunication infrastructure, and (3) human capacity (United 
Nations, 2014a). On a similar note, the ITU (2015b) published a report which measured 
ICT Development Index. This index was measured by three dimensions: ICT access, ICT 
use, and ICT skills. Each dimension consists of a set of indicators. It could be used to 
assess and monitor developments in ICT between countries. South Korea topped the list 
among 167 countries: for the sake of comparison, the UK ranked 4th. The noticeable 
point from these surveys is that they measured not only infrastructure but also human 
skills and knowledge of ICT. This suggests that educating people to adapt to an ever-
changing environment is an important criterion that needs to be included when 
measuring ICT development.  
 
It is worthwhile looking at how the proliferation of mobile devices has changed human 
behaviour in South Korean society. Mobile devices in particular have become crucial 
tools for online transactions. According to a report from the Bank of Korea (2017), the 
number of daily internet transactions processed via computers and mobile phones in 
2016 was 87.5 million on average; 60.5% of them (52.9 million) were conducted via 
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mobile devices. The number of daily mobile transactions drastically increased over three 
years. The figure in 2016 was 148.4% higher than that of 2013 (52.9 million versus 21.3 
million). Likewise, the number of registered online users was 122.5 million in 2016; 64.1% 
of them (74.7 million) were mobile users. The number of mobile users increased 100.8% 
over the three years (74.7 million versus 37.2 million). A huge embrace of mobile phones 
in daily lives transformed the landscape of internet banking. The table 3.1 shows that 
the annual increases in mobile banking overwhelm those in internet banking.  
 
Table 3.1: Use of internet and mobile banking (Bank of Korea, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017) 
Internet banking26 
 








2013 95.5 million 10.5 54.3 million 18.7 
2014 103.2 million 8.1 66.5 million 22.4 
2015 116.9 million 13.2 78.0 million 17.4 
2016 122.5 million 4.9 87.5 million 12.2 
Mobile banking 
 








2013 37.2 million 55.2 21.3 million 66.5 
2014 48.2 million 29.6 31.0 million 45.5 
2015 64.8 million 34.4 42.2 million 36.3 
2016 74.7 million 15 52.9 million 25.3 
 
This trend has changed not only customers’ behaviour but also the service practices of 
the banking sector. Traditionally, customers had to visit local branches to execute 
                                                          
26  Internet banking includes transactions via all sorts of devices; thus, figures relating to 
internet banking include mobile banking.  
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transactions. However, in 2015, non-face-to-face transactions (e.g., CD/ATM, telephone 
banking, internet banking) made up 88.7% of all transactions, and internet banking 
constituted almost half of all non-face-to-face transactions (Bank of Korea, 2016). The 
banking industry had to adjust to the changing transactional behaviour of customers. 
Banks increased investment in providing comprehensive and safe online services while 
slowly closing down their local branches. About 7.7% local branches27 have been closed 
from 2012 to 2016 due to the rapid rise in the number of internet transactions (Financial 
Supervisory Service, 2017).  
 
This changing landscape in monetary transactions indicates that, on a daily basis, a huge 
amount of money is transferred online: the use of physical notes and coins is dwindling. 
From a criminal’s point of view, targeting online transactions seems more lucrative than 
snatching money from others’ pockets. It is expected that offline fraudsters and thieves 
will move to cyberspace either alone or in alliance with accomplices who have computer 
skills, as cyberspace offers more financial opportunities. An explanation of this 
phenomenon is presented in later sections.  
 
3.2.3 The significance of SMEs in the economy 
 
According to the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Basic Law in South Korea, 
company size is determined by annual turnover and not by the number of employed 
staff.28 Enterprises were considered as SMEs if their annual turnover was less than from 
150 billion won (£100.9 million)29 to 40 billion won (£26.9 million), depending on the 
business sector in which they are operating. However, at the time of this research 
government agencies were still using the previous criterion, categorising company size 
by the number of employees. In particular, the most representative agency which 
publishes national statistics, the National Statistical Office is an example. Also, this study 
                                                          
27 596 branches were reduced from 7,699 in 2012 to 7,103 in 2016 nationally.  
28 When the law was reformed in June 2015, the criteria for SMEs have changed.  
29 In this research, the Korean Won-to-British Pound ratio was calculated at the exchange rate 
of March 13, 2018 (1 British Pound = 1,485.33 Korean Won). 
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excludes micro businesses which employ less than 10. This is because micro businesses 
tend to have highly personalised and informal management styles (Matlay, 1999), which 
indicates that they merit a separate study from larger SMEs (e.g., Mir & Feitelson, 2007; 
Parry, 2012). Therefore, SMEs in this study refer to companies with more than 9 and less 
than 300 employees. More specifically, small businesses employ 10-49 staff and medium 
businesses employee 50-299 staff. This criterion effectively excludes micro and large 
businesses.  
 
It is indisputable that SMEs contribute to output and employment in society. In 2016, 
companies with less than 300 employees were about 3.94 million which amounted to 
99.9% of the total number of businesses, and they employed about 18.2 million people, 
85.7% of the total workforce (National Statistical Office, 2017). These figures show that 
the South Korean economy relies more heavily on SMEs than the economy of any other 
nation.   
 









1~4 3,173,203 80.3 5,705,551 26.8 
5~99 758,333 19.2 10,211,699 48.0 
100~299 14,710 0.4 2,292,599 10.8 
Over 300 3,946 0.1 3,049,394 14.3 
Total 3,950,192 100.0 21,259,243 100.0 
       
An OECD report (2017a) presented some criteria for measuring the state of 
entrepreneurship among its member countries. The report, Entrepreneurship at a 
Glance 2017, compared the employment rate by enterprise size in the total economy. It 
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showed that South Korean large companies with over 300 staff30 hired 13% of the total 
business economy, which was far short of the OECD average of 42%. On the other hand, 
the proportion of employment by SMEs was 87%. This figure is about 29 percentage 
points higher than the OECD average of 58%, ranking it 2th among the 37 countries. 
These comparative figures demonstrate that South Korean SMEs have a pivotal role in 
employment compared to those in other nations. Sometimes, based on these statistics, 




Figure 3.1 Employment by enterprise size (OECD, 2017a) 
 
The Small and Medium Business Administration (SMBA)31  provides statistics online 
from its database system. Industry classification by company size in 2014 categorised 
business activity in each sector (see: Table 3.4). Wholesale/retailing, 
accommodation/restaurant, and other services were found to be the top three 
industries in which SMEs operate. However, large businesses showed a different pattern. 
                                                          
30 Unlike other countries, the size class “250+” refers to “300+” for South Korea due to the 
differences in domestic statistical criteria.  
31 As of July 26, 2017, the Small and Medium Business Administration was officially renamed 
Ministry of SMEs and Startups. This study however used the previous name because the name 
was changed at the later part of this research.  
85 
Over 50% of large businesses were in manufacturing, facility management/business 
support, and the real estate industry in descending order.  
 
Among the classified sectors, wholesale/retailing, accommodation/restaurant, 
education services and other services can be grouped as labour-oriented industries. 
These services can be provided if certain elements such as facilities, appliances, and 
labourers are available: they do not require a high level of technology to function. 
Around 58.9% of SMEs operated in this category, which implies that over half of SMEs 
were not in industries that depend on high levels of technology. On the other hand, 
manufacturing, construction, publication/broadcasting communication/information 
services, facility management/ business support, and science/technical services can be 
classified as technology-oriented industries. Technology is an important factor in the 
provision of these services. Over 58% of large businesses were involved in this category, 
whereas 30.9% of SMEs were placed there. Technology-oriented industries are the 
backbone of the export trade.32 The table 3.3 shows that large businesses accounted 
for about 81% of exports in 2012.  
 
Table 3.3: Exports by company size (Korean Statistical Information Service, 2013) 
 Total amount Percentage 
SME US$102,872 million 18.8% 
Large business US$444,046 million 81.1% 
Others US$951 million 0.2% 
Total US$ 547,870 million 100% 
                                                          
32 The Ministry of Strategy and Finance (2015) announced 13 major export items in 2014, which 
were semiconductor devices, refined petroleum, cars, general machinery, petrochemical 
products, ships, steel, flat displays (e.g., LCD, OLED, PDP), wireless communications equipment, 
car parts, textiles, home appliances, and computers.  
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Table 3.4: Industry classification by company size (SMBA, 2016) 
 Micro business Small business Medium business Large business 
Manufacturing 325,621 10.63% 56,988 15.09% 10,056 9.89% 696 22.29% 
Construction 106,420 3.47% 19,046 5.04% 2,328 2.29% 224 7.17% 
Wholesale/retailing (sales) 876,093 28.60% 76,073 20.14% 34,204 33.63% 292 9.35% 
Logistics 364,231 11.89% 8,347 2.21% 2,803 2.76% 102 3.27% 
Accommodation/ restaurant 616,086 20.11% 68,208 18.06% 16,887 16.60% 81 2.59% 
Publication/ broadcasting 
communication / information services 
21,587 0.70% 13,508 3.58% 1,411 1.39% 112 3.59% 
Facility management /business support 30,268 0.99% 14,038 3.72% 2,882 2.83% 565 18.09% 
Real estate 107,054 3.50% 7,339 1.94% 4,283 4.21% 356 11.40% 
Financial/insurance 7,381 0.24% 1,347 0.36% 2,667 2.62% 134 4.29% 
Science/technical services 59,340 1.94% 26,599 7.04% 1,452 1.43% 216 6.92% 
Education services 124,966 4.08% 15,543 4.12% 8,685 8.54% 80 2.56% 
Other services33 418,213 13.65% 68,034 18.02% 11,531 11.34% 213 6.82% 
Etc.34 5,741 0.19% 2,570 0.68% 2,520 2.48% 52 1.67% 
Total 3,063,001 100% 377,640 100% 101,709 100% 3,123 100% 
                                                          
33 This includes healthcare, fixing, leisure, and social welfare services.  
34 This includes sectors which take an extremely small portion such as mining, agriculture, forestry, fishing, electricity, gas, and environmental processing.  
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3.3 Cyber security issues in South Korea 
 
3.3.1 Primary cyber security concerns 
 
In contrast to the rapid advancement of ICTs, in-depth research on the criminogenic 
nature of new technologies and their security problems has not yet been carried out. 
Only a few countries like the US and the UK provide a legal framework and institutional 
support to deal with cyber security at a national level. This clear lack of national 
initiatives is partially attributed to the nature of cyber security. While crimes and 
disasters in the real world accompany physical damage such as casualties and destroyed 
buildings, cyber security breaches do not necessarily lead to visual consequences. In 
many cases, people believe that nothing serious has happened if there is no visual 
damage. Likewise, a government does not normally take measures until real damage 
has materialised. Without institutional support it is difficult to prepare preventative 
measures against cyber threats due to a lack of urgency in formulating cyber security 
laws and policies.  
 
The UN (2014a) and ITU (2015b) reported that South Korea has the most state-of-the-
art ICT infrastructures as well as users with high computer skills and knowledge. These 
facts and figures are nothing more than an indication that South Korea is a technology-
friendly place for IT users. On the contrary, a higher level of dependency on ICTs makes 
users and computing environments more exposed to cyber security risks. As an example, 
Symantec (2017) reported a number of identities stolen in 2016 by countries. In South 
Korea 10,394,341 identities were stolen, ranking it 7th in the world. 
 
When it comes to cyber security threats, South Korea in itself is a target of cyber-attacks 
from external states and non-state entities. In particular, cyber terrorism perpetrated 
by North Korea is considered the top priority in South Korea (Chung et al., 2016). North 
Korea recognised cyber-terror attacks as effective provocations to gain the upper hand 
at a future military campaign (Kang, Kim, Kim, & Yoo, 2016). Military experts argue that 
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thousands of North Korean hackers under the Reconnaissance General Bureau attempt 
cyber infiltration against enemy states on a daily basis (T. Kim, 2014). Since 2011, North 
Korea committed six major cyber-terror acts, primarily targeting government 
institutions, communication stations, and the financial sector (Table 3.5). Even though 
those attacks did not take the form of cyberwarfare, they caused massive chaos and 
damage35 to South Korean society. Throughout the series of cyber-terror attacks, the 
South Korean government faced heavy criticism and lost public confidence with 
defending cyberspace (Jang, 2016). 
 
It is only fairly recently that North Korea has tried to hack into the mobile devices of 
government officials (Jo, 2016). A smartphone contains a lot of personal information 
about the owner. This personal information includes contact lists, text messages, emails, 
records of online activities, documents, and media files. In early 2016, the head of the 
National Intelligence Service made public in a parliamentary briefing that emails 
containing malicious software had been sent to about 300 government and military 
officials; as a result, 40 smartphones had been infected (Kwon, 2016). This malware not 
only enabled North Korean hackers to gain contact lists and text messages, but also to 
wiretap phone conversations. North Korea is notorious for acting in an unpredictable 
manner, but in terms of cyber terrorism there is one thing that is predictable: North 
Korea constantly changes its cyber terrorism tactics in response to technological 
developments (Kang et al., 2016). Previously, it attempted to attack public institutions 
and national infrastructure. Now, it directs its cyber offences towards infiltrating the 
mobile devices of a few important individuals.  
 
Provocations by North Korea in cyberspace compelled the South Korean government to 
focus on: (1) cyber terrorism rather than overall cyber security and (2) protection of 
critical national infrastructure owned by public organisations and large corporations 
(Choi, 2010; T. Kim, 2014). The political circumstance has created a vacuum in overall 
                                                          
35 However, official figures were not estimated for the damage in aggregate. 
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aspects of cyber security other than cyber terrorism, leaving behind stakeholders such 
as individual citizens and SMEs. 
 
Table 3.5: Major cyber-terror activities by North Korea 
Time Type of attacks Target 
12 April 2011 Malicious codes National Agricultural Bank 
28 April 2012 GPS interruption International airports 
9 June 2012 Hacking Joong-Ang newspaper 
20 March 2013 APT attack Major television stations, banks 
25 June 2013 – 
1 July 2013 
Hacking, DDoS 
69 government institutions (Ministry of Defence, 
National Intelligence Service, the Blue House, etc.) 




High-ranking government officials, including military 
officers 
 
Secondly, within general cybercrime, cyber financial fraud has emerged as a crucial 
social problem (Kim et al., 2015; Yoon, 2013). Cyber financial fraud includes phishing36, 
pharming37, smishing38 memory hacking39, etc. In cases of phishing, fraudsters steal 
personal information of millions of individual citizens, and call or send emails randomly 
to individuals on their lists. Most types of cyber financial fraud take advantage of 
malicious codes to lure people into danger. These attacks are random and automated, 
so any person in South Korea could be a potential victim.  
 
                                                          
36 Phishing is a compound word of private data and fishing. Fraudsters either call or send emails 
to random people and deceive them to transfer money to the crime account.  
37 Pharming is manipulating the victim’s PC via a malicious code to steal financial information. 
The code stealthily directs the victim to be connected to the false banking site.  
38 Smishing is a compound word of text message (SMS) and phishing. If a person clicks on the 
Internet address in a random text message, malicious code is installed on smartphone. The code 
steals financial data or takes away some money.  
39 Memory hacking is due to a malicious code resident in the victim's PC memory. The code 
withdraws the victim’s money from the normal bank site.  
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What the law enforcement agencies underestimated was that cyber financial fraud 
evolved quickly following technical advancement. After realising the severity of these 
new types of crime, the police started to tally up basic statistics in relation to cyber 
financial fraud from 2013. The number of cyber financial frauds amounted to 33,763 
cases with £17.3 million worth of damage in 2013 (NPA, 2014). In 2014, though the 
number of reported cases decreased by 53.8% to 15,596 cases, the total amount of 
damage increased by about 149% to £43.1 million (NPA, 2015). This means that the 
average amount of damage per case surged by about 439% between 2013 and 2014. 
Also, the arrest rate in 2014 was just above 42%. This figure is much lower than the 
average arrest rate for all cybercrimes from 2011 to 2014, which was 69.3%. While 
criminal proceeds increased, the probability of being caught decreased. From a classical 
criminological perspective, it can be argued that there were low deterrence effects 
because the benefits from these crimes outweighed the costs. This demonstrates that 
cyber financial fraud offers more lucrative opportunities to cybercriminals than other 
cybercrimes.  
 
Table 3.6: Cyber financial fraud statistics (NPA, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017a) 
 










2013 33,763 - - 




2014 15,59640 6,567 42.1 
64.1 billion Won 
(£43.1 million) 
4.1 million Won 
(£2,760) 
2015 14,686 7,886 53.7 - - 
2016 6,721 4,034 60.0 - - 
 
                                                          
40 The sudden drop of this figure was attributed to a change of the scope of cyber financial 
fraud from 2014 onwards. 
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These cyber financial crimes took advantage of loopholes in financial transaction 
systems (e.g., insufficient authentication layers). Even though the crimes provoked 
public distrust in financial institutions, the banks at first provided no countermeasures. 
South Korean banks argued that they did not have legal responsibility because they just 
provided banking services without any involvement in the online transactions between 
victims and fraudsters. However, considering that cyber financial fraudsters use online 
transaction services, the cooperation of the banking industry was a requirement for 
effectively dealing with these types of cybercrimes. The Prime Minister’s Office began a 
government-led joint industry initiative and came up with a broad framework consisting 
of several public and private organisations in December 2013 (Financial Supervisory 
Service, 2013). The involved entities were the Police, financial watchdog agencies, banks, 
and the Korea Federation of Banks. All the participating organisations agreed that they 
needed to make an all-out effort to prevent and respond to cyber financial fraud. Firstly, 
for prevention, the watchdog agencies pressured banks to set up more security layers 
to detect cyber fraud. Secondly, for a swift response to minimise damage to the victims, 
the Police and banks created hot lines to freeze the bank accounts of both victims and 
criminals. This government-led joint industry initiative was based on a regulatory 
framework which relied on the authority of public watchdogs along with a crime control 
framework that stressed arrests and prosecutions of criminals. 
 
The concern on cyber terrorism by North Korea justified that the government and large 
companies should be protected because they run critical national infrastructures. On 
the other hand, cyber financial fraud targets individual citizens. Unfortunately, these 
two main concerns did not recognise that SMEs could be potential cybercrime victims. 
Despite the significance of SMEs in the national economy, the exposure of SMEs to high 
levels of cyber-attacks was overlooked. This tendency was also found on the 




3.3.2 Cybercrime figures  
 
Based on the White Paper (2014) of the NPA, cybercrime statistics in South Korea 
combine the figures relating to cyber terrorism incidents and general cybercrimes. The 
former includes cyber-dependent crimes such as hacking and the spread of viruses and 
worms, while the latter consists of cyber-enabled crimes. Cyber-enabled crimes are 
traditional crimes that are strengthened in their scale and capacity by the use of ICTs 
(McGuire & Dowling, 2013). Fraud and theft are examples. The total number of 
cybercrimes is composed of about 10% of cyber terrorism incidents and 90% of general 
cybercrimes (NPA, 2017a). The number of total cybercrimes reported to the police 
increased significantly by about 30.9% from 116,961 cases in 2011 to 153,075 cases in 
2016. This increase rate is much higher than that of traditional crimes which recorded 
5.5% increase over the same period of time.  
 
Table 3.7: Comparison between traditional crimes and cybercrimes (NPA, 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015, 2016, 2017a) 
 
 















2011 1,752,598 1,382,463 78.8 116,961 91,496 78.2 46.6 
2012 1,793,400 1,37,121 76.4 108,223 84,932 78.4 47.6 
2013 1,857,276 1,420,658 76.5 155,366 86,105 55.4 34.4 
2014 1,778,966 1,392,112 78.3 110,10941 71,950 65.3 35.8 
2015 1,861,657 1,500,234 80.6 144,679 104,888 72.5 - 
2016 1,849,450 1,552,455 83.9 153,075 127,758 83.5 - 
                                                                                
To understand the nature of offending, it is worth investigating how cybercrime is 
associated with traditional crime and whether traditional crimes are being replaced by 
                                                          
41 The sudden drop of this figure was attributed to a change of the scope of cybercrime. From 
2014 onwards Cyber Bureau developed and used a new classification scheme for cybercrime 
statistics.  
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new types of offending. These can be examined by comparing cybercrime figures with 
traditional crime figures. However, simply comparing the total number of traditional 
crimes and cybercrimes would not make sense because some types of cybercrime are 
purely new and do not have relationships with traditional crimes. For example, cyber-
dependent crimes such as unauthorised access and cyber terrorism are purely 
technology-driven cybercrime with different criminal motivations. Therefore, it would 
be reasonable to examine comparable types of crimes in order to explore crime 
transitions from offline to online. As such, the comparison in this part is limited only to 
crimes for financial gains: traditional theft and fraud are compared with cyber fraud. 
Conceptually, these two traditional crimes are in parallel with cyber fraud. The 
difference is whether an act of crime occurs within physical boundaries or in cyberspace.  
 
The Table 3.8 shows that traditional theft and fraud have decreased significantly from 
2012 to 2016 (respectively, 30.1% and 10.8%). In contrast, cyber fraud has increased 
drastically over the same period of time (130.8%). Although there was a small decrease 
between 2013 and 2014, this was most likely a minor correction of the big increase in 
the previous year. The basic pattern was that traditional theft and fraud decreased while 
cyber fraud increased over time.  
 
This pattern seems to support the argument that traditional offline crimes are replaced 
by cybercrime. Organised crime groups increasingly rely on cyber fraud because this 
type of cybercrime produces a high rate of return on investment compared to other 
types of crime (Gehem et al., 2015). For some criminals, cyberspace is a more attractive 
place than physical space because of anonymity and issues over jurisdiction. Thus, it is a 
good reason that traditional criminals prefer cyberspace to physical space. However, 
there are not enough sample years included in the study to make a firm conclusion that 
the decrease in traditional theft and fraud is associated with the increase in cyber fraud. 
Therefore, these figures should be interpreted cautiously.  
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Table 3.8: Annual changes of traditional crimes (theft and fraud) and cyber fraud (NPA, 











2012 290,460 - 270,868 - 46,394 - 
2013 288,343 -0.73 269,082 -0.66 85,856 +85.1 
2014 266,222 -7.67 238,409 -0.11 72,263 -15.8 
2015 245,853 -7.65 247,293 +3.73 96,535 +33.6 
2016 203,037 -17.42 241,613 -2.30 107,090 +10.9 
 
Although cybercrimes were on the rise, police responses to cybercrimes were rather 
unstable (see: Table 3.7). The arrest rate has dropped from 78.2% in 2011 to 55.4% in 
2013, and increased to 72.5% in 2015 and to 83.5% in 2016. On the other hand, the 
prosecution rate has continuously decreased from 46.6% to 35.8% between 2011 and 
2014. No explanation on the weak police responses was provided in the White Papers, 
however one possible explanation is the emergence of new types of cybercrimes. As 
suggested above in this section, new types of financial fraud have been incorporated 
into the statistics from 2013. 33,763 cases of new financial fraud were reported to the 
Police in 2013, but information on how many cases were processed was not revealed in 
the Whiter Paper. Another explanation is the jurisdiction in which cybercrimes were 
committed. It is difficult to arrest cybercriminals located in a foreign nation because 
cooperation with the local police of the nation requires a commitment of time and cost.  
 
To uncover the nature of offending, it is also important to compare law enforcement 
activities in traditional crimes and cybercrimes. The arrest rates for both were very 
similar in 2011 and 2012, but they showed a discrepancy from 2013 onwards. There was 
a big drop in the arrest rate for cybercrimes, from 78.4% in 2012 to 55.4% in 2013. In 
2013, the arrest rate for cybercrimes was 21.1 percentage points lower than that for 
traditional crimes, and 13.0 percentage points lower in 2014. The arrest and prosecution 
rates for cybercrimes have fluctuated between 2011 and 2016, but the arrest rate for 
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traditional crime has been stable during the same period. This analysis demonstrates 
the unstable nature of law enforcement activities against cybercrimes. Relatively 
ineffective police responses to cybercrimes are assumed to be found in other countries: 
they are not limited to a South Korean context only. In contrast to the constant evolution 
of cybercrimes, the effectiveness of law enforcement activities against cybercrime is 
questionable. Law enforcement officers face many difficulties in dealing with 
cybercrimes.  
 
Firstly, the ability of cybercriminals to adapt to new technological developments 
outpaces that of the police. Cybercriminals normally have strong technological 
backgrounds with IT expertise, whereas police officers tend to lack computer knowledge 
and skills. Recently, the police have invested more in hardware and software for the 
investigation of cybercrimes. In order to retain more skilled IT personnel, the South 
Korean Police provided more structured training to officers and sometimes have directly 
hired skilled professionals into the police force (Kwon, 2014). Although the police are 
attempting to catch up with cybercriminals, the latter are always far ahead of the law 
enforcement officers.  
 
Secondly, jurisdiction issues are the main hurdles in front of law enforcement activities. 
The problem lies in the fact that the police operate locally, whereas cybercrime is a 
globalised issue (Wall, 2007). Taking action against cybercriminals located outside of one 
state’s jurisdiction requires more time and effort (Yar, 2013, p. 89). In some cases, a local 
police force may need the cooperation of law enforcement agencies in other nations, 
but it can take time for the foreign agencies to embark upon the necessary course of 
action. If a reported crime is an online fraud case which involves a small amount of 
money, the police may not be willing to devote their resources to it. In voice phishing42 
cases, most fraudsters operate in China, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines, where 
                                                          
42 Voice phishing is a type of cybercrime which uses social engineering techniques over the 
telephone to gain access to the victim’s financial data.  
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criminal justice systems rarely deal with these crimes (Kim, 2016). Thus, it would be 
reasonable to assume that a huge portion of the reported cases were not resolved. 
 
Thirdly, the police officers responsible for cybercrime have a heavy caseload but limited 
resources. This phenomenon is due to the nature of cybercrime. Cybercrimes may only 
do minor harm to individuals, but the damage is large in aggregate (Wall, 2007). In 
particular, online fraud and scams disproportionately victimise many individuals with 
small amounts of damage. This is termed by Wall (2007) as the asymmetry of the 
offender-victim relationship. A few spammers send bogus emails to millions of people 
by using botnets. Botnets are an army of connected computers which are used to 
commit coordinated attacks on the command of a control server. The NPA recorded 
85,856 online fraud cases in 2013, which accounted for 55.2% of the total cybercrimes. 
One in two cybercrime cases reported to the police was related to online fraud. As the 
most prevalent type of cybercrime, online fraud creates some difficulties for police 
investigators. Even though many individual victims come to local police stations to 
report their cases, it is questionable whether the investigators pay the same amount of 
attention to them as they do to traditional crimes. They will think that undertaking a 
substantial effort is not worthwhile because the damage is small, thus justifying their 
investment of time and effort into bigger cases.  
 
There is one type of cybercrime which has caused damage to Korean businesses, which 
is trade fraud. Trade fraudsters target businesses which engage in foreign exports. They 
see a window of opportunity from physical distance, time difference, and email 
communications between trade partners. As the Korean economy relies heavily on 
export-oriented growth, it is no wonder Korean businesses are targeted by trade 
fraudsters. Trade fraudsters take advantage of hacking skills to steal information such 
as invoices from a trade partner as well as social engineering skills to push money 
transfers. Impersonating its trade partner, fraudsters send the revised invoice to a 
company employee which contains changed payment details (i.e., bank account 
numbers). They exploit the fact that most trade partners communicate via emails.  
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The Korean Police did not provide statistical data on this type of crime in any 
publications. It may be because cyber trade fraud is still in its early stages. However, the 
researcher could get these data through an official information request system.43 Cyber 
trade fraud has steadily increased between 2013 and 2017 (NPA, 2018, p. 1). The 
average annual increase rate was about 81.3% during those years. Although information 
on the total amount of damage was collected only in 2013 and 2014 (Ryu, 2016), these 
figures provide meaningful information in terms of the scale of the damage.  
 
Table 3.9: Cyber trade fraud statistics44 (NPA, 2018, p. 1; Ryu, 2016) 
 The number of 
reported cases 
The total damage 
The average damage  
per case 
2013 44 
4 billion Won 
(£2.7 million) 
90.9 million Won 
(£61,204) 
2014 88 
6.5 billion Won 
(£4.4 million) 
73.9 million Won 
(£49,728) 
2015 150 - - 
2016 155 - - 
2017 187 - - 
 
Cyber trade fraud emerged as a noticeable type of cybercrime from 2015 onwards. 
Unlike large companies, which have an abundant experience with exporting and 
importing, SMEs are generally unaccustomed to international transactions. In this 
respect, SMEs tend to fall for trade fraud when trade fraudsters target them. The Korea 
International Trade Association (2015) announced that it would host meetings with 
SMEs from June 2015 to inform them about fraudsters’ modus operandi and the 
appropriate preventative measures to be taken. This effort was intended to alert and 
educate SMEs, but there was a clear lack of coordinated efforts from government 
                                                          
43 Anyone can request official statistics and data from any public sector organisations via 
www.open.go.kr. 
44 The figures in this table involve cyber trade fraud perpetrated via emails only. 
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agencies. Whereas public and private organisations gathered together to deal with 
cyber financial fraud on a national scale, cyber trade fraud did not command enough 
attention from the concerned public entities. The email below is an example of trade 
fraud.  
 
Figure 3.2 An example case of cyber trade fraud  
 
There may be a shift underway in cyberspace from financial fraud to trade fraud. This is 
called crime displacement. Committing cyber trade fraud does not require special skills 
other than the general ones needed for cyber financial fraud. Thus, cyber financial 
fraudsters do not need to put more effort into committing cyber trade fraud. There is 
no additional entry barrier between cyber financial fraud and cyber trade fraud.  
 
One reason behind the crime displacement is a cost-benefit analysis. Potential criminals 
are more likely to commit a crime which gives them more benefit for the same amount 
of effort. The benefit (i.e., the average damage per case) from cyber trade fraud greatly 
outweighs that from cyber financial fraud (see: Table 3.6 and 3.7). Another reason is 
deterrence effects. When crime prevention policies have deterrence effects on certain 
types of crime, motivated offenders will move onto other crimes. In the case of cyber 
financial fraud, the Prime Minister’s Office led the national initiative, formulating a 
holistic framework from the end of 2013. In fact, the number of reported crimes 
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consequently decreased between 2013 and 2016 (see: Table 3.6). This decline may be 
interpreted as the result of effective deterrence against cyber financial frauds. If this 
interpretation is assumed to be true and the trend continues, crime displacement may 
happen from cyber financial fraud to cyber trade fraud.  
 
3.4 National cyber security governance 
 
3.4.1 Cyber security agendas and initiatives 
 
In South Korea, the government ministries and agencies45 involved in cyber security are 
divided according to the sector (i.e., military, public, and private) they are required to 
protect: KrCert is the agency that is responsible for engaging with the private sector 
(National Intelligence Service, 2015).  
 
The National Security Office (NSO) under the Presidential Office takes on the roles of a 
command station for dealing with national cyber threats, acting as a hub of emergency 
responses (National Intelligence Service, 2015). The National Cyber Security Centre 
under the National Intelligence Service (NIS)46 supports the NSO by leading the involved 
public and private sector organisations. The centre has an authority to coordinate not 
only a wide range of policy implementations, but also practical operations, no matter 
which sector is concerned (J. Kim, 2014). The related agencies do their part according to 
national directives. However, the structure is oriented to emergency management 
rather than coordination of activities and prioritisation of agendas. There is no review 
mechanism on the regular basis within the structure (Yun, 2016). In this respect, many 
scholars argue that there is no control tower which concerns a cyber security strategy 
(Jang, 2014, p. 110). 
                                                          
45 The government entities involved are the National Security Council, National Intelligence 
Service, Ministry of National Defence, National Police Agency, Communications Commission, 
Personal Information Protection Commission, Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Science, 
ICT and Future Planning, etc. 
46 NIS is a Korean intelligence agency equivalent to MI5 or MI6 in the UK.  
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To comprehend the cyber security governance, three distinct characteristics need to be 
pointed out. Firstly, from the legal point of view, the government’s cyber security 
activities do not have a fundamental legislative basis (J. Kim, 2014). In fact, those are 
based on the ‘National Information Security Management Regulation’, which is an 
ordinance, not a law or even a presidential decree. An ordinance is a government order 
that only affects subordinate government agencies. They cannot regulate the rights of 
citizens. However, the government’s cyber security measures have a huge impact on 
businesses and individual citizens. Many legal scholars argue that these government 
activities do not have a sound legal basis; as such, they violate constitutional values. 
Additionally, most civic groups have serious doubts about the overwhelming authority 
of the intelligence agency (NIS), asserting that the government’s countermeasures are 
likely to infringe on human rights. This weak legal standing has led to the lack of public 
legitimacy (Park & Kim, 2013).  
 
Secondly, the NIS dominates the whole national agenda with respect to cyber security. 
This is somewhat understandable, considering that South Korea has to confront North 
Korea’s communist regime. The protection of national infrastructure from North Korea 
has been deemed the government’s top priority. In the event of cyber terrorism, the NIS 
effectively takes charge of all investigations into cyber security breaches, as stipulated 
in the ‘National Information Security Management Regulation’. It is considered so 
serious a problem that the NIS is authorised to coordinate every aspect of governmental 
strategy and to distribute resources. Due to the significant role of the NIS, the cyber 
security framework mainly involves responding to cyber terrorism on the national level. 
While most government resources are devoted to protecting critical infrastructure such 
as telecommunications, electricity, transportation, chemical production, and financial 
services, which are run by public organisations and large corporations; however, on the 
other end of the spectrum, SMEs have been largely neglected. This skewed focus is 
perhaps unjustified since there is not much concrete evidence for the spread of cyber 
terrorism and the actual threat it presents (Denning, 2000; Yar, 2013).  
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Thirdly, the South Korean government does not have a proclaimed national cyber 
security strategy (Jang, 2014, pp. 105-113). However, there is a quasi-strategy, which is 
called, ‘National Cyber Security Comprehensive Measures’. This report was set up in July 
2013 and aimed to achieve: (1) raising responsiveness against cyber threats, (2) 
establishing smart cooperation among involved departments and agencies, (3) providing 
solid security measures in cyberspace, and (4) preparing for a creative cyber security 
platform (Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, 2013). 
 
However, the publication of the report was a hasty response to the 3.20 cyber-terror47 
and 6.25 cyber-terror 48  which targeted important public institutions and large 
corporations. At that time, dealing with cyber terrorism was the focal point of the 
government. Due to the situational urgency, there was a lack of discussion on what 
components the report needed to encompass and how it could be associated with other 
policies on higher and lower levels. This means that the ‘National Cyber Security 
Comprehensive Measures’ was not aligned with other strategies. Unlike the UK’s cyber 
security structure, which shared mutual goals and objectives, the Korean equivalent 
failed to maintain a logical structure at either the strategic level or the operational level. 
In addition, this report failed to sufficiently take cyber security governance, legal 
framework, and international cooperation into consideration (Yun, 2016). There was 
also a problem in relation to report dissemination. The government did not disclose the 
full text of the report and the report was not passed on to several involved departments 
and agencies, including the NPA (Jang, 2014, p. 105). Thus, this report was understood 
as a publication of comprehensive countermeasures, rather than a national strategy.  
 
                                                          
47 On 20 March 2013, the electronic networks of major television stations and banks were 
paralysed. A North Korean cyber warfare agency, Bureau 121, was blamed for this attack.   
48 On 25 June 2013, 69 major government institutions, including the Blue House, were victims 
of website change, DDoS, information theft, and code injection. Upon discovering that the 
hackers used similar hacking methods to those deployed during the 3.20 cyber terror, the South 
Korean government announced that North Korea was behind this incident.  
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The absence of a national strategy delivers a serious problem. Korean public and private 
sector organisations as well as international society do not know what the Korean 
government’s position is in terms of cyber security. The absence of the strategy reflects 
that the Korean government approaches cyber threats from a narrow perspective. One 
noticeable thing is that cyber security threats and cybercrime are not viewed as 
requiring public and private partnerships or an inter-departmental approach. The 
perception behind this could be that those problems can be solved by only a handful of 
government agencies or departments.  
 
3.4.2 Reporting mechanisms 
 
There are two strands of reporting mechanisms in South Korea. One involves general 
cyber security breaches, and the other concerns cybercrimes. Firstly, KrCert, or the 
Korea Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Centre, deals with cyber 
security breaches in SMEs (National Intelligence Service, 2015). The KrCert covers the 
whole private sector except for the financial services industry, which is protected by an 
independent public entity, the Financial Security Institute49. When a suspicious activity 
is found in computers or networks, businesses are offered a consultation from the KrCert. 
The KrCert investigates the case to identify the cause and source of a breach. However, 
this investigation is rather a technical inspection, and is therefore different from a 
criminal investigation. 
 
Secondly, the police initiate an investigation if a breach is recognised as having violated 
the law. Because the Korean Police are one national police force, local police stations 
and sub-stations provide standardised services to public across the nation. In terms of 
reporting criminal cases and investigation, a local approach is taken. Once citizens 
                                                          
49 The assumption that underlay the creation of the Financial Security Institute was that the 
protection of financial assets of customers was of vital importance, especially since the financial 
services industry was the main target of cybercriminals. 
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realise that they are victimised, they can go to the nearest police station to report the 
case. There is no national reporting centre like Action Fraud in the UK.  
 
It is worth mentioning that no studies or government publications suggest that private 
or international nodes are partners in reporting mechanisms. Unlike the UK’s single 
point of contact, victims in Korea can contact several public agencies: KrCert, the Police 
or Prosecutor’s Office50. The absence of a single point of contact has given rise to 
confusion among the public and inefficiency from the agencies involved. On realising the 
disadvantages, the NPA dispatched three police officers to 118 call centre in Korea 
Internet & Security Agency (KISA) from 2015 which handled phone calls from citizens 
and companies with cyber security problems. If a call handler suspected an incident was 
related to cybercrime, he or she referred the call to the dispatched police officers to 
provide a detailed consultation. In 2016, the 118 centre received 365,735 calls and 4,416 
calls among them were referred to the police. However, of 4,416 calls, only one incident 
was booked for official investigation (NPA, 2017b). This can be interpreted in various 
ways. It may be that victims did not want to engage in actual investigation or that the 
absolute majority of the referred calls did not even provide enough evidence for the 
investigation.  
  
SMEs can also approach these points of contacts when they find suspicious online 
activities. It is questionable how much information SMEs get from government 
organisations. When an agency receives reports from SMEs in need of help, information 
starts to flow from the latter into the former. While SMEs try to give all information 
possible to get support, the agency is usually reluctant to share information that might 
help SMEs to protect themselves in the future. This indicates that the relationship 
between SMEs and these government agencies is unilateral rather than bilateral, which 
results in asymmetric information sharing. The unbalanced relationship comes from the 
nature of the reporting mechanisms, which is reactive rather than proactive.  
                                                          
50 The Prosecutor’s Office has a statutory authority to investigate a criminal case of any kind, 
but direct investigations into cybercrimes by the prosecutors are rare.  
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3.4.3 Cyber security initiatives for SMEs 
 
The South Korean economy depends heavily on the export of manufacturing products, 
and technology-oriented industries account for most of its exports (Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance, 2015; Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.). Because of the economic 
importance of exports and technology, protecting technology information is one of the 
government’s principal interests. The government has concentrated its resources on 
securing the proprietary information of businesses directly related to exports (Choi, 
2010; Park, Lim, Lee, & Lim, 2013). Following this governmental drive, in academia much 
of industrial security researchers has studied technology protection of businesses. 
Between 2010 and 2016, over two thirds (78.7%, 37 out of 47) of studies on industrial 
security were found to focus on technology protection (Lee, 2017). This tendency is also 
applied to research on SMEs. Academic studies on SMEs’ cyber security focused on 
technology leakage (e.g., Chang, 2010; Kang, 2015; Y. Kim, 2014; Nam, 2012). The focus 
on technology protection and leakage is problematic in that this narrow scope of 
research excludes many areas in the industrial security discipline (Jung, Ryu, & Kim, 
2012).  
 
In terms of the government’s initiatives, there are two policies that aim to protect 
exporting companies from cyber security breaches. Firstly, the KISA has created a 
security standard called the ‘Information Security Management System (ISMS)’. This 
security standard is a modified version of ISO/IEC 27001 for protecting enterprises in 
South Korea. The ISMS is predicated on the ‘Act on the Promotion of Information and 
Communications Network Utilisation and Information Protection’. This national 
standard was designed to cover large companies51. If a company does not go through 
the process, it will be ordered to pay a penalty of 30 million won (£20,197). Unless SMEs 
operate in a sector related to the Internet or online data, the standard is not compulsory 
(Kim & Kim, 2016). The certification costs over 10 million won (£6,732), but the KISA 
                                                          
51 Clause 47 stipulates that ISPs, Internet Data Centres, enterprises with an annual turnover of 
over 150 billion won (£100.9 million), and online enterprises with a turnover of more than 10 
billion won (£6.7 million) or with more than one million daily users must obtain ISMS certification. 
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reimburses 30% of the cost for SMEs (KISA, 2016). However, this means that SMEs still 
have to pay 7 million won (£4,712) for the process, which is a great deal of money for 
them. In addition, the KISA has not clearly outlined the potential benefits of the 
certificate for SMEs. The agency is certain that the certificate can increase cyber security 
levels, but how it can help SMEs to increase their business values is not presented. It is 
questionable how many SMEs will voluntarily apply for the certificate.  
 
Secondly, the SMBA, a public body, established a security operations centre in Seoul to 
monitor, assess, and defend the systems of SMEs 24/7 in November 2011 (SMBA, 2011). 
This centre provides registered businesses with security monitoring, vulnerability check-
ups, incident alarms, and monthly feedback. The main objective of this service is to 
prevent the leakage of confidential technology information, such as proprietary 
information, intellectual property, and trade secrets. When it embarked on this service, 
it aimed to extend its reach from 250 enterprises in 2011 to 5,000 enterprises in 2015. 
Most participation came from medium companies: there was meagre participation from 
small businesses. This lack of registration was caused by one of the service’s 
requirements whereby a registered company must have network systems such as an 
Intrusion Prevention System, a firewall, and an Intrusion Detection System (SMBA, n.d.). 
However, installing these systems is costly and small owners are unaware of the 
requirement to do so. While the security operations centre was intended to cover SMEs, 
its requirements have created an entry barrier that has prohibited SMEs from registering. 
The creation of the security operations centre was based on the assumption that cyber 
security breaches targeting proprietary information of SMEs were serious. However, it 
should be questioned whether there is compelling evidence to prove this argument.  
 
3.4.4. Relevance of the UK’s cyber security framework to South Korea 
 
The cyber security framework was constructed through a top-down decision-making 
process both in the UK and South Korea. As cyber security was interlinked with national 
security, the framework was established with a focus on maintaining national interests. 
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However, the two governments looked at this issue from a different angle due to the 
disparate socioeconomic contexts in which they were situated. There were several 
distinctive points found between the South Korean and UK’s cyber security frameworks. 
Documentary research has found some differences in three dimensions (see: Table 3.10). 
 
Firstly, the most distinctive trait of the UK’s framework was the alignment of the 
hierarchical strategies (see: Section 2.6.1). From National Security Strategy to 
framework for internet investigations by National Police Chiefs’ Council, there was a 
logical consistency. By dealing with cybercrime as a subset of cyber security, cybercrime 
could be viewed as a continuum of cyber security and risks. This allowed for policy 
makers to broaden an understanding of cybercrime in association with cyber security 
agendas. Thanks to the comprehensive coverage of the strategies, the UK government 
clearly recognised that SMEs were potential victims which needed to be protected.  
 
In contrast, there was no national cyber security strategy in South Korea. With the 
absence of the strategy, the government could not have a structured approach to cyber 
risks and threats. Thanks to the socio-political background, this resulted in focusing 
heavily on cyber terrorism perpetrated by North Korea. While cyber terrorism was dealt 
with on the national level, cybercrime was deemed as a local matter and primarily the 
police were responsible for it. With having no coordination and prioritisation of agendas, 
protection of Korean SMEs was not on its list of priorities. In this respect, discourses on 
cybercrime, cyber security, and general risks and security were separated and not 
discussed in connection with one another. The great loss from this porous structure was 
that it failed to reach and protect SMEs from cyber risks and cybercrime.  
 
Secondly, the UK government adopted a program-based approach to implement the 
national strategies. The NCSP ran for five years with £860 million investment (see: 
Section 2.6.3.1). Based on the clear objectives, this programme supported not only 
public organisations but also businesses. In addition, there was an emphasis on the 
public and private cooperation (see: Section 2.6.3.2). In connection with Regional 
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Organised Crime Units, 10 regional offices of the CiSP attempted to reach local 
businesses in order to promote the information sharing of cyber security issues. Along 
with the aligned cyber security structure and strategies, the two underpinning initiatives, 
the NCSP and CiSP, aimed to support SMEs in a different manner.  
 
On the other hand, the Korean government took an issue-based approach. National 
approaches to cyber security were oriented towards emergency management rather 
than risk management. Most attention was given to resolving a breach on the national 
level without focusing on how to manage risks in normal times. As an example, when 
cyber financial fraud emerged as a primary social problem in 2013, the Prime Minister’s 
Office took the government-led join industry initiative to address the issue (see: Section 
3.3.1). This initiative involved various watchdog agencies and law enforcement agencies 
for implementation. This indicates that it was based on a regulatory or crime control 
framework (see: Section 3.3.1). The nexus between the issue-based approach and the 
regulatory or crime control framework is intuitive in that they were considered to be 
effective in resolving an abrupt issue within a short period of time. Although the use of 
regulations and arrests could attain a strong effect in the short term, these were, rather, 
reactive measures which did not necessarily relate to risk management.  
 
Thirdly, the UK reporting mechanism included private and international organisations 
based on the assumption that cyberspace could not be secured only by the public police. 
Forming broad partnerships with non-public nodes was necessary in dealing with 
cybercrime which is global, asymmetric, and automated. When it comes to a reporting 
system, it took a national approach based upon a single point of contact (see: Section 
2.6.5). As to cyber fraud and cybercrime, the UK government received reports on a 
national basis via Action Fraud. Depending on the NFIB’s scoring criteria, reports which 




Compared to this, the Korean government did not include non-public entities as their 
partners. There was no clear indication that private or international organisations were 
their working partners. Besides, the Korean reporting system allowed for several points 
of contact (see: Section 3.4.2). Cybercrime victims could report to any police stations, 
KrCert, or Prosecutor’s Office. Public reports were expected to be readily reviewed by 
an investigator. In principle, this guaranteed a swift process, which was of great benefit 
to victims. However, redundant reporting mechanisms could entail management 
inefficiency for the agencies concerned. Not only that, the localised and redundant 
mechanisms could make national agencies have difficulty comprehending the 
cybercrime trend on the national level.  
 
In conclusion, the UK framework was formulated through national leadership which 
provided a guidance for involved government departments and agencies. Furthermore, 
the UK framework acknowledged the significant role of private and international 
organisations, embracing the concept of internet governance. There was a consistency 
among the cyber security structure, approaches to cyber security, and reporting 
mechanisms. The greatest gain could be that the UK framework was more likely to reach 
and protect SMEs. In contrast, it was analysed that there was a clear lack of national 
leadership in the South Korean framework, ranging from the structure, approaches, and 
reporting mechanisms. These three dimensions were not interlinked because the 
framework was unstructured without having national strategies and underpinning 
initiatives. As a result, two tendencies were identified from the South Korean framework: 
(1) its orientation to reactive measures and (2) a lack of structured interdepartmental as 
well as public and private sector coordination. From a risk management point of view, 
the UK’s framework was more tuned into addressing risks and threats while the South 
Korean framework focused on managing emergencies or breaches. A great difference of 
this was that the Korean government looked at the past when the UK government 
looked at the future. It would be interesting to see if the analyses here correspond with 
findings from the quantitative and qualitative data in the later Chapters.  
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Table 3.10: Comparisons of cyber security frameworks between the UK and South 
Korea 




 Alignment of the hierarchical 
strategies 
 Recognition of the role to 
protect SMEs 
 No national cyber security 
strategy 





 Program-based approach 
(e.g., NCSP) 
 Emphasis on public-private 
cooperation (e.g., CiSP) 
 Issue-based approach 




 Inclusion of private actors 
and international partners 
 Single point of contact 
 National approach 
 No recognition of non-
public partners 
 Several points of contact 





In this chapter, the empirical field of inquiry, or South Korea, was examined. Starting 
from providing background information of the sociocultural context, cyber security 
issues and the national cyber security structure were investigated. The government has 
failed to provide a holistic cyber security framework that includes a wide range of the 
cyber security breaches against SMEs. Compared to governments, large companies, 
individuals, SMEs stand alone, without much support from the government.  
 
One small attention paid to SMEs was centred around preventing the leakage of 
technology information. The government’s initiatives targeted only one third of SMEs 
(30%) which had high levels of technology. Considering that around 60% of SMEs were 
in labour-oriented industries (see: Section 3.2.3), the majority of SMEs were excluded 
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from these cyber security initiatives. Some might argue that there can be general 
deterrence effects from this policy, but measures for technology protection do not 
necessarily increase overall cyber security. SMEs are also vulnerable to other types of 
breaches, such as the theft of personal information, cyber financial fraud, or trade fraud.  
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This chapter begins by introducing two research paradigms germane to research 
methodologies, and outlines the research design and the process that advances 
throughout the research. In social science, research methodology is grounded on 
ontological and epistemological perspectives and closely interlinked with data collection 
and analysis techniques. How to collect and analyse data hinges on research 
methodology which is bounded by epistemological paradigms. Furthermore, 
interpreting research findings is determined by research methodology. Therefore, the 
selection of appropriate research methodology cannot be overvalued. For future studies, 
it is important to describe research methods used in this study in detail in order that this 
study can be replicated, or at least repeated in a similar way in another country.   
 
First of all, research questions should be clearly stated before research design is 
established. Research questions guide the research progress as they take the role of a 
reference point for the research as a whole. The following sections investigate the 
appropriate research methodology in addressing the research questions. After 
examining the pros and cons on the compatibility of the two fundamental research 
methodologies, mixed methods research was chosen as the suitable one for this 
research. Lastly, data collection methods, data analysis process, and research issues are 
touched on in the later part of the chapter.  
 
4.2. Summary of the research methodology  
 
This study was based on both positivism and interpretivism for philosophical 
foundations due to the interdisciplinary nature of this research and the large scope of 
the research problem. As the research design, a mixed methods approach was taken to 
raise comprehensiveness as well as to increase the validity of findings. The research was 
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carried out in three phases: (1) documentary research, (2) quantitative questionnaires, 
and (3) qualitative interviews. Among various types of mixed methods design, 
explanatory sequential mixed methods was adopted so that findings from the 
quantitative data could be explained in more detail with the qualitative data.  
 
Firstly, documentary research was conducted to have some contextualised knowledge 
relating to the research topic before embarking on data collection. For high reliability 
and representativeness, the researcher mainly referred to documents and records from 
international organisations and the governments, such as trend analysis reports, 
statistics reports, white papers, policy reports, and investigation reports. Moreover, the 
researcher tried to rely on primary sources to use basic and original data. The 
government documents for this research were obtained from official channels. This 
resulted in supplementing Chapter 2, the Literature Review, and constructing Chapter 3, 
the Empirical Field of Inquiry. 
 
Secondly, quantitative research was carried out via online survey questionnaires. 
Distribution of the survey questionnaires were facilitated through an online platform of 
the Korea Federation of Small and Medium-sized Businesses (K-BIZ). As this organisation 
was aimed at promoting interests of SMEs, this research was found to fit with interests 
of the organisation. After consultation with the K-BIZ, four provinces and five self-
governing areas were chosen in terms of the geographical scope for data collection. 
Using convenience sampling, emails which included research introduction and the 
survey link were sent to 5,028 SMEs in those nine administrative areas, and a total of 
352 SMEs returned the questionnaires. The response rate was 7% (see: Appendix 6). 
However, 24 samples were discarded due to poor quality of responses. To sum up, 328 
samples were collected from SMEs’ IT managers and owners among the total population 
of around 0.5 million SMEs. 
 
Thirdly, semi-structured interviews were conducted to reflect the points of view from 
the researcher and respondents. Interviews consisted of two stages: (1) interviews with 
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IT managers and owners in SMEs and (2) interviews with government officials. Generic 
purposive sampling was used for the interviews with IT managers and owners in SMEs. 
These interviewees were selected from the survey respondents in the previous phase. 
All survey respondents were invited to join an interview through the survey 
questionnaire guide (see: Appendix 1) and 35 survey respondents accepted the 
invitation. Finally, the researcher chose 13 IT managers and three owners in SMEs in 
ways that answered the research questions and that widened variation in organisational 
characteristics, such as business sector and size. At the next stage, the interviews with 
government officials were carried out. This stage pertained to three government 
agencies (i.e., National Police Agency [NPA], Korea Internet & Security Agency [KISA], 
and Small and Medium Business Administration [SMBA]). Only officials working in the 
headquarters were appropriate for interviews because cyber security policies were 
formulated in the headquarters. Snowball sampling was employed because the 
researcher had difficulty in identifying and accessing appropriate interviewees. Hence, 
the first contact was found on the website of each organisation and the contact 
recruited more participants. Three officials from each agency or in total nine officials 
were selected. The exact number of interviewees at both interview stages was decided 
during the data collection process, following the criterion of data saturation. Both the 
quantitative and qualitative phases used non-probability sampling techniques and this 
approach was appropriate in that this study was oriented to be exploratory. 
 
In terms of data analysis, the quantitative data was analysed via STATA (version 14) 
which produced descriptive statistics as well as inferential statistics (see: Section 5.3). 
On the other hand, thematic analysis suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006) was used to 
identify themes within the qualitative data (see: Sections 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6). The 
use of QSR NVivo (version 11.3) provided efficient data management and data 
transparency (see: Appendix 7). Findings from the quantitative and qualitative research 
were triangulated with the existing literature to obtain a comprehensive picture of cyber 
security management in Korean SMEs (see: section 7.2). The triangulation strategy 
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contributed to gaining additional knowledge and maximising the validity of research 
findings.  
 
4.3 Research methodology 
 
4.3.1. Philosophical foundations 
 
The choice of research methodology and methods is based on the research problem 
(Creswell, 2014) and research questions of the study (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
In addition, a researcher’s perspective on the nature of reality (ontology) and acceptable 
knowledge (epistemology) in a discipline influences the use of specific methodology and 
methods. The research approach is related to the interplay of philosophical assumptions, 
research design, and related methods (Creswell, 2014). Creswell (2014) used the term, 
worldview, to represent ontological and epistemological positions of a researcher. The 
worldview provides philosophical reasons why the methodology is chosen. 
Subsequently, the methodology informs the available methods that are used in a study. 
In other words, the methods selected in a research depend on the methodology which, 
in turn, is affected by the ontology and epistemology of the researcher.  
 
Ontology   →   Epistemology   →   Methodology   →   Methods 
Figure 4.1 Philosophical foundations for research methodology 
 
4.3.1.1. Ontological and epistemological positions 
 
According to Chalmers (2013), a paradigm is “made up of the general theoretical 
assumptions and laws, and techniques for their application that the members of a 
particular scientific community adopt” (p. 100). A research paradigm is a philosophical 
framework that governs research, and also reflects a belief system, worldview, and 
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theoretical assumptions of researchers (Willis, Jost, & Nilakanta, 2007). Debates on a 
paradigm revolve around ontological and epistemological positions.  
 
Ontological considerations are concerned with the nature of social entities. There are 
two ontological positions which are often referred to. The first position, objectivism, 
implies that social phenomena and meanings exist independently of social actors. 
Although their existence is not under the influence of social actors, they can work as a 
restraining force against social actors (Bryman, 2016). For example, organisation and 
culture as external constructs can constrain social actors through rules and internalised 
beliefs. The second position is constructionism. This position sustains that social 
phenomena do not exist separately but are constructed by social actors. Meaning is a 
social outcome which is constantly revised through human interactions.  
 
Epistemological stances are of great importance in considerations of research strategy 
(Bryman, 2016). Epistemology concerns the study of how people can know about reality 
or knowledge. Positivism and interpretivism are the two research paradigms mainly 
mentioned.  
 
Positivism involves the idea that research methods used in the natural sciences can be 
applied to the study of social phenomena (Sarantakos, 2013). French philosopher 
Auguste Comte, who established positivism, advocated sociology, which is called social 
physics, to be validated by the scientific methods (Flyvbjerg, 2001). It is assumed that a 
reality derived from unchangeable natural laws and mechanisms exist in the form of 
cause-effect relationship (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Positivists explain social phenomenon 
in the same way as natural phenomenon is explained. Objectivity is the most crucial 
characterisation in this approach and it is required for the researcher to be detached 
from the research subjects under investigation in order to develop universal causal laws 
(Weber, 2004). Hypotheses and measurements are incorporated in the research without 
consideration on contextual factors surrounding research subjects. Based on the 
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rigorously scientific methods, the findings from particular observations are used to draw 
broad inferences for population.  
 
Positivism is considered the primary philosophical basis of quantitative research. 
Quantitative methodology is predicated on the belief that social phenomenon exists 
objectively. It is assumed that the whole society can be divided into parts or units for 
research. Emphasis is given to the generalisation of the findings to the whole population. 
This approach emphasizes that data from social reality are quantified for collection and 
analyses. Quantitative research follows deductive reasoning. Researchers start off by 
suggesting a theory to be tested and make hypotheses as presumed answers. After 
collecting data, they seek to investigate causal relationships among variables via 
statistical or mathematical techniques based on hypotheses testing. Above all, during 
this process it is significant for a researcher to take a neutral and objective stance during 
the research process.  
 
On the other hand, interpretivism is predicated on the view that researching humans is 
fundamentally different from studying objects in the natural sciences. This position 
posits that social realm is constructed through interactions among people, indicating 
that people engage in the interpretation of reality. To study human interactions and 
behaviours, it is critically important for a researcher to comprehend the subjective 
perceptions of human subjects in their social and cultural context (Willis et al., 2007). 
Social constructions such as language, meanings, and instruments are gateways to 
understand the social world. This approach advocates that the subjectivity of the 
researcher takes an integral part in the research (Weber, 2004).  
 
Interpretivism constitutes the philosophical underpinnings of qualitative research. 
Interpretivist approaches and constructionist approaches tend to be spoken of inter-
changeably (Robson & McCartan, 2016). Qualitative methodology postulates that social 
phenomenon is constructed by people in society rather than exists independently. 
Because the whole society cannot be comprehended by merely aggregating parts of it, 
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it is critical for a researcher to interpret social phenomena with understanding of the 
context through multiple perspectives. The reflection of subjective perceptions of a 
researcher during the research is accepted as a natural process, thus researchers tend 
to employ case studies, interviews and observation to reflect different aspects of the 
issue (Robson & McCartan, 2016). Predicating on inductive reasoning, qualitative 
research closely investigates cases or perceptions and behaviours of people to find 
hidden concepts or themes. Relationships of concepts are explored in the course of data 
collection and analysis without predetermined hypotheses.  
 
Table 4.1: Comparisons of philosophical assumptions between the two methodologies 
 Quantitative Qualitative 
Ontology Reality exists objectively 
Reality is socially constructed 
by people 
Epistemology 
Independence between subjects 
and the researcher 
Interdependence between 
subjects and the researcher 
Axiology Value-free research Value-oriented research 
 
A long-standing discussion on ontological and epistemological paradigms revolved 
around the connections between philosophical stances and research methods. Guba 
and Lincoln (1994) tried to find links between research paradigms and specific methods. 
For example, positivism is often considered to have a close association with quantitative 
research, while qualitative research is assumed to be based on an interpretivist or 
constructivist position. Although these associations are normally expected between 
ontological/epistemological positions and research approaches, there are no definitive 
connections (Bryman, 2016). Either qualitative or quantitative research is not wholly or 
exclusively committed to a specific philosophical stance. Researchers can choose 
research methods that are appropriate to their research rather than being predisposed 
by research paradigms.  
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4.3.1.2. Positivist and interpretive research inquiries 
 
Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) suggested that multiple worldviews can be used in a 
mixed methods study and that the choice of worldviews is related to the type of mixed 
methods design. They further explained that researchers can change their worldviews 
depending on phases in the project. In this study both positivism and interpretivism 
were taken. The researcher shifted from a positivist worldview in the first phase of the 
research (quantitative) into an interpretivist worldview in the second phase (qualitative). 
The nature of the study and research questions worked as a guidance for choosing an 
appropriate research philosophy. The two stances became philosophical foundations of 
this research for establishing an appropriate research design that were expected to 
bring about desired research outcomes.  
 
First of all, the positivist inquiry was chosen to conduct this research scientifically and 
objectively with empirical data. As was explained in Section 4.3.1.1, positivism is 
adequate to quantitative research. This study used survey questionnaires as a 
quantitative tool and quantitative data was statistically analysed through the structured 
process. Independence between the researcher and subjects and statistical rigour were 
expected to limit bias as well as to generalise the findings.  
 
Secondly, the interpretivist inquiry was necessary for underscoring the issues being 
studied in this research. This research intended to be exploratory to build a 
comprehensive portrait surrounding SMEs’ cyber security management. Interviewees 
from different SMEs were exposed to different business environment and had disparate 
experiences of security breaches and cybercrimes. Providing this, the interviewees held 
their own perceptions of the risk, practices, and countermeasures. Also, their 
interpretations and perceptions were reinterpreted by the researcher to come up with 




Table 4.2: Comparisons between quantitative and qualitative methodologies 



















4.3.1.3. Debates on mixed methods research 
 
Mixed methods research has emerged as a distinct research approach since 1980s 
(Creswell, 2014). Although there is no consensus on the definition of mixed methods 
research, which is often termed as multiple methods, multi-strategy, and triangulation, 
the general idea is to use more than one method or source of data in the research of 
social phenomenon. Pragmatism has provided dominant philosophical bases in mixed 
methods research (Johnson et al., 2007). Pragmatists put more weight on the research 
question than research methods or worldviews (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Their 
perspective indicates that the choice of a research strategy and methods is largely 
dependent upon the research question in the study. Any valuable research tools can be 
used if they are deemed to successfully address the research question (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 1998).  
 
There were pros and cons in terms of the compatibility of quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies. Some scholars were against the compatibility, claiming that they were 
derived from two different paradigms with conflicting assumptions (Bednarz, 1985; 
Kuhn, 2012; Sale, Lohfeld, & Brazil, 2002). Different ontological and epistemological 
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positions of the paradigms did not allow the combination of them for validation or 
triangulation purposes (Sale et al., 2002). This notion argues that quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies cannot study the same phenomena due to paradigmatic 
differences.  
 
On the contrary, other scholars (Bryman, 2016; Creswell, 2014; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004; Robson & McCartan, 2016) held that both methodologies were compatible each 
other with the possibility of integration. Although they are associated, respectively, with 
different paradigmatic assumptions, the association is not deterministic (Bryman, 2016). 
It is possible that qualitative research is connected to positivism and that quantitative 
researchers take an interpretivist and constructionist stance. Beyond the possibility of 
consolidation, mixed method research was considered another type of research 
paradigm along with qualitative research and quantitative research (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2011; Johnson et al., 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998).  
 
4.3.2. Research design 
 
This study adopted a mixed methods approach as the research design. The mixed 
methods research design is not limited to using more than one research methods but 
involves the combination of the two research strategies (Bryman, 2016). The 
combination of the quantitative and qualitative approaches can produce distinctive 
benefits such as triangulation, comprehensiveness, and stronger inferences that cannot 
be generated from an individual approach (Johnson et al., 2007; O'Cathain et al., 2007; 
Robson & McCartan, 2016).  
 
Mixed methods research draws on the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative 
research and neutralises the weaknesses of an individual research strategy (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2011). Bryman (2006) pointed out offsetting the weaknesses as one of 
rationales in mixed methods research. In quantitative research generalisation of the 
findings is highly emphasised. Reliability and validity of the research are very important 
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criteria so that similar research can be replicated by other researchers. However, 
quantitative research does not capture the subtleties and complexities of research 
subjects within a context. In addition, quantitative research does not have much 
flexibility after a research design is chosen, as it is mostly performed in fixed designs 
(Robson & McCartan, 2016). On the contrary, qualitative research provides rich 
explanations on complex relationships among the subjects and the related processes, 
although it is criticised for a lack of objectivity, generalisation, and transparency (Bryman, 
2016). Therefore, mixed methods research can provide a comprehensive illustration of 
research subjects as well as statistical inferences by combining both approaches. From 
the research design point of view, this allows the study to have a more robust research 
process.  
 
Like other research methods, a mixed methods approach has its own challenges. One 
challenge is that a researcher should be knowledgeable in both qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies and have more time and resources to complete the 
research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). There are several types of mixed methods 
research depending on priority and sequence between the quantitative and qualitative 
methods (Bryman, 2016). The complexity of the research design models requires a more 
rigorous approach by the researcher. Another challenge is that it is difficult to fully 
integrate research findings from the quantitative and qualitative research. Integration 
means “comparing, contrasting, building on, or embedding one type of conclusion with 
the other” (Creswell & Tashakkori, 2007, p. 108). Simply presenting quantitative and 
qualitative findings separately undermines the quality of mixed methods research. 
When conducting mixed methods research, it is important for a researcher to follow the 
logic. The logic is explained that qualitative and quantitative methods should 
compensate for each other to create complementary strengths and diminish 
weaknesses (Johnson et al., 2007). This logic allows for a researcher to adopt mixed 
methods research strategically in a way that satisfies research purposes.  
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When using a mixed methods approach, a justification for this choice needs to be clearly 
provided (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). This approach was selected for this study to 
increase exploratory power and to enhance the robustness of the research process. The 
decision to connect both strategies was largely guided by the research problem. The 
research problem, ‘how is cyber security managed in South Korean SMEs?’, could not be 
comprehensively understood without using both the quantitative and qualitative 
strategies.  
 
Firstly, the quantitative phase was used to assess cyber security situations for SMEs. This 
was because there was an obvious lack of situational assessment on SMEs in South Korea. 
More importantly, it identified relationships or correlations among organisational 
variables. This investigation helped the researcher to identify organisational factors 
which were associated with increasing cyber security. This quantitative approach 
explored general cyber security situations for SMEs, allowing for a statistical balance for 
this study. The findings produced in this stage laid foundation for the next stage.  
 
Secondly, the qualitative phase addressed unanswered questions from the quantitative 
phase by interviewing not only IT managers and owners of SMEs but also officials in 
government agencies. This data collection process helped to capture the complexity of 
the contexts surrounding SMEs. The scope of this research was broadened because this 
strategy presented an in-depth understanding of the research problem. The qualitative 
findings eventually aimed to provide interactions between internal arrangements and 











 A self-completion (online) questionnaire of SMEs’ IT managers 
and owners (328 samples / convenience sampling) 
Qualitative 
research (2nd) 
 Semi-structured interviews with SMEs’ IT managers and owners 
(16 interviewees / generic purposive sampling) 
 Semi-structured interviews with cyber security officials in the 
KISA, SMBA, and NPA (9 interviewees / snowball sampling) 
 
In a mixed methods design there are three basic types except other advanced types 
(Creswell, 2014, p. 15).52 The first type is ‘convergent parallel mixed methods’. It is to 
merge both qualitative and quantitative data in a way that presents comprehensive 
results. The second type is ‘explanatory sequential mixed methods’. Quantitative 
research is conducted before qualitative research is embarked upon. Quantitative 
analysis is explained in more detail with the qualitative data. The last one is ‘exploratory 
sequential mixed methods’. The research sequence is the reverse from the second 
model. The researcher first explores concepts or variables through qualitative research 
and uses them in the follow-up quantitative research.  
 
Among the three types, the second was employed in this study. The procedure involved 
collecting and analysing survey data in the first phase, followed up with semi-structured 
interviews. The main reason for this approach was that the quantitative phase provided 
an overall understanding of the research problem (Ivankova, Creswell, & Stick, 2006). 
Quantitative results could be clarified and analysed further with open-ended questions 
                                                          
52 Creswell and Plano Clark (2011, p. 69) suggested six major mixed methods research designs, 
which were the embedded design, transformative design, multiphase design along with the 
three basic types. Creswell (2014) claimed that the former three designs were advanced 
strategies which derived from the basic models.  
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in the qualitative stage (Creswell, 2014). In this aspect, this approach was useful for the 
exploration of the research problem. It suited the aim of this study which was to have a 
comprehensive understanding of SMEs’ cyber security management. The follow-up 
qualitative research after the quantitative analysis offered a detailed layer of 
information, helping the researcher to answer the research questions.  
 
However, a researcher needs to be cautious in that qualitative analyses in some studies 
might not add values but merely describe quantitative findings (Robson & McCartan, 
2016). Avoiding mere reiteration of quantitative findings was of great concern for this 
study. The researcher made an effort in order for the qualitative phase to add 
substantial values by exploring participants’ views in more depth.  
 
4.4. Research methods 
 
4.4.1. Documentary research  
 
Documentary research has not been recognised as an established research method 
(Platt, 1981). Documents keep records of events in detail which normally people cannot 
have an experience of, providing researchers with access to unobservable actions or 
events. Payne and Payne (2004, p. 60) define documentary research as “the techniques 
used to categorise, investigate, interpret and identify the limitations of physical sources, 
most commonly written documents, whether in the private or public domain” (p. 60). 
Documents form a significant source of data, but also this research method is applicable 
at various stages of the research process (Finnegan, 2006). Denzin (1970) argues that 
documentary research is useful as an independent research method, but also takes a 
crucial part in conducting a triangulation. Due to these advantages, documentary 
research is used as a versatile method in many disciplines, for both quantitative and 
qualitative research. The scope of documents is very large, covering public, private, and 
personal records. Examples are official records, letters, diaries, photographs, the media, 
biography, and visual documents (Macdonald, 2008).  
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This research intended to incorporate national cyber security mechanisms regarding 
protecting SMEs along with internal cyber security arrangements of SMEs. For this, 
documentary research was employed to provide contextual information by utilising 
government and private documents and records. This method allowed for the 
researcher to contextualise cyber security arrangements and mechanisms.  
 
McCulloch (2004) suggests four established rules when appraising documents: 
authenticity, reliability, meaning, and theorisation. As a fundamental criterion, 
documents should be verified as having the genuine origins and provenance. Scott (1990) 
contends that this criterion is applied to documentary research as well as all social 
research. Second, reliability refers to trustworthiness of documents. To examine 
reliability, whether a document contains bias or unfaithful accounts from an author 
needs to be considered. McCulloch (2004) interprets the concept of reliability broadly 
by including representativeness as a subset of reliability. Compared to this, Scott (1990) 
classifies representativeness which involves survival and availability as a separate 
criterion. Third, meaning involves providing a clarity and comprehensibility to a 
researcher. Fourth, theorisation concerns a theoretical framework through which 
documents are analysed. Three main traditions are positivist, interpretive and critical 
approaches.  
 
Documents need to be read cautiously. Documents on the same event are produced 
with different orientations or purposes, consequently, presenting different meanings to 
the same phenomenon. In addition, some documents may not disclose social context 
which is necessary to construct social settings surrounding an event. For these reasons, 
a documentary researcher needs to adopt triangulation as a research strategy to achieve 
validity in a way that examines documentary data from various angles (Macdonald, 
2008). Finnegan (2006) provides practical guidelines for researchers. When searching 
for documentary data, the researcher took eight questions from Finnegan (2006, pp. 
146-149) into consideration. These are: 
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(1) Has the researcher made use of the existing sources relevant and 
appropriate for his or her research topic? 
(2) How far has the researcher taken account of any ‘twisting’ or selection of 
the facts in the sources used? 
 (3) What kind of selection has the researcher made in her or his use of the 
 sources and on what principles? 
 (4) How far does a source which describes a particular incident or case reflect 
 the general situation? 
(5) Is the source concerned with recommendations, ideals or what ought to be 
done? 
 (6) How relevant is the context of the source? 
 (7) With statistical sources: what were the assumptions according to which the 
 statistics were collected and presented? 
 (8) Having taken all the previous factors into account, do you consider that the 
 researcher has reached a reasonable interpretation of the meaning of the 
 sources?  
 
Chapter 2, the Literature Review, and Chapter 3, the Empirical Field of Inquiry, are the 
results of documentary research. In particular, Chapter 3 which presented a 
socioeconomic overview of South Korea relied upon this method to look at South Korean 
literature. In order to attain high reliability and representativeness, the researcher 
mainly referred to documents and records by international organisations and Korean 
and the UK governments. Those documents include trend analysis reports, statistics 
reports, white papers, policy reports, and investigation reports. They also include some 
unpublished government documents or circulars. The researcher endeavoured to obtain 
primary sources rather than secondary sources in that the former conveys the basic and 
original data, while the latter copies and interprets original materials (Macdonald, 2008). 
Although the researcher was a Korean police officer, the researcher’s status as a Senior 
Inspector in the NPA did not contribute to obtaining any Korean documents. All of the 
documents acquired for this research were gathered from official channels.  
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4.4.2. Quantitative approach (survey questionnaires) 
 
No other research method has become more prominent as survey research in social 
science disciplines within a short period of time (Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014). Festinger 
and Katz (1953) stated, “It is this capacity for wide application and broad coverage which 
give the survey technique its great usefulness in the behavioural sciences” (p. 16). The 
broad applicability of the survey research to social problems has itself given a dominant 
position in addressing issues from many fields.  
 
The survey research collects data from a sample of respondents who were drawn from 
a well-defined population. In this respect, how to select samples is a major concern. If 
the representativeness of the sample is not guaranteed, it is hard to claim generalisation 
from a sample to a population. Therefore, choosing a right sampling method depending 
on research purposes is essential in the survey research. The survey research is 
employed to acquire a body of quantitative data at a single point in time (Bryman, 2016). 
This is why it is closely related to the cross-sectional design. It means that results from 
surveys do not present trends over time, but provide a snapshot of phenomena. A 
researcher asks questions to respondents and the questions are vehicles that measure 
variables of interest. Usually, a number of variables are to be investigated and patterns 
of association (e.g., correlations or causal relationships) among the variables are 
identified via statistical analyses.  
 
Survey questionnaires contain a set of predetermined questions mostly in a closed 
format. The identical questions are given to respondents to reduce variations that may 
come from using different words in questionnaires. The standardised manner of the 
survey research corresponds to the use of a fixed design. The standardisation increases 
the reliability of quantitative findings in regard to measurement, but there is little room 
for flexibility after the research design is decided (Babbie, 2007). Another downside in 
relation to this aspect is that the survey research is less appealing to exploratory studies 
but appeals more to descriptive or interpretive studies (Robson & McCartan, 2016).  
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Questionnaire and structured interviews are the two predominant methods in 
conducting surveys (Bryman, 2016). A researcher can contact respondents in person, by 
mail or phone, or through the Internet. Survey data collection methods evolve over time, 
especially reflecting technological innovations (Krosnick, 1999). Computer-assisted 
personal interviewing and audio computer-assisted self-administered interviewing are 
the examples. Internet survey is being increasingly used in research. Traditional 
approaches, such as face-to-face interview, telephone interview, and self-completion 
questionnaire via mail, require a huge amount of time and money. Moreover, it is 
challenging to recruit respondents due to their modern lifestyle and privacy issues.  
 
Self-completion questionnaires were administered via the Internet in this study. Survey 
participants gained access to the survey through an URL from a web-based program, 
Bristol Online Survey (BOS)53, which is designed for academic research. Compared to an 
e-mail approach, web-based programs allow for more response options and flexible 
survey designs. Robson and McCartan (2016) compare the Internet survey approach to 
other approaches as shown in Table 4.4. Compared to the traditional methods, the 
Internet survey has desirable advantages especially in terms of cost and length of data 
collection period. Also, respondents can be supported by visual aids to assist in following 
the order of questions.  
 
On the other hand, the response rate of the Internet survey may be lower than that of 
other methods. People tend to ignore survey emails or delete them because no rapport 
was created between the researcher and respondents. Another downside may be 
response bias. People with higher education and socioeconomic status are more likely 
to have Internet access than poorer people. It is possible that the poor are 
underrepresented in the Internet survey.  
 
Having said that, in this research the advantages were expected to outweigh the 
disadvantages in that low response rate and high response bias did not seem to pose 
                                                          
53 www.onlinesurveys.ac.uk 
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serious harm on the quality of this study. Firstly, Krosnick (1999) argued that according 
to recent studies surveys with low response rates could yield more accurate results than 
those with higher response rates. It is supported by the argument that 
representativeness is not in direct proportion to response rate. Secondly, almost all 
SMEs in South Korea, research subjects in this study, were connected to the Internet. 
Most of them had their own websites for advertisement and sales purposes. Also, 
banking services and administrative processes were undertaken electronically on 
computers. Considering the high level of connectedness of SMEs to the Internet, the 
response bias was not a huge concern in this study.  
 
Table 4.4: Comparison of data collection methods in the survey research (Robson & 











Cost Low Very low High Low/Medium 
Length of data 
collection 
period 
Long Short Medium/Long Short 
Use of visual 
aids 
Very good Very good Good Fair 
Rapport Fair Poor/Fair Very good Good 
Control of 
question order 
Poor Poor/Fair Very good Very good 




Response bias Medium/High Medium/High Low Low 
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4.4.3. Qualitative interviews 
 
The interview is probably the most widely used data collection method and one of the 
most invaluable sources to obtain information in research. Given the research problem 
and questions, it was imperative to conduct an interview with managers and owners in 
SMEs and officials in relevant government agencies. There are three main types of 
interview, which are distinguished by the extent of structure or standardisation of the 
interview: (1) the structured interview, (2) the semi-structured interview, and (3) the 
unstructured interview (Robson & McCartan, 2016).  
 
The structured interview is the least flexible form among the three types. This type of 
interview is applicable especially when the researcher has a good understanding of the 
research topic. The interviewer gives each respondent exactly the same questions in the 
same sequence and respondents have a limited range of answers. By using a 
standardised format of asking questions, it is easy for a researcher to quantify interview 
responses. This allows for the maximisation of the validity and reliability of 
measurement (Bryman, 2016). A trade-off of imposing a standardised manner is that 
there is a risk of losing vast meanings in responses.  
 
The semi-structured interview intends to reflect the point of view from respondents. It 
allows the researcher to have his or her latitude to modify interview questions or their 
order during the interview. Based on an understanding of respondents and the flow of 
the interview, the interviewer can ask impromptu questions. This enables the 
interviewer to elicit detailed answers from each respondent. If a particular response is 
considered significant, the interviewer can probe for more information. One major 
difference from the unstructured interview is that an interview guide has a series of 
questions in advance. This means that the latitude of the researcher in the semi-
structured interview is much less than that in the unstructured one.   
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Lastly, the unstructured interview is the most flexible type in the interview process. It 
aims to “find out what kinds of things are happening rather than to determine the 
frequency of predetermined kinds of things that the researcher already believes can 
happen” (Lofland, 1971, p. 76). A distinctive difference from the structured interview is 
that the unstructured interview intends to uncover the interviewee’s experience of a 
topic or situation (Lofland & Lofland, 1984). The interviewer keeps an area of interest 
only and a list of topics in mind which require to be addressed. Phrasing questions and 
asking them in any sequence are under the discretion of the interviewer. Sometimes, an 
interviewer can share their opinion on the topic with respondents if the conversation is 
deemed appropriate. Flexibility of this type enables an interviewee not only to freely 
articulate ideas and opinions but also express emotions, beliefs, and values. In this 
context, building good relationships between the researcher and interviewees is very 
important. Therefore, it is advised that a researcher interviews subjects in person rather 
than hiring a third person (Burgess, 1984).  
 
The structured interviewing is mostly adopted in quantitative research due to its high 
validity and reliability. On the contrary, the semi-structured interview and the 
unstructured interview are described as qualitative interviewing (Bryman, 2016; Robson 
& McCartan, 2016). Through qualitative interviewing a researcher enquires into 
experiences, opinions, and viewpoints of others in specific social settings (Rubin & Rubin, 
2012; Turner III, 2010). Given the nature of this method, qualitative interviewing is also 
referred to as in-depth interviewing (Taylor, Bogdan, & DeVault, 2016). It is beyond a 
simple data collection method, but supports the researcher to reconstruct a whole 
picture of complicated contexts and process in question. Data collection is conducted 
through active engagement and interaction between the interviewer and interviewees. 
The interview is carried out as an informal conversation rather than a formal question 




In qualitative research, the semi-structured interview and unstructured interview are 
widely adopted because of their flexibility in garnering detailed information. Qualitative 
interviewing has long been used with other research methods, such as participant 
observation and documentary research. Of the two interviews, the semi-structured 
interview was finally selected for the data collection method in the qualitative phase. 
This was due to the research design and research orientation of this study. First of all, 
survey findings from the quantitative stage informed a set of questions that needed to 
be asked during the interviews. This brought about some structure to the interview. 
Second, the qualitative phase was oriented to explore research questions in more depth 
while clarifying and explaining the quantitative findings. The interviewer probed for 
more information by changing the order and even the wording of questions, following 
up the responses from the interviewees.  
 
4.5. Data collection and analysis 
 
4.5.1. Data collection 
 
4.5.1.1. Sampling strategy 
 
It is important for a researcher to clearly define the unit of analysis and the level of 
analysis before carrying out the research. The former is what or whom is being studied 
and the latter concerns the scale of the research. The unit of analysis in this study was 
SMEs and the research fell into a meso-level analysis. In addition, it is worth 
distinguishing the unit of analysis from the unit of observation. It is usual that they are 
identical in a study (Babbie, 2007), but that is not the case in this research. Although this 
study was on organisations, organisational data were empirically drawn from individuals. 
In other words, the research collected data at the individual level of observation, but 
the level of analysis was at the organisation level. Characteristics and behaviour of SMEs 
were measured by quantitative questionnaires and qualitative interviews.  
 
133 
Sampling techniques are categorised broadly as probability sampling and non-
probability sampling. Probability sampling guarantees the equal chance of each unit to 
be included in a sample, while non-probability sampling does not entail a randomised 
selection method. It is hard to argue which, if any, is better than the other. The choice 
of sampling techniques depends on various vectors such as research questions, design 
and methods.  
 
Probability sampling is generally preferred by quantitative researchers. In quantitative 
research, it is vital to elicit statistical inferences about the population from the sample. 
The inferences are drawn upon for the generalisation of the research findings to an 
entire population. The generalisation is possible in probability sampling because the 
sample is selected as representative of the population. It should be guaranteed that 
samples are chosen in a random fashion. Even though probability sampling cannot get 
rid of sampling error, this randomised selection process has a better chance of reducing 
sampling error than non-probability sampling (Bryman, 2016). On the other hand, non-
probability sampling does not have logical grounds to make statistical inferences 
(Robson & McCartan, 2016). 
 
In qualitative research, there is a greater preference by researchers to use purposive 
sampling as a non-probability form of sampling (Bryman, 2016). This is mainly because 
qualitative research gives more emphasis on the context and process. Qualitative 
researchers attempt to provide thick descriptions on research subjects in the setting 
being investigated and how interactions among the subjects evolve over time in context. 
Thus, it is needed to intentionally select samples that fit into research purposes and 
questions.  
 
In this study, each stage utilised different sampling strategies. A quantitative data 
collection process used convenience sampling. This was followed up by qualitative 
interviews with a subset of the survey respondents. The interviewees were chosen 
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through generic purposive sampling. Lastly, government officials were selected via 
snowball sampling for additional qualitative interviews.  
 
Firstly, the survey of IT managers and owners in SMEs used convenience sampling. As a 
type of non-probability sampling method, this technique is usually used when there is a 
high accessibility to potential samples. Convenience sampling has no inclusion and 
exclusion criteria in terms of selecting samples and does not require high costs and long 
duration of time. Due to the ease of research, this technique is adopted by many social 
science researchers. In particular, in the field of organisation studies convenience 
sampling is more commonly used than probability sampling (Bryman, 2016).  
 
The data collection of survey questionnaires was possible due to support from the K-BIZ. 
This organisation is an interest group whose members include almost all SMEs in South 
Korea. Thus, it has contact details of its members, communicating with them on a 
regular basis. This organisation also has an online platform which enables constant 
exchanges of information with SMEs. The researcher contacted the organisation for 
support in this research. The K-BIZ is known for its openness to researchers and experts 
who wish to approach SMEs as academic interest from outsiders are considered 
important elements to gain supports for SMEs. After obtaining official approval from the 
K-BIZ, the researcher asked for the K-BIZ to pass on an invitation letter and survey 
questionnaires to SMEs via email. The researcher relied on the K-BIZ contact list by virtue 
of its accessibility. 
 
As SMEs are dispersed around the nation, it is almost impossible to conduct random 
sampling method without full support. Instead, convenience sampling method was an 
appropriate choice for this research. In South Korea, there are eight provinces and nine 
self-governing areas. Of these, four provinces and five self-governing areas 54  were 
randomly selected in order to narrow down the geographical scope for data collection. 
                                                          
54 These include Gyeonggi-do, Gangwon-do, Gyeongsang buk-do and Gyeongsang nam-do, 
Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Daejeon and Ulsan.  
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Using convenience sampling method, emails which contained research introduction and 
the survey link were sent to 5,028 SMEs in those nine administrative areas. A total of 
352 SMEs returned the questionnaires online for a response rate of 7% (Appendix 6). 
The survey data were collected for about two months (28 Oct 2016–27 Dec 2016). 
Although 352 samples were collected, 24 samples were discarded because of the poor 
quality of responses.  
 
Secondly, it was followed up by semi-structured interviews with IT managers and owners 
in SMEs, using generic purposive sampling. This sampling technique is often used in a 
mixed methods context in that quantitative data are used as the basis for selecting 
qualitative samples (Bryman, 2016, p. 414). In this study, a group of respondents in the 
quantitative phase became a sampling frame from which qualitative samples were 
drawn. In the survey questionnaire guide (Appendix 1), it was mentioned that they were 
also invited to participate in a further interview. Survey respondents who expressed 
their willingness to join constituted the sampling frame for the qualitative interview 
phase. Thirty-five survey respondents accepted the invitation and 16 SMEs were 
selected from them. The selection depended upon the research questions which needed 
to be answered. The researcher also tried to reflect variation in organisational 
characteristics, such as business sector and size. This process followed the idea that data 
collection in the qualitative stage is based on the quantitative results (Creswell, 2014, p. 
224).  
 
In the generic purposive sampling, there are established criteria in selecting cases or 
contexts and the criteria are mostly informed by the research questions (Bryman, 2016). 
The unanswered questions and newly-emerged questions from the survey findings were 
important guidelines for deciding the criteria. Questionnaire answers of the 
respondents were reviewed in light of the criteria in order to identify proper samples 
that fitted into those criteria. It was a purposive process from finding the criteria to 
choosing samples. The researcher continued to collect samples until the research 
questions were fully answered.  
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Thirdly, when it comes to a sampling method for semi-structured interviews with 
government officials, snowball sampling was used. Government agencies related to this 
research were the NPA, KISA, and SMBA. At first, the researcher identified one or more 
initial participants relevant to the research topic and then the identified participants 
recruited other individuals who were relevant to the research. This sampling process 
continued until the researcher had enough samples.  
 
In terms of interviewing government officials, the researcher intended to interview 
officials working in the headquarters of the NPA, KISA, and SMBA. These agencies 
directly or indirectly addressed cyber security issues of businesses, although each 
agency took a different approach. Because cyber security polices and schemes for SMEs 
were mostly drawn up and formulated in the headquarters, and officials in local offices 
were not aware of ongoing issues and severity of the problems on the national scale.  
 
Snowball sampling is useful when it is difficult to identify appropriate participants 
(Bryman, 2016, p. 415). This difficulty was also applied to this study. Since the researcher 
had no experience in working in the cyber security field, there were no initial 
acquaintances within those agencies. Thus, the first contact was found on the official 
website of the organisations. All public organisations in South Korea provide specific 
roles and contact lists of sub-departments on their websites in order to enhance public 
accountability and transparency. Subsequently, the researcher asked the first contact 
person for more contacts in his agency relevant to the study. All interviews were carried 
out for one month (02 Feb 2017–28 Feb 2017). 
 
To sum up, both the quantitative and qualitative phases used non-probability sampling 
techniques. In the mixed methods research, using non-random samples in both 
quantitative and qualitative phases is the most frequent combination, regardless of 
research goal, objective, purpose, and question. (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007). The 
quantitative and qualitative data in this research cannot be generalised because samples 
drawn from non-probability sampling do not exhibit a proportional representation of 
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the population. The research findings are valid within the social settings germane to the 
study, which means that the application of the findings to other contexts might not be 
appropriate. This indicates that these sampling techniques might entail weak external 
validity. However, non-probability sampling was considered an appropriate choice for 
this research because this study aimed to be exploratory rather than representative.  
 
4.5.1.2. Population and sample size 
 
The total population of this study is all the SMEs in South Korea. In this study, SMEs are 
referred to as a company whose number of employees is more than 9 and less than 300 
employees (see: p. 84). As discussed in the previous chapter, the number of SMEs in this 
category was on the rise annually with a total of 479,349 in 2014 (see: Table 3.4). At the 
time of data collection the number of SMEs was estimated to be around 0.5 million.  
 
There is no hard and fast rule in terms of deciding sample size in a study. One 
misunderstanding might be that quantitative research involves large samples whereas 
qualitative research uses small samples. In fact, the sample size varies according to the 
research questions, purposes, and the research design (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007). 
It is also true that a larger variation exists between quantitative and qualitative research 
than variations within either quantitative research or qualitative research. Due to the 
differences of research orientation, both research strategies have their own criteria 
when deciding sample sizes.  
 
Large sample size is mostly applauded in quantitative research. This is because raising 
sample size increases validity and representativeness of the research while reducing 
sampling error. Determining the appropriate sample size in quantitative research largely 
depends on confidence levels and confidence intervals (Babbie, 2007). This study 
followed a general standard, which is 95 percent confidence level and plus or minus 5 
percent confidence intervals. This means that the researcher can be 95 percent 
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confident that the study findings are accurately within the interval. The sample in the 
quantitative phase consisted of 328 out of a total of 0.5 million SMEs.  
 
In a similar vein, a variation exists in the size of sample in the qualitative research 
(Bryman, 2016, p. 417). Unlike the quantitative research which has numeric criteria in 
choosing the appropriate sample size, the choice of sample sizes in qualitative research 
is decided largely by the researcher. It does not mean that the choice of sample size is 
purely subjective. When it comes to the minimum number of samples, there is no unified 
standard. Warren (2002) argued that interviewees between 20 and 30 are the minimum 
number in qualitative research, while Adler and Adler (2012) suggested that samples 
between 12 and 60 are appropriate. In the case of using interview as a data collection 
procedure, Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2006) asserted that 12 interviewees were 
sufficient if a selected group is not particularly heterogeneous.  
 
Taking a considerable variation of qualitative research into account, Bryman (2012) 
suggested five criteria in deciding sample size: (1) theoretical or data saturation, (2) 
minimum requirements for sample size, (3) the style or theoretical underpinnings of the 
research, (4) the heterogeneity of the population, (5) the breadth and scope of research 
questions. These criteria are useful guidelines not only when making a decision on 
sample size, but also when providing a justification for the decision. Among these criteria 
data saturation (theoretical saturation in studies using grounded theory) is considered 
the most important one. Data saturation suggests that samples should be collected up 
to the point at which new themes are not found in the data. It is ideal for sample sizes 
not to be too small to acquire data saturation (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007). This is the 
reason why the minimum number of samples is included in the five criteria. In this 
research, the exact number of interviewees was decided during the data collection 
process. The decision was guided by the survey findings and research questions that 
needed to be answered. The researcher ceased further sampling when similar themes 
were repeated and new themes were not identified. It was decided that 16 IT managers 
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and owners from SMEs and 9 government officials were the proper number of 
interviewees to provide meaningful findings and analyses. 
 
4.5.2. Data analysis  
 
4.5.2.1. Data analysis process 
 
The survey questionnaires contained nominal and numeric data on a range of issues 
regarding cyber security situations of SMEs. Numeric data were measured by the 5 Likert 
scale. The quantitative data collected was coded and analysed by statistical software, 
STATA (version 14). STATA has a vast array of statistical functions, carrying out analyses 
of complex quantitative data.  
 
The quantitative data was used in two ways. Firstly, descriptive statistics such as 
frequencies and percentages presented rudimentary information on each survey 
question. Secondly, inferential statistics such as chi-square tests, one-way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) and two sample t-tests were run to see whether there was an 
association among different categorical groups. These tests were undertaken mostly by 
business size and categories of business sector.  
 
To analyse the interview data, thematic analysis was used to identify patterns or themes 
within data. This is one of the most widely adopted approaches among qualitative 
analytic methods. As other analytic methods, thematic analysis has both advantages and 
disadvantages. Braun and Clarke (2006) argue that one of the advantages of thematic 
analysis is its flexibility which enables it to be applied across different types of 
epistemological paradigms. However, compared to other analytic methods such as 
grounded theory, thematic analysis is not an identifiable technique (Bryman, 2016). As 
such, there are no clear procedures of conducting thematic analysis despite its universal 
applicability. In addition, Bazeley (2013) argued that thematic analysis tends not to 
clearly explain the processes through which themes are identified and emerged from 
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data. Therefore, it is important to articulate the way that themes are identified and how 
they relate to other themes (Bryman, 2016). These processes need to be justified. It 
needs to be clearly explained how themes are associated with research questions and 
literature. The choice of an analytical method comes down to research questions, which 
implies that research questions should inform a proper method (Holloway & Todres, 
2003).  
 
This research used a thematic analysis process proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006). 
There are six phases of analysis, which is recursive process: (1) familiarizing yourself with 
your data, (2) generating initial codes, (3) searching for themes, (4) reviewing themes, 
(5) defining and naming themes, and (6) producing a report. The researcher transcribed 
interview conversations in Korean first and then translated them into English. One 
Korean-American reviewed the whole transcription to check the quality of the 
transcription. After a couple of readings of the data, the coding process started to 
generate descriptive codes, analytic codes, sub-themes and finally themes55. Analytic 
codes were examined closely to identify relationships and patterns. This thorough 
examination let the sub-themes and themes emerge from the data.  
 
The qualitative data was analysed through QSR NVivo (version 11.3) which is a 
qualitative data analysis computer software package. The software contains a wide 
range of functions such as data management, coding, and categorising of data from 
interviews, observations, and multimedia sources. Using software for data management 
is becoming the standard in qualitative research. It is essential to organise and 
manipulate large amounts of data in a way that enriches the analysis. Using software 
also supports transparency in a research process. Having the data organised in 
accessible dataset for others to be able to access and interpret from supports the broad 
goal of transparency.  
 
                                                          
55 The coding process generated 116 analytic codes, 15 sub-themes, and five main themes – 




In social science, triangulation refers to the examination of the research problem from 
at least two different perspectives or by using multiple research methods. It aims to 
increase the validity of the procedures and results of research as well as to improve the 
research rigour. This strategy is based on the premise that a research topic can be better 
comprehended if the researcher incorporates multiple perspectives (Denscombe, 2014). 
The concept of triangulation was originally used by navigators and surveyors to pinpoint 
exact locations of objects in space by combining measurements from several distinct 
points (Rothbauer, 2008). Researchers in social science also have accepted and 
developed triangulation for studying social phenomena. Because every research 
method has its own disadvantages, an examination of several sources provides benefits 
such as neutralising the disadvantages and strengthening research findings and 
interpretations. In this respect, triangulation has a substantial presence in the sphere of 
mixed methods research (Denscombe, 2014). Denzin (1978, as cited in Flick, 2004, p. 
178) recognised triangulation as a validation strategy, distinguishing the four different 
types:  
 
 (1) triangulation of data: using data from different sources,   
 (2) investigator triangulation: using different observers or interviewers, 
 (3) triangulation of theories: using different perspectives and theoretical 
  points and 
 (4) methodological triangulation: using multiple research approaches.  
 
However, there is another perspective on triangulation. Triangulation is seen as a 
strategy for substantiating and justifying knowledge by adding additional knowledge 
rather than as a validation strategy (Flick, 1992). This perspective argues that combining 
different theories or methods helps researchers obtain a comprehensive picture, adding 
breadth and depth, not accuracy (Fielding & Fielding, 1986). Rothbauer (2008) in a 
similar vein acknowledges that this strategy allows for exploration and understanding 
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different dimensions of research subjects in a way that underpins their findings and 
interpretations.  
 
This strategy was used in this study not only as a data collection technique but also as a 
data analysis technique. It was intended to maximise the validity of research findings as 
well as to gain additional knowledge. This study relied upon three different research 
methods (see: Section 4.4). The employed methods were documentary research, 
quantitative questionnaires and qualitative interviews. Among the four types of 
triangulation, this study adopted data and methodological triangulation as it used the 
data from different sources and combined both quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
In addition, when discussing all research questions in Chapter 7 triangulation was used 
as the main strategy to juxtapose the quantitative and qualitative research findings 
along with the existing literature.  
 
4.6. Research ethics 
 
Various questionable practices in social research can be broken down into four main 
ethical principles as indicated by Bryman (2016). The first principle was ‘no harm to 
participants’. Not only physical harm but also psychological harm should be avoided to 
the participants. Any particular ethical harm was found for the survey respondents and 
interviewees in this research. Especially, this study did not involve vulnerable groups 
such as children or people with disabilities. In order to prevent any harm, several 
measures were taken.  
 
 All participants were voluntary. 
 Considering the organisations that participants were employed, consent for their 
participation was gained from the host organisation. 
 Participants were clearly informed that they could withdraw at any time (also, 
they could withdraw their permission to use the data until data collection 
process ended). 
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The second principle was ‘informed consent’. All the participants were fully informed on 
the goal, purposes, and the nature of the study. According to the British Society of 
Criminology (2006), it also needed to be explained why the research was being carried 
out and how the findings would be diffused. Comprehensive information was offered to 
the participants so that they could make an informed decision on the participation of 
the research.  
 
 Participants were alerted to potential risks in invitation information. 
 Participants were reminded of the risks before the start of survey and interview. 
 Participants were informed that data would be published but would be 
untraceable and anonymous. 
 Signed consent was acquired. 
 Participants were provided with the University supervisory details for making a 
complaint. 
 
The third was ‘no invasion of privacy’. This principle was also referred as ‘anonymity and 
confidentiality’ (Robson & McCartan, 2016). Respondents could refuse to answer private 
questions even though they agreed to participate. The statement of the British 
Sociological Association (2002) suggests that the privacy principle may be undermined 
by covert methods. This research did not use any covert methods and no particular 
privacy issues were expected. It was ensured that both the survey respondents and 
interviewees were protected under anonymity and confidentiality.  
 
 Participants and employing organisations were coded anonymously 
 All data not in the public domain was anonymous  
 Data in the public domain, traceable to an anonymous participant, was 
anonymised or discarded 
 Participants were fully aware that their participation was known to the employer 
and the data gathered was visible to the employer 
 Raw data was not shared with anyone else including colleagues in the University 
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The fourth principle was ‘no deception’. Experimental research often uses deception to 
encourage natural responses of participants (Bryman, 2016). This study did not involve 
any experimental settings but sought verbal and written answers based on their pre-
existing perceptions and knowledge of their organisations. The researcher had no 
reason to use any deceptive methods to affect either the survey respondents or the 
interviewees in this study.  
 
Although the researcher explained these principles to interviewees thoroughly, it was 
noted that some of them were uncomfortable with recording their voices. In fact, among 
25 interviewees, seven56 of them brought up this issue in the middle of an interview or 
after the interview. They asked not to keep their interview recordings. Instead, they 
allowed for transcribing their recordings, but wanted to discard the recorded files after 
the transcription process. The researcher made sure that their interview recordings 
were deleted after transcribing them. Therefore, their requests did not affect the data 
collection and analysis phases. This example demonstrates that the researcher 
respected the ethical requirements and privacy of all research participants.  
 
The researcher had a dual role throughout the research.57 It was necessary to consider 
the implications of the police officer-researcher role. In principle, the police officer is 
obliged to abide by the law, while the researcher has the ethical obligation to keep 
respondents’ anonymity and confidentiality. The former and the latter may produce 
different responses when they are informed of a crime by a respondent. In this regard 
there may be a role conflict during the research process. In this situation, the researcher 
would have followed his professional sense. In other words, any disclosure of an 
unreported crime during the research would have led the researcher to report it to both 
                                                          
56 Two interviewees were from officials from the public sector organisations and five were from 
SMEs.  
57 The researcher has worked as a police officer in the National Police Agency in South Korea 
for about 10 years. He was officially permitted to take extended leave from the job to pursue a 
Ph.D. in the UK for 3-5 years. 
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the host organisation and the authorities. However, the researcher did not face any 
situations related to a conflict within his role.  
 
There was a concern that the dual status could have a negative impact on the reliability 
of the study. For example, respondents might have tried to give the answers that the 
researcher wanted. For this reason it may be argued that the status as a police officer 
should not have been revealed. However, the researcher gave accurate information on 
the status of the researcher to research subjects by disclosing his dual status. In addition, 
it was emphasised that the researcher was officially exempted from his police duty until 
his research finishes and that the research would not be influenced by his role as a police 
officer. Another concern that required attention was that his police uniform might have 
had improper influence over the respondents and interviewees. As the researcher was 
not on official duty, there was no need to wear his uniform during the research.  
 
These aforementioned measures were expected to greatly minimise the possible undue 
influence of the police status on the subjects. However, it should be admitted that the 
significance of this research was pointed out to the survey respondents and 
interviewees before any form of participation started. This was intended not to elicit 




This chapter summarised the research process that was adopted in this study. The 
development of this chapter followed a logical order from suggesting research 
paradigms and methodology to presenting the data collection and analysis processes. In 
particular, considerable attention has been paid to the justification on why mixed 
methods research and, subsequently, explanatory sequential mixed methods have been 
chosen for this research, drawing on the research questions, aim and orientation.  
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The integration of quantitative and qualitative approaches was designed to effectively 
address the research questions by using survey questionnaires and qualitative 
interviews. There was a limitation in generalisation and replication of the findings in that 
both quantitative and qualitative phases were dependent upon non-random sampling 
techniques. Although the inability to generalise findings is a weakness of this research, 
this could be compensated for by using the mixed methods approach (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2011). Also, the choice of the research design in this study was the result of 
calculated decision-making, acknowledging the trade-off between generalising the 
findings and satisfying research aims and questions. Lastly, this chapter discussed 
research ethics germane to the researcher and this study. Ethical issues included the 
role conflict between a researcher and a police officer. The following chapters present 







CHAPTER 5: QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS - CYBER SECURITY IN 




This chapter discusses the results of the survey and provides detailed analysis of the 
results. The primary purposes of the survey were: (1) to assess current situations that 
SMEs face in relation to cyber security and (2) to identify whether there are some 
differences depending on business sectors and sizes. The survey consisted of two 
sections which included 37 questions58. Section A focuses on delivering assessment of 
SMEs’ current situation. Section B includes questions for backgrounds of a company and 
socio-demographic questions. The survey questionnaire is attached in Appendix 1. 
 
The survey questionnaire contained both nominal data and numeric data. Using the 
statistical package STATA (version 14.0), this analysis consists of descriptive statistics 
and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics (e.g., frequencies and percentages) 
illustrated the basic features of the data, while inferential statistics (e.g., chi-square tests, 
one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), and two sample t-tests) were used to see 
whether there was an association among different categorical groups.  
 
As explained in Chapter 1, the five research questions of this thesis served as reference 
points to guide the organisation of the survey questionnaire. The questions in the 
questionnaire were built upon a set of questions that HM Government (Department for 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 2016, 2017, 2018) used to explore the cyber security 
situation in the UK. The research questions are explored through an examination of 
survey responses. Profiles of the SMEs surveyed are provided in Section 5.2 and results 
and analyses are presented in Section 5.3. Lastly, Section 5.4 suggests the main themes 
found from the analyses.  
                                                          
58 Section A includes 26 questions, section B includes 11 questions.  
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5.2. Profiling the survey respondents 
 
This study is built on a sample of 328 respondents from SMEs selected from the 
population described in the previous chapter. Creating a profile is a first stepping stone 
to analysing survey data in that respondents and their SMEs could then be formally 
classified through various characteristics based on the profile. A profile of the 
respondents consists of two organisation-specific characteristics. Those are the type of 
business organisation and the number of employees.  
 
Business sector classification followed ‘Industry classification by company size’ (SMBA, 
2016) as suggested in Chapter 3 (see: Table 3.4). The number of missing responses was 
very small: five (1.5%) in the question on business sector and two (0.6%) in the question 
on business size. There was much variation among business sectors. Only 0.9% of SMEs 
were in the transportation and storage or the real estate sectors but as many as 38.1% 
in the manufacturing sector (see: Table 5.1). In this chapter we reduce this variation by 
also grouping businesses according to the orientation of their services: 
 
 (1) services largely directed at the public,  
 (2) services largely directed at organisations,  
 (3) public services and  
 (4) manufacturing and construction.  
 
In terms of business size, 40 more samples of small businesses (184 cases) were 
collected than medium businesses (142 cases). However, the proportion gap between 
small businesses (56.1%) and medium businesses (43.3%) is not disproportionately large. 





















2 1 0 3 0.9% 
Real estate 3 0 0 3 0.9% 
Arts, entertainment 
and recreation 
3 1 0 4 1.2% 
Repair and extra 
service activities 
7 5 1 13 4.0% 
Financial and 
insurance activities 











20 9 0 29 8.8% 
Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 
12 14 0 26 7.9% 
Education service 
activities 
12 4 0 16 4.9% 
Public services 
(14.9%) 
Human health and 
social work activities 
8 7 0 15 4.6% 
Environmental service 
activities 
7 11 0 18 5.5% 
Manufacturing 59 65 1 125 38.1% Manufacturing 
and 
construction 
(45.4%) Construction 14 10 0 24 7.3% 
Missing 3 2 0 5 1.5% (1.5%) 
Total 184 142 2 328 100% 100% 
Percentage 56.1% 43.3% 0.6% 100%   
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Services largely directed at public 42 16 1 59 18.0% 
Services largely directed at 
organisations 
39 27 0 66 20.1% 
Public services 27 22 0 49 14.9% 
Manufacturing and construction 73 75 1 149 45.4% 
Missing 3 2 0 5 1.5% 
Total 184 142 2 328 100% 
Percentage 56.1% 43.3% 0.6% 100%  
 
5.3. Results and analysis  
 
In this section, SMEs’ cyber security situation is assessed. In the survey, questions were 
categorised into five groups which represent differing themes. Overall, these categories 
are intended to explore the current cyber security context in which SMEs operate their 
business. The objective of the survey is to have an awareness of management 
arrangements and surrounding contexts of SMEs because there is an obvious lack of 
situational assessment on SMEs in South Korea. These are the five categories: 
 
 (1) business connectedness to ICTs and their significance, 
 (2) incidence and impact of cyber security breaches, 
 (3) approaches to cyber security risks, 
 (4) dealing with cyber security breaches and 
 (5) information acquisition and relationship with external organisations.  
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5.3.1. Business connectedness to ICTs and their significance 
 
The vast majority of Korean SMEs adopted online services in some form (Figure 5.1). 
‘Email addresses for organisation or employees’ (87.2%) was identified as the most 
prevalent online service, followed by ‘a website or blog’ (64.9%) and ‘online business 
bank account’ (39.0%). There was a noticeable distinction in the use of online services. 
Most businesses used online services for communications (i.e., email addresses) and 
advertising (i.e., website or blog and accounts on social media sites) purposes. By 
contrast, online services for business transactions (i.e., ordering or booking by 
customers) and financial transactions (i.e., bank accounts) were used by around a third 
of businesses (respectively, 27.4% and 39.0%). 
 
1. Which of the following, if any, does your company currently have or use? 
(multiple choice) 
 
Figure 5.1 Types of online services that SMEs use 
Keys 
① Email addresses for your company or its employees    
② A website or blog 
③ Accounts or pages on social media sites (e.g., Facebook or Twitter)  
④ The ability for customers to order, book or pay for products or services online 


















① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥
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About a third (32.6%) of the respondents replied that online services were either 
‘important’ or ‘very important’ elements in their businesses (Figure 5.2). On the other 
hand, approximately half (46.0%) of the SMEs did not consider online services as a core 
part of their business offering (i.e., ‘not at all important’ or ‘not very important’). About 
a fifth (21.3%) gave a neutral reply. There were 44 more negative responses than 
positive ones, which was translated into a 13.4 percentage point difference. The fact 
that negative answers outnumbered positive ones may be counterintuitive when 
considering that South Korea is one of the most connected societies in the world (ITU, 
2015b; OECD, 2017b; UN, 2014a). However, it highlights that SMEs did not recognise 
their business dependence upon online services as much as they actually used them 
(Figure 5.1). 
 
2. To what extent, if at all, are online services a core part of the goods or services 
your company provides?  
 
Figure 5.2 SMEs’ perception on online services 
 
The extent to which SMEs considered online elements within their businesses varied 
considerably by business size. Medium firms were more likely to consider online services 
as significant business elements than small firms. While slightly less than a fifth (19.0%) 

















③Neutral ④Important ⑤Very important 
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viewed in the same way. Similarly, a 14.1 percentage point more of medium firms 
answered ‘important’ than small firms did (28.2% versus 14.1%). The t-test59 showed 
that medium and small businesses had a significantly different perception of online 
services (p<0.001)60.  
 
Table 5.3: t-test statistics on the perception on online services by business size 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval 
Small 184 2.54 0.09 1.21 2.36 2.71 
Medium 142 3.16 0.11 1.34 2.94 3.38 
diff 326 -0.62 0.14  
diff = mean(Small) - mean(Medium) Ha: diff < 0 t value df 
  .000 -4.41 324 
 
The use of personally-owned devices for regular work within a firm is a widespread 
phenomenon in Korea. Although the widespread use of personally-owned devices at 
work brings convenience to staff, this also means that firms face another set of cyber 
security risks. Staff in the overwhelming majority (77.7%) of businesses used their own 
devices to some extent (Figure 5.3). However, it was notable that the median in the 
proportion of staff who used their own devices was ‘1-20%’ and this proportion went 
down as the value went up. The results highlight that the extent of actual use of 
personally-owned devices by staff was not considerably high within a firm. 
 
                                                          
59 A t-test is used when a researcher wants to compare two different groups on a variable of 
interest (by comparing the means of the two groups) or the same group before and after some 
event (Emerson, 2017). 
60 In statistical hypothesis testing, the p value is the probability that a researcher would get the 
result by chance if the null hypothesis is true (Acock, 2016). In this case, the null hypothesis is 
that medium businesses’ perception on online services is not different from small businesses’. 
The result that p < 0.001 means that there would be less than one time in 1,000 by chance of 
obtaining the result if the null hypothesis is true. Thus, it rejects the null hypothesis, concludes 
that medium businesses’ perception on online services is different from small businesses’. 
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3. How many employees in your company use personally-owned devices such as 
smartphones, tablets, home laptops or desktop computers to carry out regular 
business-related activities? 
 
Figure 5.3 Proportion of staff who use personally‐owned devices for regular work 
 
Also, there was a difference by business sector. Over half (58.3%) of businesses in the 
financial and insurance sector and less than half (41.4%) of businesses in the information 
and communication sector replied that more than 80% (‘81–100%’) of staff used their 
own devices at work. On the contrary, manufacturing and construction sectors showed 
the opposite tendency. Over a fifth (23.2%) and a half (50.0%) of businesses, respectively, 
in manufacturing sector and construction sector answered that no staff used their own 
devices at work.    
 
Cloud computing was widely adopted by Korean businesses, with about four fifths 
(83.2%) of businesses using some sort of externally-hosted web services (Figure 5.4). 
Only a minority (16.8%) of businesses did not use them in any form. Over a third (39.4%) 
















①None ②1-20% ③21-40% ④41-60% ⑤61-80% ⑥81-100%
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4. Does your company currently use any externally-hosted web services, for 
example to host your website or corporate email accounts, or for storing or 
transferring data?  
 
Figure 5.4 SMEs’ use of externally‐hosted web services  
 
The use of cloud computing differed by business size. Medium companies were more 
likely to use externally-hosted services for any reason than small companies. Less than 
a third (27.2%) of small companies used these services more than ‘often’, compared to 
over half (55.6%) of medium companies. According to the t-test result, medium 
businesses used externally-hosted web services more often than small businesses 
(p<0.001), which supports the argument that cloud computing tends to be more 
acceptable as the company size grows (Brender & Markov, 2013; Truong, 2010).  
 
Table 5.4: t-test statistics on the use of externally-hosted web services by business size 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval 
Small 184 2.55 0.10 1.30 2.37 2.74 
Medium 142 3.45 0.10 1.25 3.25 3.66 
diff 326 -0.90 0.14  
diff = mean(Small) - mean(Medium) Ha: diff < 0 t value df 













①Never ②Not very often ③Neutral ④Often ⑤Very often
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Less than half (42.4%) of businesses considered externally-hosted web services were 
more than ‘critical’ to their businesses. It should be noted that the frequency 
distribution of answers in Figure 5.5 was quite similar to that of answers in Figure 5.4. 
The similar pattern of the frequency distribution graphs may imply that these two 
variables were associated. As a proof of the association, the correlation value between 
these two variables was .65 which was statistically significant at the .05 level. This 
indicates that the perception of whether these externally-hosted web services were 
critical to the respondents’ companies (Figure 5.5) was highly related to the actual use 
of these services (Figure 5.4). 
 
5. How critical, if at all, are these externally-hosted web services to your company?  
 
Figure 5.5 Criticality of externally‐hosted web services 
 
Perception on the criticality of cloud computing services varied by size band. Over half 
(53.5%) of medium firms viewed these services as more than ‘critical’ to their businesses, 
compared to about a third (34.2%) of small firms. The t-test analysis confirmed that the 
















①Not at all 
critical 
②Not very critical ③Neutral ④Critical ⑤Very critical
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Table 5.5: t-test statistics on criticality of externally-hosted web services by business 
size 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval 
Small 184 2.81 0.09 1.28 2.63 2.99 
Medium 142 3.43 0.11 1.26 3.22 3.64 
diff 326 -0.62 0.14  
diff = mean(Small) - mean(Medium) Ha: diff < 0 t value df 
  .000 -4.37 324 
 
5.3.2. Incidence and impact of cyber security breaches 
 
Over half (55.4%) of the SMEs have experienced one or more cyber security breaches in 
the last 12 months. Among the affected businesses (n=182), the vast majority (76.4%) 
suffered fewer than 5 breaches and the proportion of the affected businesses went 
down dramatically as the number of breaches increased. As a consequence, SMEs can 
be formed into two broad groups:  
 
 (1) a group which did not suffer any breaches and  
 (2) a group which suffered a few breaches. 
 
In addition, it is worth mentioning that a tenth (10.1%) of the respondents did not know 
whether their businesses experienced cyber-attacks. Businesses which answered ‘Don’t 
know’ consisted of 18 small firms (9.8% of the total small firms) and 15 medium firms 
(10.6% of the total medium firms), which did not show any meaningful difference. 
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6. Approximately, how many cyber security breaches or attacks have you 
experienced in total over the last 12 months? 
 
Figure 5.6 Experience of cyber security breaches or attacks 
Keys 
① None  ⑤ 15 to fewer than 20 
② Fewer than 5  ⑥ 20 to fewer than 50 
③ 5 to fewer than 10 ⑦ 50 or more 
④ 10 to fewer than 15 ⑧ Don’t know 
 
Overall, there was a negative relationship between breach experience and the size of a 
firm (Table 5.6). The incidence of breaches was found to be significantly different by 
business size, with over two thirds (68.1%) of small firms and about half (52.8%) of 
medium firms having experienced breaches over the last 12 months61. The association 
between breach experience and business size was statistically significant (p=.008). 
STATA showed that tau-b was -.160, which showed a weak relationship. 62  The 
asymptotic standard error (ASE) for tau-b was .058. And if tau-b is divided by this 
estimated standard error, the z test value is obtained. Here, z=-.160/.058=2.76. This z 
                                                          
61 ‘Don’t know’ responses were excluded from this analysis.  
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value was significant at the .05 level. 63  It means that the weak relationship was 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 5.6: Cross-tabulation of Cyber security breach experience and business size 
 Cyber security breach experience 
No Yes Total 
Small 53 113 166 
Medium  60 67 127 
Total 113 180 293 
           Pearson chi2(1) = 7.124           Pr=.008 
            Kendall’s tau-b = -.156            ASE=.058 
 
Among those SMEs (n=132) which claimed online services were ‘not very important’ and 
‘not at all important’ to their business offer, less than two thirds (64.4%) experienced 
any form of breach64. On the contrary, among businesses (99 SMEs) that considered 
online services were ‘important’ and ‘very important’ to their business offer, about half 
(53.5%) have experienced breaches. A t-test confirmed that businesses which had no 
breach experience considered online services as more essential than businesses which 
had breach experience (p=.025). 
 
Table 5.7: t-test statistics on the perception on online services by breach experience 
 Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval 
Breach 
experience 
No 113 3.02 0.13 1.33 2.77 3.26 
Yes 182 2.71 0.10 1.30 2.52 2.90 
 diff 295 0.31 0.16  
diff = mean(No) - mean(Yes) Ha: diff > 0 t value df 
  .025 1.97 293 
 
                                                          
63 If z > ± 1.96 then it is significant at the .05 level and if z >± 2.60 it is significant at the .01 level. 
64 ‘Don’t know’ responses were excluded from this analysis. 
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Another factor related to breach experience was the business sector that a firm 
belonged to (Table 5.8). A chi-square test showed that cyber breach experiences and 
categories of business sectors were associated (p=.008). Businesses that provided 
‘public services’ were either more targeted by offenders or unprepared for cyber threats 
than businesses in other sectors. The opposite interpretation could be given to 
businesses that provided ‘services largely directed at organisations’. 
 
Table 5.8: Cross-tabulation of cyber security breach experience and categories of 
business sector 
 
Categories of business sector 





Frequency 22 30 8 51 111 
Expected 
frequency 
20 23 17 51 111 
Yes 
Frequency 31 29 36 83 179 
Expected 
frequency 
33 36 27 83 179 
 Total 53 59 44 134 290 
              Pearson chi2(3) = 11.704   Pr=.008  
 
Keys 
① Services largely directed at public ③ Public services 
② Services largely directed at organisations ④ Manufacturing and construction 
 
The most common type of breaches experienced (Figure 5.7) were infections with 
viruses, spyware or malware (75.8%, 138 out of 182) and stealing money through 
fraudulent emails or fake websites (33.5%). There was a very large gap between the two. 
Other noticeable types were unauthorised access (19.2%) and denial-of-service attacks 
(17.6%). Figure 5.7 was comparable to Figure 5.8 in that the most prevalent source of 
the breach was reported as emails, email attachments, or websites (53.8%, 98 out of 
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182), followed by malware authors (38.5%). This reaffirmed that Korean SMEs were 
plagued by massive viruses and malware via email attachments or websites (Symantec, 
2017). Against this backdrop, malware authors were seen as the main source of these 
attacks. Considering that the vast majority of the SMEs used emails and websites for 
their business (see: Figure 5.1), it was clear that they were constantly exposed to cyber 
security breaches. 
 
7. Which of the following have happened to your company in the last 12 months? 
(multiple choice) 
 
Figure 5.7 Types of breaches experienced 
Keys 
① Denial-of-service attacks  
② Access to computers, networks or services without permission (i.e., hacking) 
③ Money stolen electronically (e.g., through online banking)  
④ Money stolen through fraudulent emails or fake websites  
⑤ Personal information (e.g., customer data) stolen electronically  
⑥ People damaging or stealing software from your computers or network  
⑦ People downloading unlicensed/stolen software to computers or network  
⑧ Computers becoming infected with viruses, spyware or malware 
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⑩ Others impersonating company in emails or online 
⑪ Breaches from personally-owned devices  
⑫ Breaches from externally-hosted web services  
⑬ Breaches on social media  
⑭ Other  
 
8. As far as you know, who or what was the source of the breach or attack? 
(multiple choice) 
 
Figure 5.8 Sources of breaches or attacks 
Keys 
① Third party suppliers ⑧ Nation-state intelligence services 
② Activists ⑨ Natural (e.g., flood, fire, etc.) 
③ Competitors ⑩ Non-professional hackers 
④ Emails (attachments) / websites ⑪ Organised crime 
⑤ Current employees ⑫ Terrorists 
⑥ Former employees ⑬ Other 
⑦ Malware authors ⑭ Don’t know 
 
The direct costs of breaches include repair costs for business continuity, extra work 
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against incoming attacks. In the long term, other impacts include loss of revenue, lawsuit 
costs, and reputational damage. These long-term costs are difficult to measure. Slightly 
over a third (34.1%) of SMEs did not know the financial costs, with a similar number 
(33.5%) estimating the impacts as under £500. Although the average cost of a breach 
could not be accurately calculated due to insufficient information, the mean cost was 
expected to be low. This was because, excluding ‘don’t know’ responses, most cases 
(70.8%, 85 out of 120) cost under £1,000 and about half (50.8%, 61 out of 120) under 
£500. 
 
9. Approximately how much, if anything, do you think the cyber security breaches 
or attacks you have experienced in the last 12 months have cost your company 
financially?  
 
Figure 5.9 Estimated costs of breaches or attacks 
Keys 
① Less than £500 ⑥ £20,000 to less than £50,000 
② £500 to less than £1,000 ⑦ £50,000 to less than £ 100,000 
③ £1,000 to less than £5,000 ⑧ £100,000 or more 
④ £5,000 to less than £10,000 ⑨ Don’t know 



















① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨
164 
Slightly under half (48.4%) of breaches were detected by anti-virus or anti-malware 
software. As these software are regularly updated by providers, they provide 
convenience for business users at low cost. These software are a one-size-fits-all 
approach, as once installed no further configurations or efforts are needed. The second 
and third most prevalent ways for detection were disruption to business (22.5%) and by 
accident (21.4%). These ways are reactive rather than proactive. Being aware of attacks 
upon disruption to business may be the worst scenario in that damage from a breach 
has already occurred. The fact that a fifth (21.4%) of businesses identified breaches by 
accident indicates that there were a large number of attempted attacks which were not 
detected. All the aforementioned detection methods did not involve any internal control 
mechanisms or security management processes. 
 
On the other hand, identification by reports from staff or contractors (14.8%) and 
routine internal security monitoring (13.2%) are more proactive methods. These 
methods indicate that there is an organisational structure for cyber security. In other 
words, internal control mechanisms are, to some extent, active in a company. It is 
expected that a business will be willing to adopt these proactive methods as their 
business management becomes more structured. Adopting proactive methods is 
recommended in that they are more likely to detect not only breaches but also 
attempted attacks earlier than reactive methods.  
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10. How was the breach or attack identified? (multiple choice) 
 
Figure 5.10 Methods for identifying breaches or attacks 
Keys 
① By accident  
② By antivirus/anti-malware software  
③ Disruption to business/staff/users/ service provision 
④ From warning by government/law enforcement  
⑤ Our breach/attack reported by the media 
⑥ Similar incidents reported in the media  
⑦ Reported/noticed by customers/customer complaints 
⑧ Reported/noticed by staff/contractors  
⑨ Routine internal security monitoring 
⑩ Other internal control activities not done routinely (e.g., reconciliations, audits) 
⑪ Other  
⑫ Don’t know 
 
Regarding the impact of breaches, there was a considerable variety in replies (Figure 
5.11). Two impacts that stood out were stopping staff from carrying out their day-to-
day work (53.8%) and any other repair or recovery costs (46.2%). These impacts are 
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measures for protecting against future attacks (22.0%) is a necessary follow-up response 
after the business disruption. These impacts are classified as direct or short-term 
impacts which require organisational responses within a short period of time. In contrast, 
some respondents did not think their firms experienced indirect or long-term impacts 
such as loss of revenue (1.6%), fines from regulators (0.0%), and reputational damage 
(6.6%) as often as direct or short-term impacts. 
 
11. Thinking of all the breaches or attacks experienced in the last 12 months, have 
these impacted your company in any of the following ways? (multiple choice) 
 
Figure 5.11 Types of the impact of breaches or attacks 
Keys 
① Stopped staff from carrying out their day-to-day work  
② Loss of revenue or share value  
③ Additional staff time to address the breach, or to inform customers or stakeholders 
④ Any other repair or recovery costs  
⑤ New measures needed to prevent or protect against future breaches or attacks 
⑥ Lost or stolen assets  
⑦ Fines from regulators or authorities, or associated legal costs  
⑧ Reputational damage  
⑨ Prevented provision of goods or services to customers  
⑩ Discouraged you from carrying out a future business activity you were intending to do  
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Even though ‘reputational damage’ (6.6%) was not recognised as a crucial impact on 
overall businesses, it was perceived differently depending on business size. Medium 
firms were more likely to suffer reputational damage than small firms (6.3% versus 1.6%). 
And, the association between reputational damage and business size was statistically 
significant (p=.025). However, no association was found between reputational damage 
and business sector categories (p=.903).  
 
Table 5.9: Cross-tabulation of reputational damage and business size 
 Business size 
Small Medium Total 
Reputational  
damage 
Yes 3 9 12 
No 181 133 314 
Total 184 142 326 
             Pearson chi2(1) = 5.010           Pr=.025 
 
Table 5.10: Cross-tabulation of reputational damage and categories of business sector 
 Categories of business sector 
1 2 3 4 Total 
Reputational  
damage 
Yes 2 3 1 6 12 
No 57 63 48 143 311 
Total 59 66 49 149 323 
                         Pearson chi2(3) = 0.569           Pr=.903 
 
Keys 
① Services largely directed at public ③ Public services 




5.3.3. Approaches to cyber security risks 
 
Less than half (42.4%) of businesses did not have formal cyber security policies (Figure 
5.12). Businesses that did not dictate the policies were distributed equally across all size 
bands (p=.980) and business sector categories (p=.101). Security aspects on removable 
devices (44.5%) and acceptable behaviours of staff (32.9%) were more commonly 
included in their policies. Alongside these two security aspects, use of personally-owned 
devices (29.6%) involved risks occurring within a company. On the other hand, risks 
coming from outside were derived from aspects such as remote or mobile working 
(29.9%) and use of cloud computing (24.1%). These aspects were not included in policies 
as often as the aspects of inside risks. This indicates that Korean businesses were more 
aware of, and prepared for, risks from inside than from outside. 
 
12. Which of the following aspects, if any, are covered within your cyber security-
related policy, or policies? (multiple choice) 
 
Figure 5.12 Adoption of cyber security‐related policies 
Keys 
① What can be stored on removable devices (e.g., USB sticks, CDs etc.)  
② Remote or mobile working (e.g., from home)  
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④ Use of personally-owned devices for business activities  
⑤ Use of new digital technologies such as cloud computing 
⑥ Data classification  
⑦ A Document Management System  
⑧ Other  
⑨ No policy adopted 
 
Slightly more businesses (35.4%) said that cyber security was a ‘low’ or ‘very low’ priority 
to senior management than those (32.1%) whose senior managers treated it as a ‘high’ 
or ‘very high’ priority (Figure 5.13). The remainder (32.6%) gave a neutral reply. 
 
13. How high or low a priority is cyber security to your company’s directors or senior 
management? 
 
Figure 5.13 Cyber security as a priority to directors or senior management 
 
A t-test showed there was no difference in senior management’s perception on cyber 
security between small and medium firms (p=.744). However, a noticeable difference 
was found when a business sector was allowed for. As might be expected, senior 
managers in the majority of financial and insurance firms (83.3%) and information and 
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whereas only a small minority of manufacturing firms (13.6%) and construction firms 
(4.2%) showed the same tendency.  
 
Table 5.11: t-test statistics on senior mangers’ perception on cyber security by 
business size 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval 
Small 184 2.93 0.09 1.16 2.76 3.10 
Medium 142 2.97 0.10 1.16 2.78 3.16 
diff 326 -0.04 0.13  
diff = mean(Small) - mean(Medium) Ha: diff != 0 t value df 
  .744 -0.33 324 
 
There was a difference in priorities between business sector categories. As to the mean 
of those categories, the mean of businesses that provided ‘services largely directed at 
organisations’ heavily outnumbered that of businesses in ‘manufacturing and 
construction sectors' (3.8 versus 2.5). ANOVA test confirmed the overall group 
differences (p=.037). However, the ANOVA test itself does not show which group is 
different from which. Therefore, a set of independent tests were needed to see the 
detailed nature of group differences. A multiple-comparison procedure, Bonferroni, 
found out that all individual group differences were statistically significant except the 
difference between ‘services largely directed at public’ and ‘public services’ (p=1.000).    
 
Table 5.12: ANOVA on senior managers’ perception on cyber security by categories of 
business sector 
Source SS df MS F Prob > F 
Between groups 83.85 3 27.95 25.30 0.0000 
Within groups 352.45 310 1.105   
Total 436.30 322 1.35   
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(3) = 8.50    Prob>chi2 = .037 
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Table 5.13: Bonferroni test between categories of business sector 





2. Services largely 
directed at 
organisations 
3. Public services 





















One hypothesis was that the importance of online services to their businesses was 
associated with senior management’s perception of cyber security. It could be explained 
that SMEs that said online services were core to their goods or services tended to regard 
cyber security as a high priority. Businesses that regarded cyber security as ‘high’ or ‘very 
high’ said that their goods or services were ‘important’ or ‘very important’ rather than 
‘not at all important’ or ‘not very important’ (56.2%, versus 27.6%). The correlation value 
of .37 showed that the two variables (business’ dependence upon online services in 
Figure 5.2 and treatment of cyber security on agendas in Figure 5.13) were moderately 
associated.  
 
Table 5.14: Correlation between business’ dependence on online services (question2) 
and the treatment of cyber security as a priority (question13)  
 Question 2 Question 13 





                                                          
65 This figure is the mean difference of the two business sector categories.  
66 This figure is the p-value associated with the two business sector categories.  
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Just over a third (36.9%) of businesses did not provide cyber security training to their 
staff in the last 12 months, whereas over half (55.8%) businesses provided their staff 
with some cyber security training. Among businesses (n=183) which offered training, the 
frequency of training centred on either ‘less than once a year’ or ‘annually’ (81.4%) 
rather than more than ‘quarterly’ (18.6%). 
 
14. Over the last 12 months, has your company provided employees with internal 
cyber security trainings? 
 
Figure 5.14 Provision of internal cyber security trainings 
 
Provision of cyber security training was associated with how important cyber security 
was to senior management (Figure 5.13). Among businesses (n=24) whose answer was 
‘don’t know’ in question 14, exactly two thirds (66.7%) of them replied that cyber 
security was either a ‘low’ or ‘very low’ priority to their senior managers. Similarly, 
among businesses (n=116) whose cyber security was either a ‘low’ or ‘very low’ priority 
to their senior managers, slightly less than two thirds (63.8%) of them had never asked 








①Never ②Less than 
once a year 
③Annually ④Quarterly ⑤Monthly ⑥Weekly ⑦Don’t know
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The association between staff training and the treatment of cyber security as a priority 
was supported by the correlation value of .6167. This indicates that the two variables had 
a moderate positive relationship which was statistically significant (p<.001). By size band, 
cyber security training was more prevalent in medium firms (63.4%) than small firms 
(50.0%).  
 
Table 5.15: Correlation between the treatment of cyber security as a priority 
(question13) and staff trainings (question14)  
 Question 13 Question 14 






Under a third (28.0%) of businesses did not have any governance or risk management 
arrangements in place (Figure 5.15). The most common type of governance was using 
staff members whose job role included cyber security or governance (41.8%), followed 
by having board members with responsibility for cyber security (36.0%). These risk 
management arrangements were dependent upon human resources, taking advantage 
of insiders within a company. This means that cyber security was mainly governed by 
internal mechanisms involving human factors. 
 
This reflected a widespread aspect of organisational culture of Korean businesses. 
Korean businesses have a strong tendency to point out who is responsible for a certain 
issue. They consider the proverb, “Everybody's business is nobody's business”, as an 
axiom for business management. However, it should be studied further whether the 
responsible staff or board members had expertise in cyber security or whether the 
assigning responsibility primarily aimed to penalise someone in case of a damage 
incurred from a breach. This is discussed further in Sections 6.2.2 and 7.2.3.1. Under a 
                                                          
67 ‘Don’t know’ responses were excluded from this analysis. 
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third (30.2%) of businesses had policies covering cyber security risks and one in five 
(22.6%) depended on outsourced providers. A business continuity plan was only 
adopted by a small minority (14.0%).  
 
15. Which of the following governance or risk management arrangements, if any, do 
you have in place? (multiple choice) 
 
Figure 5.15 Governance or risk management arrangements 
Keys 
① Board members with responsibility for cyber security   
② An outsourced provider that manages your cyber security  
③ A formal policy or policies in place covering cyber security risks  
④ A Business Continuity Plan  
⑤ Staff members whose job role includes cyber security or governance  
⑥ Other  
⑦ None of these 
⑧ Don’t know 
 
Senior managers in over a third (38.7%) of businesses were never given an update on 
any actions taken around cyber security (Figure 5.16). The obvious lack of reporting 
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followed by manufacturing (49.6%), wholesale/retailing (45.8%), and construction 
(41.7%) businesses. All financial and insurance firms had an internal reporting structure 
on cyber security updates at least quarterly. Across the board, no senior management 
was given updates on a daily basis. Businesses (n=5) that reported weekly were all 
medium firms and three of them belonged to the financial and insurance sector. 
 
16. Approximately how often, if at all, are your company’s directors or senior 
management given an update on any actions taken around cyber security?  
 
Figure 5.16 Cyber security updates for directors or senior management 
 
Among businesses (n=127) whose senior managers were never updated on cyber 
security actions taken, slightly over half (53.5%) of them rated cyber security as a ‘low’ 
or ‘very low’ priority and one in ten (12.6%) of them considered cyber security a ‘high’ 
or ‘very high’ priority. It was highly likely that senior managers were not keen to be 
updated if they did not perceive cyber security as a high priority, and the positive 
relationship between cyber security updates and acceptance of cyber security as a 
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Table 5.16: Correlation between the treatment of cyber security as a priority 
(question13) and cyber security updates (question16)  
 Question 13 Question 16 






A small number of businesses (n=16) showed the opposite tendency. Those businesses 
replied that their senior managers were never given an update, although they viewed 
cyber security as more than a ‘high’ priority. This underlines that their senior 
management’s perception on cyber security (i.e., acceptance as a priority) was detached 
from their actual engagement (i.e., cyber security updates). There was a large difference 
between the perception and engagement. 
 
Some form of action to identify cyber security risks was taken by the large majority 
(82.0%) of SMEs (Figure 5.17). Among the choices suggested, regular health checks 
(68.3%) were shown as the most widely adopted action, while ad-hoc health checks 
beyond regular processes (27.4%) or an internal audit (22.6%) were adopted by less than 
a third of SMEs.  
 
Chi-square tests showed that internal audit (p=.009), ad-hoc health checks (p=.001), and 
risk assessment (p=.011) were associated positively with business size. Medium firms 
had a greater tendency to implement these measures than small firms (internal audit: 
29.6% versus 17.4%, ad-hoc health checks: 36.6% versus 20.7%, risk assessment: 23.9% 
versus 13.0%). However, no group difference was found in adopting regular health 
checks (p=.409). This indicates that business-as-usual health checks were widely used by 
all business sizes as a generic prescription, while other measures were more likely to be 
adopted as business size increased.      
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Table 5.17: Cross-tabulation of measures taken to identify risks (an internal audit) and 
business size 
 Small Medium Total 
An internal 
audit 
Yes 32 42 74 
No 152 100 252 
Total 184 142 326 
            Pearson chi2(1) = 6.783         Pr=.009 
 
Table 5.18: Cross-tabulation of measures taken to identify risks (ad-hoc health checks) 
and business size 
 Small Medium Total 
Ad-hoc health 
checks 
Yes 38 52 90 
No 146 90 236 
Total 184 142 326 
             Pearson chi2(1) = 10.225         Pr=.001 
 
Table 5.19: Cross-tabulation of measures taken to identify risks (risk assessment) and 
business size 
 Small Medium Total 
Risk 
assessment 
Yes 24 34 58 
No 160 108 268 
Total 184 142 326 
             Pearson chi2(1) = 6.511         Pr=.011 
 
Table 5.20: Cross-tabulation of measures taken to identify risks (regular health checks) 
and business size 
 Small Medium Total 
Regular 
health checks 
Yes 123 101 224 
No 61 41 102 
Total 184 142 326 
             Pearson chi2(1) = 0.683         Pr=.409 
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17. Which of the following, if any, have you done over the last 12 months to identify 
cyber security risks to your company? (multiple choice)  
 
Figure 5.17 Measures taken to identify cyber security risks 
Keys 
① An internal audit 
② Any business-as-usual health checks that are undertaken regularly 
③ Ad-hoc health checks or reviews beyond your regular processes 
④ A risk assessment covering cyber security risks 
⑤ Invested in threat intelligence 
⑥ Other 
⑦ None of these 
 
5.3.4. Dealing with cyber security breaches 
 
Cyber security rules and controls could be classified into three groups depending on the 
responses. Over half of businesses said they applied software updates (66.5%) and 
malware protection updates (74.4%), and configured firewalls appropriately (50.9%). 
These types of controls were intuitive to adopt in that they require low resources. A set 
of updates were intended mainly to prevent infiltration of viruses and malware. Other 
controls widely adopted were restricting IT administration and access rights (46.6%) or 
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monitoring of user activity (26.2%), security controls on company-owned devices 
(26.8%), and only allowing access via company-owned devices (28.7%). A segregated 
guest wireless network (19.8%) was the least common form of control. Adopting these 
unpopular types of controls requires not only financial support but also managerial 
support in that they need to reconfigure their systems. 
 
18. Which of the following rules or controls, do you have in place? (multiple choice) 
 
Figure 5.18 Adoption of rules or controls 
Keys 
① Applying software updates when they are available  
② Up-to-date malware protection  
③ Firewalls with appropriate configuration  
④ Restricting IT admin and access rights to specific users  
⑤ Any monitoring of user activity  
⑥ Encrypting personal data  
⑦ Security controls on company-owned devices (e.g., laptops)  
⑧ Only allowing access via company-owned devices  
⑨ A segregated guest wireless network  
⑩ Other  
⑪ None of these  
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Most SMEs (94.5%) did not have formalised incident management processes to deal 
with breaches (Figure 5.19). This result indicates that Korean SMEs were not prepared 
to manage potential incidents. Although this statement applied to both small and 
medium businesses, there was a difference between the two groups. Medium firms 
were more likely to have the process than small firms (8.5% versus 3.3%, p=.042). 
However, it does not necessarily mean that in the vast majority of businesses any sort 
of plans were not ready. This will be investigated further in the qualitative analysis in 
Chapter 6 (see: Section 6.2).  
 
Table 5.21: Cross-tabulation of incident management process and business size 
 Business size 




Yes 6 12 18 
No 178 130 308 
Total 184 142 326 
             Pearson chi2(1) = 4.138        Pr=.042 
 
Among business sectors, financial institutions stood out. Under half (41.7%) of financial 
and insurance firms had these processes, followed by information and communication 
firms (20.7%). By contrast, sectors such as wholesale/retailing, transportation, real 
estate, administrative and support services, arts, entertainment and recreation, repair 
and extra services did not have a single business that adopted an incident management 
process.  
 
Businesses that provided ‘services largely directed at organisations’ had the highest rate 
of having incident management processes compared to other categories (12.1% versus 
5.6% overall). Businesses in ‘manufacturing and construction sectors’ had the lowest 
rate (1.3%). The group difference was found to be statistically significant (p=.010).  
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Table 5.22: Cross-tabulation of incident management processes and categories of 
business sector 
 Categories of business sector 




Yes 5 8 3 2 18 
No 54 58 46 147 305 
Total 59 66 49 149 323 
               Pearson chi2(3) = 11.418        Pr=.010 
 
Keys 
① Services largely directed at public ③ Public services 
② Services largely directed at organisations ④ Manufacturing and construction 
 
19. Is there any incident management processes in your company?  
 
Figure 5.19 Adoption of incident management processes 
 
As a means of risk management, insurance gives businesses an additional layer of 
protection from financial loss. From a financial point of view, insurance is a good tool to 
hedge against the risk of damages from cyber breaches. However, insurance was not 
found to be a widely accepted means of risk management in relation to cyber security. 













20. Do you have insurance which would cover you in the event of a cyber security 
breach or attack?  
 
Figure 5.20 Insurance to cover cyber security breaches or attacks 
 
There was a big difference between medium and small firms. Fewer small than medium 
firms were covered by any type of insurance (1.6% versus 19.0%). A chi-square test 
showed the group difference was statistically significant (p<.001). Over half (58.3%) of 
financial and insurance firms and a third (36.4%) of administrative and support service 
firms were covered by insurance when a breach entailed financial damage. By contrast, 
no business in education services, arts, entertainment and recreation services, and 
repair and extra services, had insurance.  
 
Table 5.23: Cross-tabulation of insurance and business size 
 Business size 
Small Medium Total 
Insurance 
Yes 3 27 30 
No 181 115 296 
Total 184 142 326 
             Pearson chi2(1) = 28.986            Pr=.000 
 
Businesses that provided ‘services largely directed at organisations’ were insured the 
most (16.7%), followed by businesses which were ‘largely directed at public’ (11.9%). 











construction’ (6.0%)) were covered by insurance the least. A chi-square test rejected the 
association between business sector categories and insurance coverage at the 0.05 level 
(p=.066). 
 
Table 5.24: Cross-tabulation of insurance and categories of business sector 
 Categories of business sector 
1 2 3 4 Total 
Insurance 
Yes 7 11 3 9 30 
No 52 55 46 140 293 
Total 59 66 49 149 323 
                           Pearson chi2(3) = 7.178            Pr=.066 
 
Keys 
① Services largely directed at public ③ Public services 
② Services largely directed at organisations ④ Manufacturing and construction 
 
When asked where to report a breach, just over half (51.2%) of businesses replied that 
they would report to the Police: other public sector agencies such as NIS (17.4%) and 
KISA (30.2%) were also mentioned (Figure 5.21). As for the private sector organisations, 
antivirus companies (30.5%), bank/credit card companies (19.2%), outsourced cyber 
security providers (27.1%), ISPs (18.9%), and website administers (17.7%) were 
mentioned. Businesses tended to report to more than one organisation68. Reporting 
destinations were also evenly distributed between public sector agencies (98.8%) and 
private sector organisations (113.4%)69. It may indicate that SMEs reported to both a 
private company and a public agency. The duplicated reporting practice needs to be 
investigated further to ascertain whether it was redundant or necessary.  
 
 
                                                          
68 742 choices were made in this question, although the sample size was 328.  
69 The combined value was over 100% because this question had multiple choices.  
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21. Who is a breach or attack reported to? (multiple choice) 
 
Figure 5.21 Destination for a breach or attack report 
Keys 
① National Intelligence Service  ⑧ Professional/trade/industry association  
② Police  ⑨ Media 
③ Korean Internet & Security Agency  ⑩ Website administer  
④ Antivirus company  ⑪ Other 
⑤ Bank or credit card company  ⑫ No intention to report 
⑥ Outsourced cyber security provider  ⑬ Don’t know 
⑦ Internet service provider (ISPs)   
 
5.3.5. Information acquisition and relationship with external organisations 
 
General online searching through major web portals (54.3%) was the most widely used 
method to seek information on cyber security threats (Figure 5.22). Under a third (29.6%) 
of businesses tapped into government websites (i.e., go.kr). A similar proportion (29.9%) 
acquired information from colleagues or experts within their company. The percentage 
of businesses that sought information from senior management in their company 
(12.2%) did not reach even half of that from colleagues or experts. This illustrates that 
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between staff and senior management. Among public organisations, KISA (22.0%) was 
the organisation businesses relied upon the most. Other agencies: Police (6.7%), NIS 
(6.4%), and SMBA (7.0%) were little used. The overall picture highlights that businesses 
were twice as dependent upon the private sector organisations (567 counts) than public 
sector agencies (282 counts) for information. 
 
22. From where have you sought information, advice or guidance on the cyber 
security threats that your company faces? (multiple choice)  
 
Figure 5.22 Destination for advice or guidance on cyber security threats 
Keys 
① Business bank/bank’s IT staff  ⑩ Online searching generally 
② External security/IT consultants  ⑪ Professional/trade/industry association  
③ go.kr  ⑫ Regulator  
④ National Intelligence Services  ⑬ Security product vendors  
⑤ Police  ⑭ Other companies  
⑥ Korean Internet & Security Agency  ⑮ 
Within your company –  
senior management/board  
⑦ 
Small and Medium Business 
Administration  
⑯ 
Within your company –  
other colleagues or experts   
⑧ Internet Service Provider  ⑰ Other  
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Under a half (44.8%) of businesses were unaware of any suggested accreditation 
schemes and standards relating to cyber security (Figure 5.23). The overall picture 
represents a large discrepancy among choices. The ISO 27001 (31.4%) from an 
international organisation and Korean ISMS (44.8%) from the KISA were widely known 
to businesses, while Government’s guidance (6.7%) and Security Operation Centre 
(13.1%) by the SBMA were not. The obvious lack of awareness on any Government’s 
guidance may indicate that either guidance did not exist or it was poorly constructed so 
that businesses were unaware of it.  
 
23. Are you aware of any of the following initiatives and standards? (multiple choice) 
 
Figure 5.23 Awareness of domestic or international standards 
Keys 
① International Standard for Information Security Management (ISO27001)  
② Any government’s guidance  
③ K-ISMS from KISA  
④ Security Operations Centre from SMBA  
⑤ Other  
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A large difference was found when factoring in business size. There was much higher 
awareness among medium firms than small firms both of ISO 27001 (39.4% versus 25.5%) 
and Korean ISMS (68.3% versus 27.2%). This difference was found to be statistically 
significant both in ISO 27001 (p=.007) and Korean ISMS (p<.001). 
 
Table 5.25: Cross-tabulation of awareness of standards (ISO27001) and business size 
 Small Medium Total 
ISO27001 
Yes 47 56 103 
No 137 86 223 
Total 184 142 326 
              Pearson chi2(1) = 7.158            Pr=.007 
 
Table 5.26: Cross-tabulation of awareness of standards (Korean ISMS) and business 
size  
 Small Medium Total 
Korean ISMS 
Yes 50 97 147 
No 134 45 179 
Total 184 142 326 
              Pearson chi2(1) = 54.777            Pr=.000 
 
More than half (57.0%) of businesses reported that they had not contacted any 
government agencies in relation to cyber security (Figure 5.24). Among those (n=141) 
who contacted them, the KISA (22.6%) was the most widely mentioned, followed by the 
Police (19.8%). A minority (8.2%) of businesses mentioned the SMBA although the SMBA 
was the public agency that directly provided many services to small and medium firms. 




24. Which any government agencies have you contacted in relation to cyber security? 
(multiple choice) 
 
Figure 5.24 SMEs’ contact on government agencies 
Keys 
① National Intelligence Services  
② Police 
③ Korean Internet & Security Agency  
④ Small and Medium Business Administration  
⑤ Other  
⑥ None of these  
 
The frequency distribution of Figure 5.25 was similar to that of Figure 5.24. Just over half 
(50.6%) of businesses mentioned they had not been contacted by suggested 
government agencies. Similar to Figure 5.24, the KISA was said to have contacted or 
provided under a third (26.8%) of businesses with any information. One notable 
difference came from the SMBA. In contrast to the meagre presence in Figure 5.24, the 
SMBA (17.7%) stood out against other agencies except the KISA in Figure 5.25. 
Disproportionately more contact was made by the SMBA than by SMEs (17.7% versus 
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25. Have you been contacted or provided with any information by any government 
agencies in relation to cyber security? (multiple choice) 
 
Figure 5.25 Government agencies’ contact on SMEs  
Keys 
① National Intelligence Services  
② Police 
③ Korean Internet & Security Agency  
④ Small and Medium Business Administration  
⑤ Other  
⑥ None of these  
 
Figure 5.24 and Figure 5.25 showed that the KISA was the most frequently mentioned 
public organisation in terms of not only being sought by businesses but also reaching 
businesses. However, the relationship with the KISA was not equal to every business 
sector. It was noticeable that two business sectors had stronger relationships with the 
KISA than any other sectors. Information and communication (69.0%) and 
administrative and support services (45.5%) firms more frequently contacted the KISA 
compared to businesses in other sectors (22.9% overall). Conversely, the KISA provided 
information mostly to businesses in administrative and support services (54.6%) and 
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and insurance sectors had a weak or moderate relationship with the KISA (33.3% and 
25.0%).  
 
Korean SMEs frequently work for large companies as a subcontractor. Under two thirds 
(63.7%) of SMEs were not required to adhere to any cyber security standard when they 
worked for their clients. Government’s scheme (26.8%) and Korean ISMS (18.0%) were 
more common types of requirements than renowned international ones (7.0%), which 
implied that domestic standards were more preferred by clients. Among SMEs (n=119) 
that said there was a requirement from their clients, over a dozen of SMEs were asked 
to adhere to more than two standards or schemes. 
 
26. Which of the following, if any, do your clients require you to have or adhere to? 
(multiple choice) 
 
Figure 5.26 Clients’ requirements for standards or schemes 
Keys 
① A recognised international standard (e.g., ISO 27001/PCIDSS)  
② K-ISMS from KISA  
③ Any government’s scheme  
④ Other  
⑤ None of these  
 
Adherence to suggested schemes was consistent across size bands. As business size 
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Medium firms were more likely to be required to have international standards than 
small firms (12.0% versus 3.3%), and the same result was applied to Korean ISMS (30.3% 
versus 8.7%). The group difference of adherence to the two types of standards was 
statistically significant (respectively, p=.002 and p<.001). However, even though slightly 
more proportion of medium firms adhered to Government scheme (30.3% versus 
23.9%), there was no statistically significant association between business size and 
adherence to Government schemes (p=.197). These results highlight that business size 
was a significant factor when choosing international standards or K-ISMS, but not when 
choosing Government schemes.  
 
Table 5.27: Cross-tabulation of clients’ requirements for standards (international 
standards) and business size  
 Business size 
Small Medium Total 
International 
standards 
Yes 6 17 23 
No 178 125 303 
Total 184 142 326 
            Pearson chi2(1) = 9.274            Pr=.002 
 
Table 5.28: Cross-tabulation of clients’ requirements for standards (Korean ISMS) and 
business size  
 Business size 
Small Medium Total 
Korean ISMS 
Yes 16 43 59 
No 168 99 267 
Total 184 142 326 




Table 5.29: Cross-tabulation of clients’ requirements for standards (Government 
scheme) and business size  
 Business size 
Small Medium Total 
Government 
scheme 
Yes 44 43 87 
No 140 99 239 
Total 184 142 326 
            Pearson chi2(1) = 1.662            Pr=.197 
 
On a related note, it was shown that the extent of requirements by clients varied by 
business sector. As expected, the financial and insurance sector was the most heavily 





Korean SMEs were highly connected to ICTs, but perception of their significance did 
not correspond to the actual adoption of ICTs. 
 
A sizable majority of Korean SMEs relied upon online services in some form. The 
adoption of online services was mainly for communications and advertisement rather 
than business or financial transactions. Online services were used not only by business-
owned devices, but also via personally-owned devices at work (77.7%). In particular, the 
use of externally-hosted web services was a widespread phenomenon in Korea. 
However, SMEs’ perception of ICTs’ significance did not necessarily match the high 
extent of actual usage of them. A 13.4 percentage point more of businesses replied 
negatively when asked whether their online services were a core part of their business 
offering. In addition, the number of positive answers (42.4%) was almost equal to that 
of negative answers (39.0%) when asked whether externally-hosted web services were 
critical to their business.  
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Cyber security breaches affected all kinds of SMEs and costs were not clearly measured. 
 
It was notable that one in two businesses (55.4%) have experienced cyber security 
breaches, the majority attributed to viruses and malware (75.8%). Most of them were 
funnelled through emails, email attachments, or websites (53.8%). Two features of 
cyber-attacks using viruses and malware are the indiscriminate nature as to victim 
selection and low cost (Wall, 2007). Despite the prevalence of a breach, its financial 
impact was not well measured. Among businesses which suffered from breaches, about 
a third (34.1%) did not know the cost and a third (33.5%) estimated the total costs to be 
under £500. Business disruption (53.8%) and direct costs (i.e., repair or recovery costs: 
46.2%) were found to be the most crucial impacts of cyber-attacks on businesses. 
 
When it comes to approaches to risks, many businesses did not have a structural 
mechanism.  
 
Under half (42.4%) of businesses had no formal cyber security policies. In line with this, 
more senior management viewed cyber security as a ‘low’ or ‘very low’ priority than 
‘high’ or ‘very high’ (35.4% versus 32.1%). In addition, senior managers in over a third 
(38.7%) of businesses were never updated on cyber security. It was more likely that the 
perception on this subject by senior managers was positively related to communications 
between staff and senior managers. Likewise, the low perception of senior management 
on cyber security was translated into a lack of staff training. Staff in over a third (36.9%) 
of businesses did not experience any sort of cyber security training in the last 12 months. 
In addition, the dominant frequency of training was less than once a year (17.1%) or 
annually (28.4%). In terms of risk management arrangements, Korean SMEs heavily 
relied upon insiders, using staff members (41.8%) and board members (36.0%) rather 
than organisational artefacts such as policies or plans.  
 
Most of SMEs were not prepared to deal with cyber security breaches, depending 
upon basic technical controls or actions. 
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The vast majority of businesses were not prepared to deal with breaches. They did not 
have incident management processes (94.5%) and were not covered by insurance 
(90.9%). What they employed mostly were malware protection updates (74.4%) and 
software updates (66.5%). These types of controls were provided online with high 
convenience to users. Also, regular health checks (68.3%) were shown as the most 
widely adopted action when businesses tried to identify cyber security risks. When it 
comes to reporting a breach, businesses were more likely to report to more than one 
organisation and reporting destinations were quite evenly distributed between public 
and private sector organisations.  
 
Public sector organisations were not identified as a main contributor to SMEs in 
relation to information acquisition or information sharing. 
 
Businesses acquired cyber security information mostly from online sources, such as 
major web portals (54.3%) and government websites (29.6%). Public sector agencies 
played a small role in contributing to SMEs’ information acquisition. Among initiatives 
and standards, businesses were well aware of ISO 27001 (31.4%) and Korean ISMS 
(44.8%). In contrast, only 6.7% of businesses were aware of the Government’s guidance 
which should have been accepted as a generic form of initiatives. Around half of 
businesses either did not contact any government agencies (57.0%) or have not been 
contacted by them (50.6%). Given that large companies contract for their services or 
products with SMEs in Korea, SMEs as a subcontractor are required to adhere to a set 
of standards. However in the cyber security domain slightly less than two thirds (63.7%) 
of SMEs were not required to have any standards. It highlights that there was not much 
pressure from client organisations in terms of cyber security standards. 
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This chapter provides findings of qualitative interview data, using thematic analysis. Raw 
data from field interviews was analysed, relevant extracts chosen and then structured 
to convey meaningful information. These extracts act as the basis of the themes 
suggested in the sections below.  
 
In total, there were 25 interviewees. Among these, 16 were IT managers or owners in 
SMEs (13 managers and three owners) and the remaining 9 were officials from the public 
sector organisations (i.e., the NPA, the KISA, and the SMBA). The 16 interviewees from 
SMEs (see: Table 6.1) were chosen among the survey respondents who volunteered to 
participate, while the 9 public officials (see: Table 6.2) were selected using snowball 
sampling. How the researcher conducted the interviews is addressed in Chapter 4. 
Acronyms are used to denote the status of interviewees. ‘CM’, ‘CO’, and ‘GO’ are 
acronyms for ‘Company Manager’, ‘Company Owner’ and ‘Government Official’, 
respectively.  
 
Braun and Clarke (2006) argued that rigorous application of thematic analysis allows for 
producing an insightful analysis which addresses research questions. Following this 
suggestion, the researcher tried to apply thematic analysis in a systematic and rigorous 
way. Finding themes is a sequential process. The course of finding themes, starting from 
identifying descriptive codes and developing analytic codes, was largely driven by the 
research questions mentioned in Section 1.2.4. Some descriptive and analytic codes 
were discarded because of their lack of relevance to the research questions. Themes 
emerged without reliance upon preconceptions, but were based on descriptive and 




Not all codes pointed at the main themes. There were dozens of codes which 
contradicted the themes. However, the researcher did not ignore the contradicting 
codes. Instead, they were carefully examined and interpreted to provide alternative 
readings of data. The researcher tried to present contradictions and contrasts among 
codes in order to enrich descriptions and discussions for this research.  
 
After an extensive coding process, five themes were identified:  
 
 (1) unstructured cyber security management,  
 (2) culture resistant to cyber security,  
 (3) fragmentation of public organisations,  
 (4) overdependence on private organisations and  
 (5) influential external conditions.  
 





Table 6.1: Profiles of interviewees from SMEs (n=16) 
 Affiliation Business sector 





















and technical activities 








Education services Public services Small 
Senior 
manager 




Human health and 
social work activities 
Public services Small 
Senior 
manager 


















CM10 Real estate Real estate activities 









and technical activities 








Services largely directed 
at organisations 
Small Owner 






CM14 Finance Financial and insurance 





CM15 Insurance Financial and insurance 
















Table 6.2: Profiles of interviewees from public agencies (n=9) 
 Affiliation Position 
GO1 National Police Agency A manager in cybercrime investigation team 
GO2 National Police Agency A manager in cyber threat analysis team 
GO3 National Police Agency A manager in cyber security planning team 
GO4 Korean Internet & Safety Agency Staff in intelligence cooperation team 
GO5 Korean Internet & Safety Agency An organiser of IT training programmes for SMEs 
GO6 Korean Internet & Safety Agency A manager in breach investigation team 
GO7 
Small and Medium Business 
Administration 
A manager in technology information  
protection team 
GO8 
Small and Medium Business 
Administration 
Staff in technology assistance team 
GO9 
Small and Medium Business 
Administration 
Staff in risk assessment team 
 
6.2 Unstructured cyber security management  
 
This theme starts from suggesting SMEs’ awareness of breaches and threats to 
understand how SMEs perceive cyber threats. It continues to examine how the 
perception plays out in businesses. The theme, unstructured cyber security 
management, consisted of three sub-themes:  
 
 (1) awareness of risks and breaches,  
 (2) approaches to cyber security risk70 and  
 (3) breach responses.  
 
                                                          
70 This sub-theme included a discontinuity between perception and engagement, no internal 
support, a factor that changes the dynamics and a lack of interest from senior management. 
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The latter two sub-themes were manifestations of the first sub-theme. While the second 
sub-theme involved general preparedness before a breach occurred, the third sub-
theme related to responsive measures after a breach. It is important to note that these 
three sub-themes appeared in a sequential order and were connected to each other. 
The awareness influenced approaches to cyber security and breach responses, and the 
approaches were linked to the breach responses.  
 
Interview data showed that SMEs’ approach to cyber security was poorly constructed, 
ranging from no internal support to a lack of interest from senior management. In line 
with these, no formal guidelines or protocols were ready regarding breach responses.  
 
6. 2. 1 Awareness of risks and breaches 
 
Having awareness of risks and breaches is a rudimentary stepping stone in preparing for 
future responses. However, in general, Korean SMEs had a low awareness of breaches 
of their computer systems. The lack of awareness mainly resulted from a technical 
difficulty in identifying beaches as well as from a lack of imagination that SMEs can be 
victimised. The moment that SMEs became aware of the risks and breaches was when 
they identified damage to their computer systems. This means that damage experience 
as a victim was a direct cause for raising awareness.  
 
CO1  
Most SMEs do not know whether a security breach has occurred. 
 
CM4 
Previously, I saw statistics which said that over half of SMEs in other countries suffered 
attacks because SMEs were easy targets. But many Korean SMEs do not think that they 
can be targets of cyber-attacks. This perception, or attitude, also increases the possibility 
of not knowing of damage even if an attack occurred.  
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Although some SMEs (12.5%, 2 out of 16) recognised that there were many attempted 
attacks before a breach materialised, this knowledge did not lead to raising awareness 
or taking any preparatory action. They were negligent of the attempted attacks based 
on the assumption that most of the attempted attacks did not lead to damage. Along 
with the naïve perception, SMEs did not have a proper event detection system. This was 
due to the lack of resources, as it requires financial resources and attention to set up a 
system to forewarn and prevent an upcoming malicious event. The insufficient 
organisational support for cyber security was a reflection on how poor the awareness 
was. The extracts below illustrated the general mentality of SMEs: 
 
CO12 
We did not suffer from cyber breaches. There are a lot of attempted hackings but there 
was no actual damage.  
 
CM14 
We did not experience any form of cyber breaches until now, but there are a lot of 
attempted breaches for sure. 
 
Even though SMEs had a low awareness on the risks and breaches, they were afraid of 
cyber threats. Over half (56.2%, 9 out of 16) of interviewees from SMEs replied that the 
most prevalent and dangerous types of cyber threats were carried out via viruses and 
malware, especially ransomware. The viruses and malware are malicious codes which 
automatically initiate damaging activities against targeted computer systems. Of various 
damaging activities, SMEs viewed information leakage as the most catastrophic scenario 
for their business.  
 
Information that SMEs wanted to protect came in two types: business information and 
personal information. The type of information to be protected depended upon the 
nature of their business. For example, some manufacturers had confidential 
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technologies to take an advantage over competitors, while banks or online shopping 
businesses regarded customers’ personal information as extremely sensitive data.  
 
Information leakage can be perpetrated by insiders as well as external actors. 
Karagiannopoulos (2016) presented several high-profile cybercrime cases in the UK and 
the US. Those cases involved stealing corporate information by insiders for pecuniary 
reasons. Coinciding with Karagiannopoulos (2016) twice as many SMEs were afraid of 
information leakage by insiders than by external cybercriminals (Table 6.3). Not all 
interviewees were included in the table because some interviewees (43.8%, 7 out of 16) 
did not suggest awareness of any threats.  
 
Table 6.3: Classification of perceived threats of SMEs 
 Insider threats External threats Total 




CO2, 12,  
CM3, 7, 8, 13, 
CM3 6 
- Manufacturing(3) 




CM14, 16 CM4, 14, 16 3 
- Public services(1) 
- Services largely directed 
at public(2) 
Total 8 4  
 
The classification revealed two interesting patterns. The first was that SMEs perceived 
insider threats more seriously than external threats (8 versus 4). This pattern was largely 
driven by the businesses which emphasised business information. SMEs that valued 
business information concerned themselves more with insider threats than those that 
treasured personal information (6 versus 2). Except for CM4, senior managers from 
SMEs which valued personal information (CM14 and 16) gave an even weight to both 
insider threats and external threats. The illustrations below show how the interviewees 
mentioned the perceived threats.  
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CM3 
I am afraid of information leakage, for sure, because classified documents should not be 
disclosed to outside companies. 
 
CM13 
We are more afraid of information leakage by insiders than by external hacking. Our 
business might be interrupted for a couple of days by external attacks or we may suffer 
some financial damage, but if classified information is leaked to our competitors, the 




Banks are targeted by hackers or malware for sure, but I also worry about breaches by 




As with external infiltration, I am also afraid of information leakage by insiders. Most of 
employees are young people in their 20’s to early 40’s. Not every employee is suspicious…. 
We have experienced quite a lot of breaches by insiders and by outsiders. To my company, 
personal information leakage is the worst case. Due to the nature of our business, which 
is online shopping, our customer information is the most important asset. 
 
The second pattern was that the threat perception was associated with which parties 
SMEs sold their services or products to. Business information was considered valuable 
by businesses in ‘manufacturing’ (CM7, 8 and 13) and by businesses whose ‘services 
largely directed at organisations’ (CO2 and CM3, 12). Given that around half of Korean 
manufacturers made products for large companies (Cho, 2014), most of SMEs in this 
category (i.e., businesses which valued business information) provided their products or 
services to ‘organisations’. These SMEs perceived insider threats as more dangerous. On 
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the contrary, businesses which provided services to the public (CM4, 14 and 16) valued 
personal information, and recognised personal information should be protected from 
both inside and external threats. This pattern highlights whether SMEs’ customers were 
organisations or members of the public was closely related to their threat perception.  
 
6. 2. 2 Approaches to cyber security risks 
 
This sub-theme involved SMEs’ attitude to cyber security risks. For senior managers, 
media outlets were the main channels for acquiring information on cyber security 
threats. An exposure to major cases from media outlets drove them to feel the sense of 
the seriousness of cyber threats. However, how managers and owners of SMEs actually 
took action on cyber security issues did not match their perceptions. This implies that 
there was a discontinuity between their perception and engagement. First and foremost, 
senior managers did not act upon cyber security issues even though they viewed cyber 
security as a priority. In particular, this applied to the situation in which they had to make 




Based on my impression, senior management know that cyber security needs more 
attention, but, well... this does not lead to investment. 
 
CM15 
Our senior managers share the idea that cyber security is important. But, they do not 
want to sacrifice their interests when they actually need to choose between security 
controls and giving up their convenience.  
 
CM11 
The good thing is that, more recently, our senior managers have interests in cyber 
security, not very high, though… I guess they heard of some bad incidents from news 
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media. The bad thing is that it does not necessarily lead to investment yet. They 
understand the severity of cyber breaches, but do not know what they need to do step-
by-step. 
 
The interviewees were all directly or indirectly involved in IT matters within a firm. In a 
business, they were positioned to get their cyber security agenda across to general staff 
and senior managers. However, there were several barriers to actual engagement in 
cyber security agendas. The main reason was an absence of internal support. To run 
training or to set up a security control requires organisational resources. Not only 
resources, but also the problem of a heavy workload. SMEs normally do not have an IT 
team or even a single IT professional solely responsible for IT matters. The large majority 
of SMEs’ interviewees (81.3%, 13 out of 16) agreed with this point by suggesting that 
they were engaged in non-IT matters. They perceived IT matters as extra responsibilities. 
Among those 13 interviewees, 6 of them (46.2%) belonged to a management/business 
support team. This shows that IT matters within a firm were classified as a supporting 
role for business. Under this working condition, it is understandable that SMEs were not 
ready for acting upon cyber security matters. Some interviewees (18.8%, 3 out of 16) 
expressed their inability to carry out an action despite a perceived need to do so. See 
below for one example:  
 
CM3 
As you might expect, we do not have dedicated cyber security staff. I do this job along 
with other IT supporting jobs, but cyber security is not the main job for me. Also, I have 
some other non-IT jobs I should deal with. I think this is normal… (What do you mean by 
‘normal’?) Well.. I see most of small and medium companies do not have proper cyber 
security staff, not even IT staff.. If there is no issue, cyber security is not the priority in my 
company at all. I have to constantly monitor information systems in the company, but I 
have no time to monitor them. I do check them when I have time or when some anomies 
are identified, for example, heavy payload of packets.  
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SMEs often run their business without enough resources. Thus, generally, teams and 
departments within a business needed to fight against each other to tap into their 
limited resources. IT staff and managers had to provide justifications to senior 
management or an owner as to why they needed more resources. This was considered 
as internal politics. Senior managers and owners treated cyber security as a small part 
of IT matters and as a cost, not contributing to their revenues. In this competitive 
circumstance, it was difficult to garner expected investment in cyber security, not even 
in general IT systems.  
 
The lack of support was represented in various forms, ranging from insufficient budgets 
and training to an absence of cyber security policies. Exactly half of the SMEs (50.0%, 8 
out of 16) replied that they did not have an internal cyber security policy. And, less than 
half of them (43.8%, 7 out of 16) said that staff training was not provided by their firms. 
It is notable that policy adoption and staff training were associated. Among 9 SMEs 
which had either staff training or the cyber security policy, over half (55.6%, 5 out of 9) 
had both of them. On the contrary, about a third (37.5%, 6 out of 16) of SMEs did not 
have either of them. In total, more than two thirds (68.8%, 11 out of 16) of the total 
SMES either had both or neither. This finding supports the assertion that cyber security 
policy and staff training are manifestations of internal support. IT managers felt the 
shortage of business support on cyber security as follows.  
 
CM10 
Even though cyber security awareness by most employees is very low, we do not make 
an extra effort to increase their awareness. It is disappointing that no one thinks any 





Our team does not have the power to push our agenda. Our team is getting busier and 
busier… so, it is like having more responsibility without proper rights… which means.. we 
need to cover our systems more deeply, but they do not allow us to take proper actions.  
 
In some cases (37.5%, 3 out of 8), the cyber security policy was not established in a 
separate format. The policy was included as part of a general security policy. The staff 
who made the policy were not cyber security experts, at times, not even IT staff. CM5 
described the member of staff in charge of the general security policy as a ‘layman’. A 
written policy is the backbone of business management. The treatment of cyber security 
policy as a subset of general security policy reflects a lack of recognition of cyber security 
as an independent area.  
 
CM5 
We have staff who make all sort of policy, including cyber security. There is no separate 
cyber security policy. It is included in the general security policy. Yeah.. cyber security is 
only a small part.. The funny thing is that he is a layman… I mean…general staff, not a 
cyber security expert. 
 
CM7 
Ye…, we also have an internal policy, but this is not noticeable if you look for it first time, 
because the cyber security policy is mixed up with other security policies. When someone 
made the security policy, he/she probably tried to jot down everything.. I need to 
upgrade it, but I did not have enough time to do it.  
 
Across the board, it was still relatively uncommon for senior management to treat cyber 
security as a priority. Half of the SMEs (50.0%, 8 out of 16) have seen cyber security as a 
low or very low priority, whereas less than a third (31.3%, 5 out of 16) have given it a 
high or very high priority (Table 6.4). The tendency of low interest from senior 
management corresponded to other sub-themes, such as a discontinuity between their 
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perception and engagement, a lack of internal support, and contrasting values. These 
sub-themes represented the unfavourable atmosphere against cyber security.  
 
Table 6.4: Cyber security as a priority to senior management 
Priority by senior 
management 
Businesses Total Percentage 
Very high CM14, 16 2 12.5% 
High CM4, 11, 15 3 18.75% 
Neutral CO2, 12, CM5 3 18.75% 
Low CO1, CM3, 7, 8, 10, 13 6 37.5% 
Very low CM6, 9 2 12.5% 
Total 16 16 100.0% 
 
However, there was a noticeable difference by the business sector. The difference came 
from the level of business connectedness to ICT. The more a business incorporated 
online elements, the higher chance it had to take cyber security as a priority. A stark 
contrast came from comparison between manufacturing/construction sector and 
financial/insurance sector. All four SMEs in manufacturing/construction sector (CM7, 8, 
9 and 13) indicated that cyber security was either a low or very low priority to senior 
management. In contrast, senior management in financial/insurance sector (CM14 and 
15) considered cyber security as a high or very high priority. On the other hand, no 
obvious distinction was made by size band. A few extracts below illustrate a low priority 
of senior management.  
 
CM7 
Our CEO and senior managers do not have interests in cyber security and pay attention 




For senior managers, cyber security is on the back burner. Most of them treat cyber 
security as just a small part of IT matters. They do not share the idea that we need more 
investment on cyber security as our business adopts more ICTs. 
 
CM13 
I don't think our senior managers put much value on cyber security. Because our business 
is manufacturing headlights, we don't really use the Internet or connected software. The 
senior managers are more into how to make a better product or how to sell more, these 
sorts of things. 
 
Having IT staff and managers responsible for cyber security was a widespread approach 
to manage the risks to SMEs. There was a consensus within organisations that IT staff 
and managers were responsible for cyber security risks and breaches. On any issues, 
assigning responsibility to a person or group was described as a widely used 
management strategy in Korean businesses. However, IT staff and managers did not 
welcome cyber security responsibilities because insufficient support and authority were 
given to them. They perceived the buck-passing as one of defensive behaviours of their 
companies as was noted by Robbins and Judge (2013, p. 431). This responsibility entailed 
negative connotations from some interviewees as follows.  
 
CM11 
(What do you think of having more responsibility? Doesn’t it mean that you will have 
more support from your company?) Not really. It is just putting the burden on IT staff 
and managers. This does not mean that my company is dedicated to cyber security. 
Giving responsibilities to someone is just a typical way of managing businesses by owners.  
 
CM5 
Well,,,, it is just a superficial thing, no substance to it,,, I mean there is no appropriate 
amount of money or proper manpower to deal with it. Giving me the responsibility is 
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like,,, putting pressure to me, or giving me another burden. It looks unfair, but this is a 
normal thing on any agenda or issue in Korean companies and public organisations. This 
implies that if there is a big breach I should be a scapegoat. There can be legal 
consequences as well. 
 
In total, the word, damage, was used 34 times throughout interviews of SMEs’ managers 
and owners. Beyond the word frequency, the word had a meaningful contextual position 
in terms of cyber security approaches. Basically, the word was used for two reasons: (1) 
to give a sense of relief and (2) to prepare against a future breach. The first reason 
applied to when there was no damage up to that point in time. The manager, CM11, 
used words, “luckily” and “thankfully” to describe the relief. The fact that SMEs did not 
experience any damage or serious damage gave them a good reason to believe that they 
were properly protected. It was assumed that they did not have any problem because 
no damage was reported. This thought process was used to justify their current cyber 
security approach, causing SMEs to have a false sense of security (CM6). The feeling that 
they were safe acted as a restraining factor for internal support on cyber security.  
 
CM11 
There was another incident. Our messenger server was hacked, but luckily the server did 
not have important data, so no damage was entailed……… Thankfully, we didn’t have to 
contact the police for investigation as no damage occurred and as we thought they were 
purely random malware. 
 
CM6 
Our business does not have many IT elements. I have never thought of cyber security in 
my business. There was no problem at all until now. I feel we are quite safe. Frankly, no 
reason to invest in cyber security things.... 
 
The second reason applied to a supposition, imagining a future damage. Over a third 
(37.5%, 6 out of 16) of SMEs revealed that they would take action if damage materialised. 
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The future action upon a potential cyber-attack was conditioned by the existence or 
extent of damage they suffered. SMEs changed their passive approach into a proactive 
one if damage was known to them. The damage identification was a turning point to 
reverse their hesitant approach. When it comes to a decision-making process in relation 
to future management actions, such as investment, support and breach reporting, the 
damage experience was regarded as a dominating referent point. However, there was 
no formal procedure or protocol on how to act upon the damage. SMEs knew that they 
should do something, but did not have an established plan as to what and how they 
should do it. Their approaches and responses were largely decided on a case by case 
basis, depending on the situation.  
 
CO2 
They seem to follow my words. Until now, it was recommendation, but if any damage 
incurs after a breach, then that will be a turning point. From then on, there will be only 
orders not recommendations. 
 
CM5 
Some staff clicked on attachments from emails and their account information has been 
leaked. And then, a massive amount of emails have been sent from our webmail server 
through this account, ending up putting our webmail server on the blacklist. As no actual 
damage has been materialised and the situation was resolved with the help of an IT 
vendor, our senior management was not informed of that attack. (So, you did not report 
the incident to your senior management?) No, I didn’t. I didn’t have to. That was not 
serious enough to do reporting. If I report this kind of things, they will look at me and say 
like “so what?”.  
 
6. 2. 3 Breach responses 
 
The absolute majority of SMEs (93.8%, 15 out of 16) did not have a formal procedure for 
breach responses. There were no predetermined guidelines or protocols on how to 
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manage breaches. This does not mean that they did not have responses in any form. The 
unstructured responses to a breach indicated that response measures were sporadic 
and reactive rather than derived from a structured procedure. SMEs were not ready for 
forthcoming breaches, but simply reacted to them with having no response pattern or 
order. In fact, decisions on breach responses were made at the moment when they 
needed to take actions. As a consequence of this IT staff or managers needed to rely on 
a judgement call by their seniors, expecting some direction for handling the situation.  
 
CM15 
If our personal information is leaked, I am not sure what my boss will do about it. It is 
not a straightforward process.  
 
CM10 
One employee tried to download whole business data this year and he was caught before 
he quit the job. It ended as a minor incident... My senior manager covered this incident, 
giving him a warning. 
 
As one of important elements of breach responses, public reporting was not well 
adopted by SMEs. SMEs did not think that reporting a breach to public organisations was 
a necessary measure for them, without recognising public reporting as one of continued 
steps of managing a breach. They treated public reporting as a means only for arrest and 
prosecution of offenders. Instead, what SMEs were interested in was business continuity. 
In interviews of SMEs, the term, damage, was interpreted in their own language. The 
damage was referred to as a disruption to business continuity. As long as their business 
runs as usual without major disruptions, they had no reason to be engaged in public 
reporting. These findings, in line with Yar’s (2013, p. 13) claim on “dark figures” of 
cybercrime, suggest that SMEs had a tendency of no public reporting. The following 
excerpts show that damage and business continuity were important criteria for public 




As long as offenders have no intention of disrupting my business or of stealing our money, 
no official reporting will be made and I will just fix the problem to prevent similar attacks. 
 
CM11 
Thankfully, we didn’t have to contact the police for investigation as no damage occurred 
and as we thought they were purely random malware. 
 
CM8 
If huge monetary damage is not materialised, no reporting will be made to the 
authorities. 
 
In addition, whether to report to the authorities needed to go through a decision-making 
process from a business management point of view. There was no set of procedures for 
when they should initiate public reporting. In fact, public reporting involved several non-
IT factors such as media attention and business reputation, thus requiring a business 
management decision. The reporting issue should not be viewed as part of IT issues, but 
from a larger perspective, involving a company-wide risk management decision. There 
was a small chance that the process reflected the needs or agendas from the cyber 
security perspective. This was because IT staff and managers were marginalised from 
the decision-making process. Although IT managers were responsible for cyber security 
issues, they were not the primary decision-makers. The following extracts explain how 
public reporting decisions were made by senior managers.  
 
CM11 
Reporting to the authorities is not a simple matter for us, because we might have to face 
unnecessary media attention, which is related to business reputation.. I need to talk to 
my boss and senior managers will ponder over this issue. There are a lot of factors they 
need to consider from the business management point of view. If we have suffered 
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We cannot simply call the police. I think whether to call the police will be decided by the 
senior management. Calling the police means the incident will be publicised in the media, 
for sure. And this will attract attentions from other government bodies and, more 
importantly, from current customers and potential customers, too. Thus, this is 
basically… a risk management decision. 
 
GO2 
But firms are not willing to report it because they are afraid of media attention and 
reputation loss. If they are caught for not reporting it, they end up paying a small fine. 
 
Despite the business-wide pervasiveness of unstructured breach responses, there were 
a few outliers which were good examples. The two medium firms (CM14 and 16), one in 
the banking sector and the other an online shopping business, had internal breach 
management processes. Both firms provided ‘services largely directed at public’, thus 
treating customers’ personal information as highly sensitive data. Thanks to the 
formalised processes, they could act upon a breach without relying on a judgement call 
by senior managers and owners. A senior manager from the banking sector (CM14) 
emphasised a business recovery throughout the breach management process, whereas 
a senior manager from an online shopping business (CM16) illustrated how a formal 
discipline process played out as follows. 
 
CM14 
We have our own protocols. Once a breach happens we assess the situation and contain 
the situation so as not to spread it through networks. Then, I report it to the CEO to be 
aware of the situation and we call our external IT security vendor immediately to find 
out an exact cause of the problem. If our banking system is shut down, we will try our 
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best to restore it. If some damage is found or personal information is leaked, then we 
contact the police for official investigation. More importantly, during this process, we 
should make sure banking systems is not disrupted.  
 
CM16 
In every case, we have a small hearing and decide the level of discipline. We do not fire 
the staff unless information is leaked intentionally. Most cases end up giving a warning. 
There were a few cases of intentional leakage. In these cases, we report to the police and 
go through criminal justice process. 
 
6.3 Culture resistant to cyber security  
 
Each group has its own unique culture. Culture in a group contains a set of values which 
are derived from a pattern of basic assumptions (Schein, 2010). Even though the values 
and assumptions are invisible, they are manifested through artefacts. The interaction 
among artefacts, values, and assumptions is not exclusive to a small number of groups, 
but universally identified in any group.  
 
The weak cyber security management suggested in Section 6.2 was analysed as a 
manifestation of culture resistant to cyber security and IT staff within a company. 
Without studying underlying assumptions and values of individual agents in an 
organisation, it is difficult to comprehend artefacts, which were summed up as the 
unstructured cyber security management in this research. Resistant culture to cyber 
security as a theme was composed of a set of different sub-themes: contrasting values, 
miscommunication, leadership of an owner, and a negative perception. These sub-
themes acted as undercurrents which formed the culture resistant to cyber security.  
 
6. 3. 1 Contrasting values 
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Business managers should be well aware of their business orientation towards profit-
making, staff trust, work efficiency, and convenience. These fundamental corporate 
values were fully accepted by staff and managers and positioned as a norm in businesses. 
However, cyber security was not compatible with these values in that it naturally 
entailed layers of security controls and tighter rules.  
 
It was difficult to identify a commonality between cyber security and those corporate 
values. Interview data showed that cyber security was understood as a conflicting value 
against those corporate values. Half of the IT managers and owners (50.0%, 8 out of 16) 
were concerned about the value conflicts. This was why several interviewees viewed the 
choice of security controls as a trade-off between cyber security and business 
effectiveness. The basic assumption was that adopting an additional security control was 
at odds with those business values. This means that IT managers had to go through a 
difficult battle with the majority of teams and departments to pursue cyber security 
agendas. They needed to win over those competing values. As a consequence, cyber 
security management was inherently situated in a weak position. Excerpts below 
illustrate how the assumption played out in an unfavourable manner.  
 
CM4 
As a small business, we emphasise more on sharing information to efficiently finish our 
commissioned work than tightly controlling access points to fortify security. This is a 
matter of choice. I think risk from cyber security breaches is definitely lower, so there is 
no point of increasing security which inevitably lowers work efficiency. 
 
CO12 
Maybe I could install a hacking-prevention system, but it slows down traffic too much… 
As a CEO, it is not easy to keep raising security due to trust issues. If I adopt additional 




They (senior managers) do not want to sacrifice their interests when they actually need 
to choose between higher security controls and more convenience for work efficiency.  
 
Due to this contrasting situation, IT staff and managers (50.0%, 8 out of 16) found 
themselves sandwiched between cyber security and corporate values. They also 
understood that overall business culture was tuned into business profits and individual 
work performance. Recognition of this difficult situation was reflected in the motto, 
strengthening security, but at the same time reducing inconvenience of other employees, 
which was provided by CM3. The motto itself was paradoxical in that his team tried to 
achieve both strong security and inconvenience reduction. The paradoxical motto not 
only reflected the conflicting situation that the IT team faced, but also could be 
understood as a neutralising strategy to adapt to the internal intricacies. As a manifesto, 
the motto signified that the IT team was willing to get along with non-IT teams and that 
it would factor in those corporate values when deciding the level of security. This 
demonstrates how the IT manager balanced the two different needs from different 
parties. The following extracts provide illustrations on this point.  
 
CM14  
Bankers work until 10pm usually. And they have to sell banking products and attract 
customers under his or her name. These things comprise their work performance, which 
translates into promotion or other incentives. In this situation, it is not easy to coerce 
security too much to other employees. 
 
CM3 
Our team’s motto is “strengthening security, but at the same time reducing 
inconvenience of other employees”. But there is a certain point that we cannot yield. We 
cannot take the risk that can lead to business disruption. If the business is disrupted, it is 
me who is responsible for it. I do not want to be labelled as an incompetent employee.   
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6. 3. 2 Miscommunication 
 
Communication is considered a crucial element in constituting corporate culture. 
Likewise, communication was embedded in the formation process of cyber security 
culture. A small owner (CM10) directly mentioned the importance of communication 
among teams. Some managers used different means of communication to reach a 
certain purpose. While a middle manager in a manufacturing company (CM13) said 
formal or informal events were held to increase loyalty of staff, a senior manager in an 
online shopping business (CM16) adopted a visual approach to convey cyber security 
messages to non-IT staff. The excerpts below show how various means of 
communication were utilised to raise cyber security elements across a company.  
 
CM10 
And on top of that active communication between separate teams is really important. 
 
CM13 
Senior managers and a CEO emphasise loyalty to employees and try to communicate 
with them. The main strategy is to host family events or casual ‘beer parties’ so that they 
feel the company is their home. It is basically making a strong bond so that they cannot 
betray our company. 
 
CM16 
We cannot handle about 300 employees by 5 IT staff. So we had to try all sorts of ways 
to reach all of them in a visual manner. We use bulletin boards, posters, TVs in corridors, 
PC screen protectors. We try to make all employees see cyber security notices as often 
as possible. 
 
Despite the importance of communication, a lack of communication was a noticeable 
phenomenon within a firm. The lack of communication was noticed both horizontally 
and vertically. This implies that a communication problem occurred not only between IT 
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staff and non-IT staff or among different teams (12.5%, 2 out of 16) but also alongside 
the hierarchical structure (25.0%, 4 out of 16). By business size, horizontal 
miscommunication tended to be suggested in small businesses (CM10 and CO12), 
whereas vertical miscommunication was conspicuous in medium businesses (CM3 and 
15). The vertical miscommunication was represented in two different relationships: (1) 
the relationship between IT staff and senior managers (CM3) and (2) the relationship 





We don’t have an employee solely for cyber security. As my business is the IT-related one, 
every employee has good understanding of cyber security. All of them have computer 
science backgrounds from high school or college. Because staff don't really tell me 
everything… I might not know what they are thinking.. But I know that my staff in charge 
of cyber security matters has some difficulty talking to others. Every staff in my firm think 
himself or herself as a computer expert, so they do not listen to others when they are 
advised about computer things. So, I let the cyber security staff directly come and talk to 
me if he finds any problem, then I can do something. It is an easier way to take action 





We try to make senior managers think cyber security is crucial for business, but they do 
not want to hear us because they don't understand what we are trying to say. At some 
point, we gave up, especially when we found out that they had absolutely no 




Recently, there was an alarm call…one employee tried to download whole business data 
this year and he was caught before he quit the job. It ended as a minor incident so we 
didn’t report it to our CEO. We can't talk to everything to our CEO.  
 
Internal reporting within an organisation is a method of formal communication. 
Reporting is a step-by-step process from staff to managers, and to an owner. A reporting 
mechanism is structured along a chain of command, thus being classified as hierarchical 
communication. Staff and managers should report their work or important issues to 
senior managers, so that they go through a decision-making process based on the 
reports from non-managerial employees. If there are no cyber security reports, senior 
management should make a decision without sufficient evidence. As a consequence, an 
outcome from decision-makings is prone to be biased. The excerpts above (CM3, 10) 
illustrated a lack of regular reporting on cyber security issues to senior management. In 
fact, reporting occurred on a limited scale. Major incidents which accompanied damage 
or business disruption were likely to be reported to senior management. This type of 
reporting was limited only to breach management rather than the whole cyber security 
management.  
 
6. 3. 3 Leadership of an owner 
 
The essence of leadership is influencing others (Yukl, 2002). In Asian businesses, position, 
authority and seniority are fundamental features which underlie leadership (Lok & 
Crawford, 2004). Drawing on this, Korean companies are based on paternalistic 
leadership which emphasises bureaucratic control and centralised decision-making 
(Cheng et al., 2014; Lok & Crawford, 2004; Swierczek, 1991). Less than two thirds of 
SMEs’ interviewees (62.5%, 10 out of 16) primarily depicted an owner as an ultimate 
decision-maker as well as a controller on most internal business affairs. This depiction 
demonstrates that an owner had a tremendous influence on every corner of their 
business based on their authority which derived from his/her official position. This was 
also the case with cyber security agendas.  
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CM13 
If a CEO changes, senior managers should change their ideas according to the CEO. This 
is Korean business culture. And, this change trickles down to general staff. 
 
CM3 
In SMEs, a CEO is the key who controls everything and decide from minute matters to 
bigger ones… Also, we are thinking about applying for ISMS certificate. Because this 
certificate is expensive and requires a lengthy process, I am not sure our CEO would say 
yes. 
 
The 10 SMEs which mentioned the heavy influence of an owner consisted of six small 
and four medium businesses. Considering the sample size, significantly more 
interviewees from small businesses (100.0%, 6 out of 6) concurred with the statement 
than those from medium businesses (40.0%, 4 out of 10). Not only managers but also 
small owners (CO2 and 12) themselves perceived the influential role of an owner. Having 
said that, an owner’s influence was viewed predominantly in a negative sense. IT 
managers expressed a sceptical opinion against their owners’ support for cyber security 
agendas. Compared to this, very few extracts were found which mentioned an owner in 
a positive light. See below for two examples.  
 
CM4 
If our business gets larger, we may need to rent a server from IDC and add some layers 
for cyber security. We… maybe… my worry is the cost. I am not sure whether our CEO 
would be favourable to this idea. 
 
CM5 
Our CEO changes basically every year. A new CEO wants to show that he or she is 
different from his or her predecessor. Thus, a new CEO mostly focuses on short-sighted 
performance with high visual effects. However, cyber security is a supporting role rather 
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than cash-generating area, so it is hard to expect any short-term performance from cyber 
security.  
 
Due to its strong authority, leadership of an owner was recognised as a significant factor 
which changed cyber security culture. One middle manager in a medium business (CM13) 
presented a successful case of how a mind-set change of an owner brought about 
cultural changes within a company. This was an outlier case.  
 
CM13 
I think the mind-set of a CEO is really important. A year ago, our CEO joined a seminar 
provided by the SMBA. From then on, he started to stress that cyber security should be 
one of our priorities. This has changed our corporate culture a little bit. Other teams tried 
to pay attention to what we said, at least...pretended to do. Now, we train staff once a 
year on how much our business information is important...  
 
There can be some downsides from a strong leadership. One of them was a structural 
bias in decision-making processes. The processes were supposed to involve discussions 
among senior management. Managers avoided engaging in the processes because their 
owners’ decision was deemed as a verdict without proper discussion. Some managers 
in small businesses (33.3%, 2 out of 6) agreed this point. They showed their reluctance 
to talk to an owner regarding cyber security decisions, deferring most of decisions to 
their owner. See below for an example.  
 
CM10 
But, our owner has an extensive authority, I mean, too much. Basically, he decides on 
most of things, even on cyber security, although he does not know anything about that. 
It is difficult to have some meaningful discussions with him because of his strong 
character. This situation makes me avoid suggesting anything about it. I just wait for his 
decisions and just follow them. 
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6. 3. 4 Negative perception 
 
Negative perception was pervasive throughout the whole interview data. In detail, “a 
lack of understanding”, “marginalised”, “do not know”, “hassle”, “discourages”, and 
“against” were the exact terms used to denote the negative perception against cyber 
security and IT staff. It was apparent that there was a dichotomy between IT staff and 
non-IT staff. Interestingly, this negative perception was identified on several levels: staff, 
manager, and organisation levels. Non-IT personnel treated IT professionals as 
supporting staff for them and deemed cyber security as a cost. Overall, each level had a 
negative tendency against cyber security agendas. In consequences, the overall culture 
showed, to some extent, an unfavourable propensity against it.  
 
CM3 
Senior managers and most of employees consider cyber security a cost. Cost is something 
they should reduce, which means that cyber security needs to be reduced, not enhanced. 
 
CM5 
IT business is booming, but… Still IT professionals are marginalised within the company... 
We are treated as supporting staff for others. No proper attention is given to us. And 




Most employees do not think of cyber security seriously. Sometimes, they are against us. 
 
As with the aforementioned negative perception, non-IT personnel had insufficient 
understanding on cyber security. The managers in medium firms (CM3, 5, and 7) who 
expressed concern over the negative perception above also mentioned a lack of 
understanding of cyber security. This clearly indicates that the negative perception and 
the lack of understanding were linked. Although it is difficult to confirm causality 
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between these two, it would be more intuitive to argue that the negative perception 
was based on the lack of understanding than vice versa.  
 
CM3 
Easily speaking… most employees do not understand cyber security. They just complain 




Our senior management does not understand what the IT team does and they look at us 
as just IT professionals. They do not know that there are professional subareas such as 
software, hardware, and security. 
 
CM7 
Haha… nope, not really... most staff do not even know what cyber security is, and only a 
few will know what they should do for cyber security. 
 
The negative perception, or disregard for cyber security was not only maintained by 
individuals, but also permeated in the organisational structure. And, the negative 
sentiments on cyber security have spread into disregard for individual agents, IT staff, 
who were involved in cyber security matters. As a comparable response, IT staff and 
managers also contained some negative feelings against non-IT staff. The 
abovementioned extracts (CM3, 5, and 7) illustrated how much animosity IT managers 
had towards non-IT staff and managers. Phrases, such as “against us”, “they just 
complain”, and “do not even know” conveyed strong negative emotions against them. 
The negative feelings and attitudes were not directional perceptions between IT staff 
and non-IT staff, but bidirectional ones. A low manager from a medium firm (CM3) 




Due to cyber security risks, we do not use wifi. If we adopt wifi, we need to do more 
network segmentation and buy another security solution. Because of the cost, we gave 
up, finally. But, some employees still ask for wifi. Though we try to explain why we cannot 
adopt it, they keep asking and ignoring our explanation. They do not want to accept that 
additional security controls need to be equipped to use wifi. They want just a convenience, 
but we have to think about security.  
 
In spite of the awareness of disregard for cyber security, most businesses (50.0%, 8 out 
of 16) could not act upon it due to the lack of internal support. Changing negative 
perceptions requires a long-term commitment with multi-faceted support. Instead, IT 
staff and managers who suffered internal disrespect figured out ways to neutralise the 
negative perception. They tried to adjust to this hostile environment by utilising an 
adaptive strategy. This strategy was not a by-product of management decisions, but an 
intentional product of IT staff and managers themselves. Aiming at getting cyber security 
messages across to non-IT staff and managers, this strategy took advantage of the fact 
that non-IT staff and managers did not have knowledge of IT matters. A low manager in 
a construction engineering business (CM3) described how this adaptive strategy was 
carried out in a real situation. According to the description below, an ostensible reason 
for this strategy was testing and alarming non-IT staff, but the real intention was to 
increase the dependency of non-IT staff on IT personnel. 
 
CM3 
Well… sometimes we do some things cautiously….. We intentionally make an incident. 
We shut down a server or disable some systems. This is a way of informing employees of 
the importance of cyber security, but also it is a good way of giving the impression that 
IT team does an important job. Some employees seem to neglect us, so that we need to 
make them feel that they rely on us for their efficient work. (When you did that, people 
don't complain about that? or aren't they suspicious of the disruption?) No. They don't 
know anyway. They do not tell whether the disruption is because of malware or.. done 
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by us. And, we have a good reason to do this, because this is another form of testing our 
staff and alarming them to be careful of their computers. 
 
Even though the negative perception was dominant feelings across businesses, some 
businesses (18.8%, 3 out of 16) identified positive sentiments against cyber security. 
Non-IT staff in those businesses were aware of the importance of cyber security and 
showed positive attitudes towards cyber security. In line with the positive feelings, they 
favourably accepted cyber security rules and policies. The following excerpts illustrate 
this point.  
 
CM4 
Our staff know that securing personal information is a critical element for our company, 
so they are aware of the importance and basically know what to do... I am sure that most 
of staff understand the importance. 
 
CM14 
Sure, they know the importance of cyber security definitely. They should follow what they 




All staff know how important it is to keep to the rules in the policy…. Most of employees 
understand that personal information of customers are important. 
 
Some investigation is needed to find out why these three SMEs were different from the 
rest. There were two commonalities. The first common feature was that cyber security 
was considered a priority by senior management. It was assumed that an emphasis by 
senior management on cyber security contributed to the increase of the awareness of 
general staff. The second commonality was related to the nature of their business. Those 
three businesses relied heavily upon ICTs in any form in order to provide education 
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services, banking services and insurance services, respectively. Their services were 
provided to the public rather than organisations, which meant that protection of 
customers’ personal information was the first priority. These commonalities indicate 
that non-IT staff and managers’ perception on cyber security was influenced by various 
factors on the organisational level.  
 
6.4 Fragmentation of public organisations 
 
Public sector organisations in cyber security have their own aims and roles. Cyberspace 
has the nature of surpassing time and geographical boundaries. This nature causes a 
new set of difficulties that public sector organisations have never encountered. 
Compared to this, public organisations are inherently bounded by geographic locations 
or jurisdiction. This is why coordination among relevant public organisations and with 
international counterparts cannot be overemphasised. However, relationships among 
the Korean public organisations were fragmented in three ways. Firstly, the level of 
cooperation was weak and they competed with each other to some extent. Secondly, 
information was not shared among them in an appropriate manner. Thirdly, two 
different approaches to cyber security were identified. These three were identified as 
sub-themes for the theme, fragmentation of public organisations.  
 
6. 4. 1 Weak cooperation and competitive milieu 
 
It is a normal expectation that public sector organisations in the same area work side-
by-side. However, this was not the case among Korean public organisations working to 
secure cyberspace. To start a discussion on this, it was necessary to identify which public 
organisations were participating actors in the cyber security area. Interviewees 
recognised that the KISA, SMBA, NPA, and NIS were the main agencies. There was no 
dispute that the four entities were engaged in protecting SMEs regarding cyber security 
and cybercrime. The question centred on to what extent they were engaged in 
cooperation. When it comes to cyber security, the KISA took the leading role since it was 
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the IT professional public body which aimed to secure the whole public and private 
network across the nation. Due to its technical and strategic expertise in cyber security, 
KISA had the role of supporting a handful of public organisations. Two government 
interviewees described it as follows,  
 
GO2 
KISA is the core government organisation when we frequently talk about cyber threats… 
They are IT professionals both in technical point of view and policy point of view... They 
have a fairly good picture about general cyber threats... KISA has the expertise in cyber 
security, so basically they have no expectation from other relevant government agencies. 
No agency knows cyber security more than the KISA, so to speak. Thus, it is the KISA that 
supports other agencies in many ways.  
 
GO5 
We (KISA) send out Internet data or other materials in cyberspace to a variety of 
organisations. I think most of government organisations have some sort of connection 
with us. We support them by providing information they need... Indeed, Police, NIS, 
military, Korea Communications Commission (KCC) are all our (KISA) partners in the 
aspect of security breaches.  
 
Interview data illustrated how their working relationships looked. There were three 
types of relationships: (1) cooperation, (2) no cooperation and (3) unofficial cooperation. 
Firstly, different extents of cooperation were found between the NPA and KISA, and the 
NPA and SMBA. Some interviewees from the NPA (66.7%, 2 out of 3) described the 
cooperation between the NPA and KISA was based on an operational and tactical level. 
The two agencies had an overlapping area in that they were responsible for cyber-
attacks and breaches. The police interpreted them as cybercrime because any form of 
cyber-attacks and breaches were criminalised under the Korean law71 . In order to 
                                                          
71 the Act on the Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilisation and 
Information Protection 
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facilitate a transfer of victims’ reports, the NPA deployed three cybercrime investigators 
to the 118 call centre in the KISA (GO3). If an inquiry was judged to be worth 
investigating, the call centre transferred the inquiry to one of the police investigators. 
This was cooperation on the operational level. On the tactical level, the NPA and KISA 
cross-examined malicious codes in order to reaffirm the nature of codes (GO1). These 
two examples show that the two agencies carried out substantial cooperation, but there 
was no indication that the cooperation was based on strategic guidance. Compared to 
this, the cooperation between the NPA and SMBA was weak. No substantial level of 
cooperation was found except occasional information sharing.  
 
Secondly, no cooperation was found between the NPA and NIS, and the KISA and SMBA. 
Interviewees from these agencies did not recognise the other agency as a partner. The 
NPA was in competition with the NIS, which will be explained below. On the other hand, 
the SMBA and KISA were involved in different frameworks. One interviewee from the 
SMBA was aware of the different roles between them. This will be explained further in 
Section 6. 4. 3. Thirdly, the NIS had an unofficial cooperation with the KISA and SMBA. 
Due to the secret nature of the NIS, the extent of the cooperation between the KISA and 
NIS was almost hidden from public view.  
 
GO9 
Roughly speaking, we (SMBA) try to protect business secrets, whereas KISA aims to 
promote a safe internet environment for everybody. So, we target SMEs directly, but KISA 










 Red line : No cooperation  
 Blue line : Cooperation  
 Dash line: Unofficial cooperation 
Figure 6.1 A diagram on the relationships among the main agencies 
 
The diagram above shows that the extent of overall cooperation was significantly weak. 
Some interviewees (22.2%, 2 out of 9) even suspected whether public cooperation was 
needed. This implies that these government agencies did not have or, if they had, shared 
common ground which justified cooperation among them. It was noted that there was 
a lack of official framework for cooperation on the organisational level. Rather, their 
relationships were based on private connections on the individual level. The informal 




Relatively speaking, there is not much cooperation going on with other public 
organisations. We (KISA) often talk to the NIS, the Police, the military and maintain fairly 
good relationships, but do not have official cooperation framework. We have official 
relationships, of course, but not the level of close cooperation if I can say... I would say 
that we have more personal relationships rather than official ones. When we go to a 







In addition, they were under competition to stand out in the league and outperform 
others. In Korean government, organisational performance was evaluated on how 
effectively an agency solved a problem rather than the extent of cooperation. This 
evaluation criterion spurred competition among government agencies working in the 
same area. If organisation A did not do anything when organisation B responded 
effectively and then made their achievement public, the organisation ‘A’ would not only 
lose face but also lose credits from higher government bodies, such as the Prime 
Minister’s Office or the Presidential Office. This hierarchical government structure lay 
behind this competitive milieu. The two excerpts below provide an example of a 
difficulty in the cooperation between agencies.  
 
GO1 
I had an experience which embarrassed me quite a lot. My team was doing an 
investigation on a high-profile case involving customers’ information leakage of an 
online shopping company. Because I had a lot of connections with officials in the KISA, 
they expected me to ring them up and do some co-work if I saw some big cases. If I don’t, 
they will be disappointed, surely. But, at that time, the case was sensitive and, also, I was 
ordered not to share the information, I did not let them know. After finishing the 
investigation, I felt very sorry for that.  
 
GO6 
Well, this is due to the fact that they are working in the overlapping area and there is a 
bit of competition going on among us,, basically we need to fight for limited credits… like 
getting credits,, so the relationship is tense and we need to be cautious…… but there is 
no competition with private firms. Both of us can win-win.  
 
Another reason behind the competition was related to organisational power struggle. 
The NIS which was, technically, in charge of cyber terrorism was viewed as trying to 
extend its hegemony over total cyber security. In particular, relationships between the 
NPA and NIS were the least cooperative compared to relationships between other 
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agencies. The NIS attempted to pass the ‘Anti-cyberterrorism Act’ which could provide 
the legal footing to the NIS. The NPA was afraid the Act would pass because, as a 
consequence of that, the NPA thought its investigatory role in cyber security could be 
significantly diminished. GO1 explained in detail how the two agencies competed 
against each other to expand or maintain their boundary.  
 
GO1 
But, the NIS is not our partner… The NIS keeps making every effort to pass the impending 
‘Anti-cyberterrorism act’. This bill dictates that the NIS is in charge of cyber terrorism 
incidents. The police chiefs will be held accountable to the NIS in any cyber terrorism 
cases or cases suspected as having links to cyber terrorism. If this bill is approved in the 
Congress, it will change the whole dynamics of how cyber terrorism cases are dealt with. 
The problem is that there is a grey area that general cybercrime and cyber terrorism 
incidents intersect. If we do not draw a fine line between them, the NIS has the possibility 
to invade our cybercrime area, too.  
 
6. 4. 2 A lack of information sharing 
 
Information sharing is a critical element to efficiently address cyber security issues. 
However, no interviewees from the government agencies mentioned an information 
sharing framework. It was evident that there was no overarching framework which 
aimed to share information among them. Rather, information sharing occurred 
occasionally among several agencies with similar needs. Although there were some 
meetings in place to discuss current issues among relevant agencies, those meetings 
centred on resolving the incumbent issues rather than sharing information. Also, the 
extent of information sharing was limited. The competing milieu was pointed out as the 
contextual factor which debilitated information sharing. Information sharing should 
have been based on trust among participants. It was therefore difficult to expect trust 
under the competing milieu. Even the low level of information sharing happened in an 
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unbalanced and asymmetric manner. Officials felt that the information sharing meetings 
did not function properly. The interview extract below points out this malfunction.  
 
GO7 
The meeting is a bit superficial. I feel that they are not willing to show or share what they 
have and just try to listen to what others say.  
 
There should be several reasons for the failure of information sharing, but around half 
of interviewees (44.4%, 4 out of 9) pointed out that the existence of the intelligence 
agency, the NIS, in information sharing meetings was problematic. The inherent nature 
of an intelligence agency was its secrecy, which translated into no information sharing. 
It is quite an irony that the secret agency was in these meetings because the NIS was not 
expected to share their information with other public organisations. In addition, the NIS 
was allegedly engaged in internal politics in various ways, and one of them was 
dispatching intelligence agents to public and non-public sector organisations to collect 
their internal information (YTN, 2017).72 If an intelligence agency of this character sits 
on the information sharing table, this would create different dynamics. In consequence, 
the existence of the NIS impeded information sharing, but also information sharing 
occurred in an asymmetric manner. GO5 phrased this situation as “the structural 
hindrance”. These excerpts provide a detailed illustration on the overwhelming 
existence of the NIS as follows.  
 
GO2 
What I felt during that time was that there was no information sharing. The NIS could 
gather information from relevant government agencies through deployed staff. But, 
what the NIS shares with other government agencies is just, simply, threat levels and the 
way of informing is unilateral notification...We have a National cyber security framework, 
but, it is hugely affected by the NIS. Because the NIS is, by its nature, against information 
                                                          
72 However, a new Director Suh Hoon abolished the domestic information officer system on 
the same day (1 June 2017) he was appointed as the chief of the NIS (YTN, 2017). 
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sharing and disclosure. The problem is that the NIS is the main actor in the framework. 
You can probably imagine how the framework will work… 
 
GO5 
The NIS does not share their information, even though the NIS exclusively dominates 
information on North Korea or on the public sector. But, the point is that the NIS is deeply 
involved in the information sharing platform…This is the structural hindrance. Due to this 
limitation, our information sharing platform is largely divided. 
 
It was the KISA which took the role of distributing cyber security information to other 
public organisations. This was why the KISA was recognised as a hub among the related 
public organisations. In this aspect, the KISA was equivalent to the GCHQ, a signals 
intelligence agency in the UK. They were both responsible for providing signals 
information to other public organisations. Therefore, dependence upon the KISA by 
other public organisations was disproportionately greater than vice versa. Despite the 
high centrality, the KISA was viewed as conducting a supporting role rather than a 
leading role. This may have reflected a general social milieu on IT professionals. In 
Korean society IT professionals have not been well respected (Ryu, 2003). This social 
milieu lingered on although the extent of disrespect slowly diminished. IT staff and 
managers in SMEs were treated as supporters as shown in Section 6. 3. 4. In a similar 
vein, the KISA was treated as a supporting agency for other public organisations (see: 
Section 6.4.1).  
 
6. 4. 3 Two different approaches 
 
It was found that there were two approaches to SMEs’ cyber security: (1) general cyber 
security and (2) technology information protection. The first centred around overall 
cyber security threats, while the second focused on protection of technology and 
business information. Each approach was taken by a different set of public organisations. 
The KISA, NPA, and NIS involved general cyber security, whereas the technology 
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information protection was taken by the SMBA, the NPA, and the NIS. It was notable 
that the NPA and NIS were involved in both approaches. In case of the NPA, each 
approach was dealt with by different bureaus. Foreign Affairs Bureau concerned 
technology information protection, whereas Cyber Bureau involved overall cyber 
security threats and cybercrime as is described by GO2 below.  
 
GO2 
One funny thing is that two Bureaus in the Police do the similar job. Foreign Affairs 
Bureau is in charge of business information leakage incidents. Its public partner is the 
SMBA. On the other hand, we, Cyber Bureau deals with cybercrime and cyber security 
and its public partner is the KISA.  
 
Conceptually, the former approach is broader than the latter one. Separating the latter 
one from the former one is a unique phenomenon. This was because the Korean 
government provided special attention to technology information protection. As 
mentioned in Section 3.4.3, protecting technology information was one of the 
government’s principal interests in that the economy depended heavily on exports, and 
technology-oriented industries. The public organisations which were involved in one 
approach were ignorant of public bodies in the other approach. Largely, public actors in 
the two approaches were divided and did not interact each other. The two sides worked 
under a different framework. It is surprising to find out that there has not been any 
discussion on these two different approaches among related public organisations. In 
particular, the SMBA which involved the business information approach did not have a 
clear idea on how their approach related to cyber security. Each interviewee from the 




Our role does not directly deal with cyber security. We call it business and technology 
information protection. Cyber security and technology information protection may have 
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some overlapping areas. Or I can say in this way. Cyber security is a means to protect 
business information. What we are doing is, in some sense, increasing cyber security. 
Without cyber security, business information cannot be protected. But, we do not say 




I don’t know much... But, maybe what we are doing can be captured by the concept of 
cyber security? Or do they involve totally different area? Well… as far as I know, cyber 
security is about technical things, but we are more like managing insiders. 
 
GO9  
We basically work for SMEs and our team assesses and prevents business information 
leakage of SMEs. Very few cases of information leakage happen offline and in almost 95% 
of all cases, business information is leaked online or via external devices. So, to large 
extent, cases that we deal with are related to cyber security. But, viewpoints from us and 
KISA are different.  
 
The relation between the two approaches has never been discussed publicly. Public 
bodies in one approach did not envisage that other bodies in the other approach could 
be their partners. With having no formal or informal relationships, there was no 
engagement or cooperation between the two sides. However, the excerpts above hint 
at the possible intersection between the two approaches, as they mentioned, 
“overlapping areas”, “captured by the concept of cyber security”, and “related to cyber 
security”. This highlights that there may be overlapping elements or sub-areas that 
require attention from both sides. In fact, there was once an internal discussion over 
this issue in the NPA. Some senior officers were aware of the common nature of these 
two approaches. However, the discussion ended to no avail. This example indicates that 




Some high-ranking officials in the headquarters thought it was redundant to handle 
similar works in different bureaus. Once there was a discussion on the possible takeover 
of business information leakage incidents by Cyber Bureau. It did not work well, did not 
change anything. Well, I don’t know how it needs to be changed, but, what I suggest is 
that both sides should work together. Because they are managed separately, it entails a 
waste of public resources. There is no communication whatsoever between these two 
bureaus. I think we need a sort of a framework which can encompass both cyber security 
and technology information protection.  
 
6.5 Overdependence on private organisations 
 
It was recognised that both public organisations and SMEs relied heavily upon the 
private sector organisations. But groups of private firms that the public organisations 
relied upon were different from those the SMEs rested upon. So did the reasons for the 
reliance. Findings below indicate that there were more organisations which required 
attention for this research and relationships among participating entities were complex. 
This section consists of two sub-themes, which are ‘dependence upon private firms by 
public organisations’ and ‘dependence upon IT vendors by SMEs’.  
 
6. 5. 1 Dependence upon private firms by public organisations 
 
Compared to the weak cooperation and competitive milieu among public organisations, 
public bodies maintained intense and close cooperation with private organisations. This 
indicates that the private sector organisations were located in a core part in relations 
among the whole cyber security actors. The NPA and KISA had different reasons for 
cooperating with private organisations. The NPA created a working group with ISPs, 
antivirus companies, and IT security companies, etc. The creation of the working group 
was driven by the NPA for their own purposes. Two interviewees from the NPA (GO1 
and 3) suggested two reasons: (1) to efficiently gather evidence and (2) to catch up with 
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recent trends. The former reason indicates that gathering digital evidence required the 
cooperation of some private companies which retained this. This is a new set of 
difficulties for law enforcement agencies compared to gathering physical evidence. The 
latter reason suggests that cybercrime investigators were keen to acquire external 
knowledge on cyber security. This level of cooperation was not a must, but an important 
facilitator for cybercrime investigation. This cooperation model can be viewed as an 
adaptive strategy in that this was developed out of need from the NPA. It opened a gate 
for cybercrime investigators to utilise informal connections with the private parties via 
the formal channel.  
 
GO1 
To efficiently resolve criminal cases, we invest in cooperation with private companies. If 
we do not have good relations with ISPs or online social media companies, it is difficult 
to collect evidence during investigations. (What about antivirus companies, and IT 
security companies?) They are more like information providers to us, because they have 
recent news on cyber-attacks and source code of malware… 
 
GO3 
Private firms such as antivirus firms or IT security firms have abundant information on 
recent trends. Their state-of-the-art information helps us to set up a new tool or tactic to 
prevent that. We have a working group with private firms and we meet once in two 
months. This is a good platform to take in outside knowledge. If we don’t know what’s 
going on outside, we can’t see what is a new type of cybercrime and how it is changing. 
 
In case of the KISA, cooperation with private parties was necessary to meet their 
organisational goal which was ‘creating a secure cyberspace’. The KISA was able to 
identify cyber security attacks either by itself or from public reports to the 118 centre, 
but it could not develop a vaccine or disable a certain server. These should be carried 
out, respectively, by antivirus companies and ISPs. The KISA’s cooperation with antivirus 
companies, IT security vendors, and ISPs was a crucial part of its breach management 
238 
process. These private parties engaged in implementing the KISA’s policies as active 
participators, following a work protocol. Compared to the NPA’s cooperation model, this 
model was based on an official partnership to reach KISA’s organisational goal.  
 
GO4 
We are very close to private entities, like antivirus companies, IT security vendors, and 
ISPs. They are important to us. Once we identify malicious codes or viruses, we directly 
report them to antivirus companies so that they can make vaccines. Then, antivirus 
vendors will update their software. Also, following the analysis of a malicious code, we 
need to cut off orders from the controlling server. To do this, we have to contact ISPs to 
ask for cut-off of certain IPs or domains.  
 
GO6 
But, with private firms conversation is more formalised. Based on MoU, we cooperate 
with private firms to share information and to execute our policies. They will not work 
with us if we do not formally recognise them as formal partners. It is much closer and 
deeper.  
 
In stark contrast, the SMBA did not engage with private organisations. This was due to 
the nature of their work. The SMBA dealt with technology information protection which 
rested on business secrecy. Instead, the SMBA’s partners were confined to the public 
sector organisations, such as Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, Korean Intellectual 
Property Office, Fair Trade Commission, the NPA, and the NIS. Except the NPA and NIS, 
the first three public organisations addressed technology and business information 
protection from slightly different perspectives. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Energy concentrated on protecting core technologies that significantly impacted on 
Korean exports, while the Korean Intellectual Property Office aimed to protect 
intellectual property rights. Lastly, the Fair Trade Commission, an antitrust watchdog, 
regulated unfair deals between large companies and SMEs. In this respect, the antitrust 
watchdog monitored whether large companies took advantage of their superior position 
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to take away SMEs’ proprietary information. The protection coverage of the SMBA was 
larger than these three public bodies in that it protected not only business information 
but also technology information which should not be exposed to outsiders. An excerpt 
below illustrates the skewed partnerships that the SMBA had.  
 
GO7 
I would say that we do not cooperate with private companies because we are dealing 
with technology information protection. There is a bit of secrecy in this area. Business 
information inherently are secrets or intellectual property. 
 
6. 5. 2 Dependence upon IT vendors by SMEs 
 
The extent of dependency of SMEs upon IT vendors was overwhelming. In fact, almost 
all SMEs (93.8%, 15 out of 16) used IT services from IT vendors and those services, to 
some extent, contained cyber security elements. IT vendors were recognised as instantly 
sought-after parties when a technical anomaly or a security breach was suspected. For 
example, an IT vendor that managed a server for an SME was the most frequently 
contacted party by the SME. In addition, an IT vendor acted as an information provider 
when an SME needed to extend its cyber security capabilities. The SMEs’ 
overdependence was predicated on the assumption that cyber security was a sub-set of 
general IT matters so that a general IT vendor could resolve cyber security problems as 
well. The following extracts describe SMEs’ dependent attitudes towards IT vendors.  
 
CO2 
Our IT vendor provides us a server along with other services, but also supports us with 




I contacted a commissioned IT vendor and the vendor fixed it within a few hours... 
Because the vendor knows the server and IT environment of our company, it is the right 
choice for us to contact the vendor if something happens.  
 
CM13 
We are using a groupware from Hanbiro. Before, we got infected with a virus and the 
server was shut down. At that time, Hanbiro contacted us and resolved the situation very 
well. Our data were fully recovered. That was a huge relief…(Do IT vendors provide 
enough cyber security, too?) Yeah, I think, to a large extent, yes…. They provide IT 
services as a package, including cyber security.  
 
Then, why did SMEs rely upon IT vendors for cyber security matters? Primary reasons 
for this were: (1) immature market and (2) practical benefits to SMEs. The first reason 
involved a market environment of an IT sector. The interviewees below (CM9 and 16) 
suggested that there were only a few IT vendors which specialised in cyber security of 
SMEs. An immature market referred to the fact that cyber security was not a recognised 
sub-area in the IT sector. This was mainly because businesses in the IT sector perceived 
that provision of cyber security controls to SMEs did not yet generate profits. Currently, 
most cyber security vendors targeted large businesses and public sector organisations 




When we work with field staff, we use clouding system. We work together in the cloud. 
This makes me worried sometimes. I tried to get a consultation about it, but it seems 





I can rarely find any cyber security solutions or services targeting SMEs. In Korea, IT 
security vendors tilt toward serving government organisations, large companies mostly 
in financial institutions, gaming companies, or major web portal providers. (Why is that?) 
Because they have money. 
 
Secondly, for SMEs practical benefits by using IT vendors outweighed downsides 
associated with it. The benefits included convenience, efficiency and responsiveness. IT 
staff and managers were able to deal with an unexpected situation through supports 
from IT vendors. SMEs perceived that IT vendors were responsive and resolved an 
urgent issue in an efficient manner. It is important to bear in mind that business 
disruption was the greatest concern in breach management (see: Section 6.2.3). These 
benefits helped IT staff and managers to have a chance to disclose their work expertise 
to non-IT staff and managers. The resistant culture and negative perceptions against IT 
staff and managers were widespread within SMEs (see: Section 6.3). In fact, IT 
professionals were marginalised from the majority of non-IT staff. Against this 
unfavourable working environment, successful support from IT vendors gave IT 
professionals an opportunity to show their presence in their companies.  
 
CM7  
Frankly, I rely on our IT vendors… one which administers the IDC server and the other 
which administers our firewall system. They monitor our systems and contact us if 
something wrong happens. Very convenient for me… (Can you give me an example?) 
Yeah, for example, the firewall vendor sends us a monthly report and lets us know the 
amount of traffic, the total number of attempted viruses and malware. Because we use 
static IPs, once I get the report, I inform some staff that their computers were infected. 
Then, general staff think that I am doing something! It is a great way to show them that 




We can use IT services from external parties… IT vendors… and they do basically 
everything. We simply need to choose products and services according to our budget. 
 
CM13 
They (IT vendors) bring us more efficiency. Employing one cyber security professional 
costs much more than using an IT vendor.  
 
On the contrary, some SMEs (12.5%, 2 out of 16) cast doubt on the trend of 
overdependence upon IT vendors. When using services from IT vendors, SMEs normally 
allowed for them to have full access to computer and network systems. This also opened 
the door for accessing corporate data by the IT vendors. The authorised access by IT 
vendors was viewed as a high risk, generating nervousness for some SMEs. This was a 
trade-off between work efficiency and data protection. Although most SMEs were 
satisfied with the use of IT vendors, it is worth noting that there were some risks involved 
in it. The worry for IT vendors is illustrated as follows.  
 
CM13 
It is great to have an external party which can support us professionally, but on the other 
hand, it makes us nervous because the external party is able to access all of our data. If 
they maliciously leak our data or disrupt our system for any reason, that will be a very 
bad incident for us. 
 
6.6 Influential external conditions 
 
The aforementioned main themes were not formulated by themselves, but were 
conditioned by socioeconomic environments. They were outcomes of interactions with 
external environments. Three substantial external factors emerged from the interview 
data. These socioeconomic factors directly or indirectly influenced dynamics of cyber 
security management in SMEs as well as relationships among the public and private 
sector organisations involved. These were identified as sub-themes in this section: tough 
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business environment, ineffective penalty system, and client-driven contractual 
mechanisms.  
 
6. 6. 1 Tough business environment 
 
Survival could be the most serious risk to any business (Borodzicz, 2005, p. 62). Likewise, 
Korean businesses have struggled to win over competitors and increase their 
survivability (Jin & Gu Suh, 2005; Lee, 2004; Wright & Kwon, 2006). In this respect, 
severe market competition was one of the most mentioned codes from SMEs’ 
interviewees (31.3%, 5 out of 16). Tough business environment has been created not 
only by domestic competitors but also by overseas ones. Korean SMEs make stringent 
efforts to keep their competitive edge in a way that outperforms foreign companies, 
especially, China, Japan, and India. Excerpts below illustrate heavy pressures from the 
competition. Due to the tough competition, SMEs placed emphasis on cultivating staff’s 
creativity, providing high quality service, and attracting customers. In contrast, applying 
additional security controls was depicted as being in contradiction to those emphases. 
This implies that the severe market condition was an inhibiting factor to the increase of 
cyber security in SMEs.  
 
CO1 
I focus more on keeping ahead of our competitors with brilliant ideas. So, I try to 
encourage my staff to be creative and brilliant. Regulating or controlling their behaviour 
is killing their creativity… it is the worst thing. 
 
CM14 
Banks in our size, or banking sector in general, face very fierce market competition. 
Bankers work until 10pm usually. And they have to sell banking products and attract 
customers under his or her name. 
 
244 
6. 6. 2 Ineffective penalty system 
 
Ineffective penalty system has emerged as an important contextual factor. Interestingly, 
this factor was not mentioned by SMEs, but only by public organisations. In the US, 
lawsuits related to corporate cyber security have surged recently, and this led senior 
managers to pay more attention to legal risks involving cyber security (Yoon, 2016). 
However, it has been continuously pointed out that Korean businesses have received 
low penalties on their illegal activities (Park, 2004). This also applied to SMEs’ cyber 
security practices. The law73, which regulated substandard cyber security practices of 
businesses, was also known for its lenient penalties (Lee, 2016). In addition, the judiciary 
was known for its tendency to sentence a small fine for illegal or substandard corporate 
practices on various aspects, including cyber security. 
 
It is of importance that relevant law is revised to effectively regulate inappropriate cyber 
security practices of businesses (Yoon, 2016). Interviewees from government agencies 
perceived that SMEs did not invest in cyber security. Some of them (33.3%, 3 out of 9) 
mentioned that ineffective penalty system contributed to the lack of cyber security 
investment. When SMEs carried out risk assessment, a penalty from a court was one of 
elements which constituted legal risks. In many cases, SMEs were placed in a situation 
which involved a choice between accepting the fine and spending budgets to meet 
regulations. Based on the rational choice theory, SMEs were highly likely to accept the 
small fine rather than investing in cyber security to abide by regulations. This tells us 
that the penalty system was not effective in changing SMEs’ behaviour. Let’s propose a 
supposition. If the law suggests a large amount of fine or imprisonment, this will increase 
legal costs, raising the legal risks accordingly. Heavier penalties are expected to change 
the dynamics of SMEs’ risk assessment. As a consequence, this will propel SMEs to 
                                                          
73 The law, Act on Promotion of Information and Communication Network Utilization and 
Information Protection, stipulates an array of activities that a person in charge of managing 
customers’ personal information or a company should abide by (see: Section 28). Section 73 
dictates that such a person or a company in violation of Section 28 shall be subject to 
imprisonment for up to 2 years or a penalty of not more than 20 million won (£13,465).  
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choose the cheaper option, which may be an investment in cyber security. How SMEs 
carried out risk assessment is set out below.  
 
GO5  
For businesses, everything is about risk management. There are financial risks, 
management risks, legal risks, cyber security risks, and so forth. How to deal with all sorts 
of risk is the major question for them. The basic equation when thinking about risk is cost 
and benefit analysis. Cyber security is not an exception. If estimated risk from cyber 
security breaches is not high, which means ‘acceptable’, they do not need to invest. (How 
do they know that it is acceptable or not?) Considering risk assessment, one important 
dimension is lawsuit or court fines. For them, it may be cheaper to pay a fine than buying 
servers and software. For this reason, they are not motivated to invest money for 
upgrading IT systems.   
 
GO6 
Still, SMEs consider that damage from a breach is not serious. Even if personal 
information is leaked, the amount of fines decided in a court is small.   
 
6. 6. 3 Client-driven contractual mechanism 
 
Subcontracting has been a very popular business practice in Korean industries, with 
about half of SMEs in manufacturing sector being subcontractors (Cho, 2014). The 
practice unfolds in the following way. When large companies make products or provide 
services, it is not the large companies that actually carry out those things. Instead, they 
hire a small company, which is called a subcontractor, to do their works. In the Korean 
subcontracting practice, large companies become contractors and SMEs become 
subcontractors (Cho, 2014). In the dual relationship, a large company becomes a client 
to an SME. This practice is deeply entrenched in Korean economy. As suggested in Table 
3.3, 81.1% of Korean exports were driven by large companies. To expand in overseas 
markets, large companies pay special attention to the quality of their products and 
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services. In consequence, when subcontracting, the contractors try to maintain the high 
quality of products or services provided by subcontractors.  
 
It is a recent trend that subcontractors’ cyber security is included as one of the elements 
in the quality control process. Some SMEs (37.5%, 6 out of 16) identified themselves as 
subcontractors. Increasingly, contractors demanded subcontractors for a certain level 
of cyber security. This was a significant external pressure for SMEs. SMEs had no choice 
but to consider cyber security seriously to win contracts from large companies. This can 
be conceptualised as a client-driven mechanism. Most of the subcontracting SMEs 
(83.3%, 5 out of 6) noted pressures from their clients. This mechanism was an offspring 
of contractual relationships between large companies and SMEs. It changed or was 
reshaped according to the relationships. Interviewees below suggest that clients’ 
requirements on cyber security had a direct impact on SMEs. These were an influential 
factor that changed their decisions on cyber security management. However, there is a 
caveat. Some business sectors can be distanced from the client-driven mechanism if 
they do not recognise subcontracting as the dominating practice. Two excerpts below 
show how the client-driven mechanism was accepted by SMEs.  
 
CM8 
We are quite sensitive to business information leakage. As a second-tier subcontractor, 
we have to abide by certain rules from a contractor. A previous client asked us for 
evidence that we met minimum standards that they required. Fortunately, our current 
contractor does not stress general security matters too much.  
 
CM13 
My company is the second-tier subcontractor. We sell our products to the first-tier 
subcontractor which sells its products to large car companies in Korea. The contractor 
sends a policy concerning cyber security and information leakage to the first-tier 
subcontractor which also refers the policy to us. The policy from the contractor is what 
we should abide by during the manufacturing process.  
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Although large clients put pressure on the subcontracting SMEs to pay attention to cyber 
security issues, they did not require the subcontractors to adhere to any known 
international standards or government schemes. The reason was that international 
standards were not applicable to SMEs and that there was no known public guidance. 
Instead, the clients used broad terms and set arbitrary criteria that required 
subcontractors to comply with. In reality, these methods were used to indicate the 
responsibilities of subcontractors if something went wrong.  
 
CM7 
Well,,, not really. They do not say specifically what we have to adhere to. International 
standards are out of our league. And, what public guidance are you talking about? I 
haven't heard of any. What they do is to use some broad sentences. This is to transfer 
cyber security responsibilities to subcontractors, I mean,,, us. Or sometimes, staff from 
some clients come to me and talk about minimum criteria that they think we need to 
have. But they are quite arbitrary. 
 
CM9 
International standards are too much. They are for really big companies. And, there is no 
government guidance that we are aware of,,, frankly. Our large clients do not clearly 
specify what we have to do. Instead, they use comprehensive phrases or ambiguous 
terms in a contract. It is like having us take responsibility for security breaches. If nothing 
happens, it is okay, but it can be bad if something does happen.  
 
6. 7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the main findings that emerged from the field interviews. 
Firstly, internal security management was unstructured in many ways. Overall, SMEs 
were not ready for potential risks or breaches as indicated by a lack of awareness of risks 
and threats, unprepared approaches to the risks, and no formal procedure for breach 
responses. Secondly, there was a culture resistance to cyber security. There was an 
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underlying conflict between different sets of values. Some corporate values, such as 
profit-making, efficiency and convenience, contradicted cyber security. 
Miscommunication among staff and negative perceptions against IT staff were pervasive. 
Authoritative leadership of an owner was recognised as having a negative impact on 
cyber security. Thirdly, public organisations which composed the cyber security 
governance were fragmented. The fragmentation was manifested in three ways: 
competition, a lack of information sharing and two divergent approaches. Fourthly, 
overreliance upon private organisations was identified. Not only public organisations, 
but also SMEs depended upon private sector organisations. This is a conspicuous 
difference of policing cybercrime from traditional crimes. Finally, as influential external 
factors, tough business environment, ineffective penalty system and client-driven 
mechanism were found to have a significant influence on SMEs’ decisions regarding 
cyber security management. 
 
The five themes can be grouped into two categories: (1) risk management mechanism 
(within a business) (2) risk management governance (including public and private sector 
organisations). The first category involves internal handling of cyber security by SMEs 
and includes two themes, which are unstructured cyber security management and 
culture resistant to cyber security. Considering the terms, such as unstructured or 
resistant, these two themes indicate negative points of view on the internal risk 
management mechanism within an SME. The second category includes three themes, 
which are fragmentation of public organisations, overdependence on private 
organisations, and influential external conditions. This category concerns relationships 
among public and private sector organisations as well as external factors that influence 
those relationships. The themes under this category highlight that risk management 
governance needs to be understood with relational terms. As opposed to the belief that 
the risk management governance posits harmony and cooperation among associated 
organisations, the findings showed that it was not the case. The themes suggested in 
this Chapter will be developed further in Chapter 7 by amalgamating the findings of the 
quantitative and qualitative research with the literature.   
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This chapter aims to comprehensively understand cyber security management in Korean 
SMEs by integrating the quantitative and qualitative research findings with the existing 
literature, including the qualitative results describing the empirical field of enquiry. The 
research questions defined in Chapter 1 are considered in turn. In this way it is shown 
that the research has progressed in a consistent manner from setting the research 
questions, constructing a proper methodology, and moving to data collection and 
analysis.  
 
The triangulation strategy improves the validity of interpretation and adds research 
rigour. This analysis technique will minimize disadvantages from using only one source 
or research method. Furthermore, this strategy fits into the orientation of this study, 
which is exploratory, by adding additional knowledge from different sources.  
 
The quantitative and qualitative findings shed light on different aspects and identify 
different factors. There are agreements in some areas, and conflicts in others. 
Furthermore, in many cases, the findings support the existing state of the literature.  
 
Although this chapter is kept as short as possible, some interview excerpts are used in 
Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 to illustrate the actual voices of interviewees.  
 
7. 2. Integration of findings 
 
7.2.1. Research question 1: The extent to which South Korean SMEs are exposed 
to cyber security risks? 
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The Internet has become a vital medium for individual communications, business 
management, and provision of government services. Both Korean SMEs and Korean 
society have a high rate of connection to ICTs (ITU, 2015b; OECD, 2017b; UN, 2014a). 
Quantitative surveys measured SMEs’ exposure to cyber security risks with three 
elements:  
 
(1) their dependence upon online service,  
(2) use of personally-owned devices at work and  
(3) use of externally-hosted web services.  
 
As illustrated in Section 5.3.1, virtually all Korean SMEs used online services in their 
business (see: Figure 5.1). However, online services were not incorporated into core 
parts of business management and were mainly used for communication and 
advertising purposes rather than for business and financial transactions. Also the use of 
personal devices and of externally-hosted web services was widespread among SMEs. 
Employees in over three quarters (77.7%) of SMEs used personal devices at work, 
although the extent of use varied by business sector (see: Figure 5.3). On a similar note, 
most SMEs (83.2%) used externally-hosted web services (e.g., cloud computing) (see: 
Figure 5.4). Personal devices at work and externally-hosted web services were not 
exclusive to each other, but stimulated the use of ICTs by SMEs. These practices 
corresponded with the fundamental corporate values of work efficiency, profit-making 
and staff trust (see: Section 6.3.1), which was why the adoption of online services was 
fully accepted by business management.  
 
Despite the high connectedness to ICTs, quantitative findings showed inconclusive 
results on SMEs’ perceptions of the significance of ICTs (see: Section 5.3.1). SMEs which 
did not think online services important part of their business outnumbered those which 
did (46.0% versus 32.6%) (see: Figure 5.2). This contrasted to their high use of online 
services. However, SMEs’ perception on the criticality of externally-hosted web services 
(see: Figure 5.5) matched the actual use of them (see: Figure 5.4). The two figures 
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illustrated the similar pattern of the frequency distribution graphs. According to 
qualitative findings, over half (56.3%, 9 out of 16) of SMEs recognised ICTs as critical 
elements for their services (Table 7.1). A junior manager from a construction 
engineering company, CM3, explained the significance of the connectedness. This 
excerpt is an excellent example of how deeply computer and network systems were vital 
in business.  
 
CM 3 
It is very crucial for us. We use ERP, email, homepage and plan to use groupware, 
electronic authorisation system, and messenger. We have a server in our Internet Data 
Centre (IDC). Because we have sensitive information in ERP, we have one server in our 
headquarters. For us, design rendering is very important. 
 
Do perceptions of the connectedness to ICT vary by business size?  
 
Medium firms were more likely to perceive both online services and externally-hosted 
web services as an integral part of their business than small firms (see: Tables 5.3 and 
5.5). However, this result was not supported by qualitative findings. The similar number 
of small and medium firms (4 versus 5) replied ‘crucial’ or ‘very crucial’ (Table 7.1). 
Therefore, it is difficult to argue there was a relationship between the significance of 
ICTs and business size.  
 
Table 7.1: The extent of significance of ICTs to SMEs (from qualitative interviews) 
Level of criticality Businesses Percentage Small firms Medium firms 
Very crucial CO1, 12 / CM3, 14, 16 31.3% 2 3 
Crucial CO2 / CM4, 11, 15 25.0% 2 2 
Neutral CM5, 9, 10 18.8% 1 2 
Not very crucial CM7, 8 12.5% 0 2 
Not at all crucial CM6, 13 12.5% 1 1 
Total 16 100.0% 6 10 
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The high connectedness to the Internet exposed SMEs to cyber threats, such as 
economic espionage and cybercrime (see: Table 2.3 in Section 2.3.2.2). The Korean 
government considered economic espionage a serious problem undermining the 
export-driven economy (Choi, 2010; Park et al., 2013). This was why some government 
agencies, such as the SMBA, the NPA, and the NIS, focused on protecting business and 
technical information as a separate approach to general cyber security (see: Section 
6.4.3). Based on the typology of cybercrime (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
2013), economic espionage and cybercrime against SMEs (e.g., cyber trade fraud in 
Section 3.3.2) are computer-related acts for personal or financial gain or harm, and 
those acts can be perpetrated via acts against the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of computer data or systems (see: Table 2.4). 
 
The use of online services blurs temporal and spatial boundaries of traditional business 
management. This characteristic is also spurred on by the use of personal devices and 
externally-hosted web services. This can pose a great risk to SMEs. Private devices which 
retain business information can be left in public places, and as a consequence of this a 
company can lose intellectual property and sensitive data (Madzima et al., 2014). In 
other cases, the use of personal devices can provide a criminal opportunity to employees 
with malicious intentions. In terms of externally-hosted web services, all business 
information is stored in outside servers managed by third party vendors and is therefore 
vulnerable to outsider threats (Brender & Markov, 2013). Hackers or organised 
cybercriminals attempt to target the servers which store business information for 
pecuniary gains, economic intelligence or personal reasons. 
 
What sort of threats concern SMEs the most?  
 
In Section 6.2.1, SMEs (56.3%, 9 out of 16) viewed information leakage as one of the 
most damaging cases for their businesses. Theoretically, information leakage can be 
carried out by either insiders or outsiders. However, twice as many SMEs were 
concerned about insider threats as opposed to external threats (66.7% versus 33.3%) 
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and this result was driven by the SMEs which concerned business information rather 
than personal information (see: Table 6.3). Whether SMEs cherished business 
information or customers’ personal information varied by the type of their customers. 
These results on perceived threats of SMEs can provide useful information to 
government agencies which create cyber security policies for SMEs. 
 
Another implication from the qualitative results above was that insider threats required 
more attention from SMEs and public or private sector organisations. An employee in a 
business can be either an agent for dealing with technical vulnerabilities or an offender 
who commits a cybercrime and it is not reasonable to rule out such possibilities. To 
address insider threats, a balanced approach to cyber security is of vital importance (see: 
Section 2.5.2). Effective cyber security management cannot be completed only by 
technical solutions, but needs to incorporate human factors and management support 
(Rhee et al., 2012; Singh et al., 2013; Singh et al., 2014; Werlinger et al., 2009). To 
implement cyber security management in a holistic manner, corporate management 
practices, risk management tools, and cyber insurance (see: Section 2.5.1), should be 
taken into consideration in any decision-making processes.  
 
7.2.2. Research question 2: How serious are cyber security breaches for South 
Korean SMEs? 
 
Seriousness of cyber security breaches consists of two elements. The first is the 
frequency of breaches and the second is the impact of breaches. It is important to bear 
in mind that the breach frequency alone is not a sufficient criterion because some 
breaches do more harm than others. Assessing the impacts and their harm allows for a 
deeper understanding of the seriousness of the situation.  
 
Quantitative results revealed that over half (55.4%) of SMEs experienced at least one 
breach in the last 12 months (see: Figure 5.6). Among the affected 182 SMEs, over three 
quarters (76.4%) experienced less than 5 breaches, while 17 SMEs (9.3%) experienced 
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breaches over 10 times. Qualitative results in a similar vein supported the quantitative 
results in that over half (56.3%, 9 out of 16) of SMEs suffered a breach. The consensus 
in both findings was in line with results from the UK survey (Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport, 2017), which showed that 52% of small firms and 66% of 
medium firms identified breaches in the previous 12 months.  
 
However, in an analysis of breach experience by business size and sector, some mixed 
results were identified. It is inconclusive to argue any relationship between business size 
and breach experience because three difference sources (columns in Table 7.2) 
presented different findings. On the other hand, both quantitative and qualitative 
findings agreed upon the findings in the analysis by business sector (Table 7.3). Both 
sources pointed out that SMEs in ‘public services’ were the most vulnerable among the 
categories of business sector.  
 
Table 7.2: Breach experience by business size  
 Quantitative finding Qualitative finding 
UK’s cyber Security 
Breaches Survey 2017 
Small 
business 
68.1% (113 out of 166) 50.0% (3 out of 6) 52% 
Medium 
business 
52.8% (67 out of 127) 60.0% (6 out of 10) 66% 
 






Services largely directed at public 58.5% 50.0% 
Services largely directed at organisations 49.2% 60.0% 
Public services 81.8% 66.7% 
Manufacturing and construction 61.9% 50.0% 
255 
Without further knowledge of business turnover or scale of business, it is difficult to 
measure the impact of breaches. Around a third (34.1%) of SMEs showed their ignorance 
of financial costs of breaches (see: Figure 5.9). In spite of insufficient information on the 
breach costs, over two thirds (70.8%) of SMEs (n=120) 74 which reported breaches cost 
under £1,000 in the last 12 months. Where did these costs originate from? These costs 
were closely associated with business disruption (see: Figure 5.11). Two crucial impacts 
(i.e., stopping staff from carrying out their day-to-day work: 53.8%, and repair or 
recovery costs: 46.2%) were considered to be direct consequences of business 
disruption. In contrast, indirect or long-term costs (e.g., fines from regulators (0.0%) and 
reputational damage (6.6%)) were not regarded as having a considerable impact. For 
SMEs, business continuity was the first priority when dealing with cyber security 




Last year computers of five employees were infected with ransomware. And all five 
infections happened at the same time, so our project files were encrypted by the infection. 
Fortunately, we had a backup, so there was not much impact. It just took a day to get 
back to the project again. 
 
CM14 
Banks like us,,, viruses, phishing and hacking are large threats. If these attacks affect our 
normal business and customers cannot use our system, this is the most serious case.  
 
It is noted that cyber security breaches against SMEs were serious from the frequency 
and impact points of view. However, despite its seriousness, it was difficult for them to 
detect a breach in advance. Some SMEs (CO1 and CM4) acknowledged that they did not 
know whether their computers and networks were breached. There should be several 
reasons for the lack of breach awareness. First and foremost, SMEs did not have 
                                                          
74 This figure was calculated after excluding ‘don’t know’ responses.  
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sufficient resources for detecting and preventing cyber threats (Bauer & Dutton, 2015; 
Harris & Patten, 2014; Singh et al., 2013; Truong, 2010). Secondly, this was attributed to 
the asymmetric nature of cyber-attacks. A disproportionately large number of cyber-
attacks are attempted before one gets through security and damages a computer 
system. This was evidenced by the fact that a fifth (21.4%) of businesses in the survey 
identified breaches accidentally (see: Figure 5.10). SMEs therefore tended to accept a 
huge volume of attempted attacks as a norm and this could not be halted due to the 
nature of cyber-attacks. The lack of breach awareness was associated with how SMEs 
interpreted cyber threats. When it comes to a breach, they cognitively classified 
breaches into two groups:  
 
(1) breaches with damage, and  
(2) breaches without damage.  
 
Most SMEs interviewed were concerned about breaches with damage and did not give 
proper attention to breaches with no damage. Damage was thus the reference point for 
taking a cyber-attack seriously and engaging in any responses. Purely attempted cyber-
attacks without damage were largely ignored by SMEs. SMEs did not use cyber security 
management as a prevention tool but purely in a reactive way.  
 
Quantitative and qualitative findings provided some commonalities in terms of types 
and modus operandi of breaches. Survey results showed that over three quarters (75.8%) 
of affected SMEs pointed out viruses and malware as the most frequent type of breaches 
(see: Figure 5.7). Similarly, according to qualitative data, the vast majority of affected 
SMEs (88.9%, 8 out of 9) found the same result. In terms of modus operandi, emails, 
email attachments, and websites have been identified as the most frequent forms of 
attacks. Over half (53.8%) of affected SMEs mentioned them as the source of attacks 
(see: Figure 5.8). Interview data substantiated this finding in that three businesses (CM3, 
CM4, and CM5) directly pointed out them as the source of the breaches. One 
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commonality of these three businesses was that they all suffered at least one breach 
over the past year.  
 
CM3  
It is also hard to imagine that there would be any all-in-one vaccine for this because 
ransomware is updated constantly… As ransomware is infected through email 
attachments or random downloads from websites… 
 
CM4 
This year one PC in a training room was infected with a ransomware, which sent spam 
emails to all staff. 
 
CM5 
Some staff clicked attachments from emails and their account information have been 
leaked. And then, a massive amount of emails have been sent from our webmail server… 
 
In these excerpts, phrases such as “random downloads” (CM3), “sent to all staff” (CM4), 
and “a massive amount of emails” (CM5) were used to describe the nature of the modus 
operandi. These phrases denote randomisation, targeting indiscriminate victims, and 
disproportionate volume, respectively. Nothing can better capture these characteristics 
than spamming, which is a method of distributing unsolicited bulk emails. Spamming 
has become an effective source for cybercriminals as it is carried out automatically via 
machines. The automatic nature of spamming is considered a major factor for 
asymmetry of the offender-victim relationship (Wall, 2007). The asymmetric 
relationship refers to the fact that the relatively small number of offenders targets a 
disproportionately large amount of victims. This highlights transformative 
characteristics of cybercrime as cyber-attacks are increasingly asymmetric, automated, 
and global on a larger scale.  
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Both quantitative and qualitative data provided similar findings on the seriousness of 
cyber security breaches for SMEs. Those findings added more explanatory power to the 
argument that SMEs were targeted by cybercriminals and the scale of the threats cannot 
be ignored (Cabinet Office, 2011a; Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 
2018; Ponemon Institute, 2017). However, there was a disparity between SMEs’ actual 
breach experience and their interpretation of cyber threats. Although SMEs experienced 
real consequences from breaches, they perceived that breaches without damage were 
not within the preview of their interest. This was mainly due to their lack of awareness 
of cyber threats. The problem is that their narrow interpretation of the threats can limit 
choices and options for possible responses to cyber security management.   
 
7.2.3. Research question 3: The extent to which South Korean SMEs are 
prepared to prevent or mitigate cyber security risks and breaches? 
 
This research question was intended to understand an SMEs’ preparedness to cyber 
security. Discussion on this question will develop through examining two dimensions: (1) 
approaches to cyber security risks and (2) dealing with breaches. The first dimension 
denotes a general readiness to the risks, which includes individuals’ perceptions, 
internal policies and practices, organisational culture, and decision-making processes. 
Those approaches are intended for addressing overall risks. On the other hand, the 
second dimension involves arrangements to deal with breaches. This dimension can also 
be seen as part of an approach to cyber security risks, but there are two reasons why 
these two dimensions need to be separated.  
 
The first reason involves qualitative findings. Two sub-themes emerged from interview 
data: approaches to cyber security risks (see: Section 6.2.2), and breach responses (see: 
Section 6.2.3). These sub-themes demonstrated that SMEs’ approaches to the risks were 
not identical to responses to breaches. This was related to the SMEs’ tendency that 
interpreted cyber threats in a narrow scope (see: Section 7.2.2). SMEs focused on 
dealing with breaches with damage, without much consideration on mitigating the risks. 
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Therefore, specific sets of rules, controls, and practices were taken to prepare for breach 
management.  
 
The second reason is the scope of those concepts. Looking at the preparedness to the 
risks and breaches separately is necessary in that risk management is a more complex 
and broader concept than breach management. While risk management is an iterative 
process which consists of identification, assessment, and mitigation, with taking various 
factors such as assets, threats, and vulnerabilities into consideration (Raggad, 2010, p. 
23), managing a breach requires temporal responses until a breach is resolved.  
 
7.2.3.1 What are the main approaches of SMEs to cyber security risks? 
 
Several questions75 from the survey were asked in order to measure the extent of 
preparedness to the risks. Overall, results from the related survey questions indicate 
that SMEs were not prepared to manage cyber security risks. Virtually all questions were 
dominated by negative responses (see: Table 7.1). In particular, negative responses of 
no experience in training, risk management through responsibility, and no update to 
senior management recorded the highest percentage among suggested choices. It is 
self-explanatory that all these responses contained negative connotations except risk 
management through responsibility. In Chapter 6, it was asked whether putting IT staff 
and managers responsible for cyber security was a sign of encouragement or 
discouragement (see: Section 6.2.2). Qualitative data suggested that responsibility for 




                                                          
75 They included cyber security policies (Figure 5.12), cyber security as a priority (Figure 5.13), 
internal trainings (Figure 5.14), risk management arrangements (Figure 5.15), an update to 
senior management (Figure 5.16), and measures taken to identify the risks (Figure 5.17). 
260 
Table 7.4: Negative responses on the preparedness to the risks (from the survey data) 
 Negative responses Percentage 
Question 12 No formal cyber security policies 42.4% 
Question 13 
Considering cyber security as a (very) low priority rather 
than (very) high 
35.4% versus 
32.1% 
Question 14 No experience in any cyber security trainings 36.9% 
Question 15 Risk management through responsibility Over 41.8% 
Question 16 No update to senior management  38.7% 
 
Many aspects of the quantitative results (Table 7.4) were replicated in qualitative 
findings (Table 7.5), although all the same aspects were not covered by the interviewees. 
Qualitative findings illustrate how lacklustre approaches were formed and played out in 
an organisational context (see: Section 6.2.2). 
 
Table 7.5: Negative responses on the preparedness to risks (from the interview data) 
 Negative responses Percentage 
Section 
6.2.2 
No formal cyber security policies 50.0% (8 out of 16) 
- As part of a general security policy 37.5% (3 out of 8) 
Considering cyber security as a (very) low priority rather 
than (very) high 
50.0% versus 31.3% 
No experience in cyber security trainings 43.8% (7 out of 16) 
 
A lack of cyber security policies implied low perception of SMEs on their current cyber 
security situation. Those SMEs thought cyber security risks did not merit organisational 
responses. Without those policies, it is difficult to expect any structured arrangements 
within a firm. Another critical aspect relates to senior management. As an influential 
group of decision-makers, senior management has a significant role in every aspect of 
business management. Hence, it is important for senior managers to have some 
knowledge of the technical side of cyber security (Rainer Jr et al., 2007) in order to 
261 
understand the associated context and engage in decision-making. However, it was 
found that senior managers did not take the lead on cyber security agendas. Senior 
mangers’ low perception of cyber security led to a lack of engagement (i.e., no update). 
Over half (57.3%) of SMEs reported that senior managers were updated on cyber 
security either ‘never’ or ‘less than once a year’ (see: Figure 5.16). Under this 
atmosphere, it is understandable that internal staff training was not emphasised. Only 
10.3% of SMEs provided staff trainings more often than quarterly (see: Figure 5.14). 
Overall, the examination of quantitative and qualitative data revealed how seriously 
SMEs were unprepared for cyber security risks.  
 
What was a major factor underlying the unpreparedness of SMEs to manage the risks? 
The qualitative data found a theme, or culture resistant to cyber security (see: Section 
6.3). This theme demonstrated that cyber security culture was not embraced as part of 
organisational culture, marginalising cyber security management from mainstream 
business management. Non-IT employees and managers perceived cyber security issues 
to contrast with widely accepted corporate values, such as profit-making, efficiency, and 
convenience. Also, there was evidence of horizontal and vertical miscommunication, 
and negative perception against IT functions and staff was pervasive. Though business 
owners were depicted as having authoritative leadership, they were viewed as not 
supporting cyber security agendas.  
 
The examination of the levels of culture revealed that SMEs’ organisational culture was 
resistant to cyber security. Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2010) classified organisational 
culture into four distinct levels: artefacts, values, underlying assumptions, and 
knowledge. Artefacts are visible structures and processes. In this study, the lack of 
policies, little or no staff training, negative attitudes towards IT staff, and a lack of budget 
for cyber security were identified as main artefacts here. These artefacts were 
manifestations from the value conflicts (see: Section 6.3.1).  
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On a deeper layer, underlying assumptions are based on unconscious perceptions and 
thoughts. There was the general consensus among non-IT staff that an additional layer 
of security controls hampered work convenience and efficiency. The interview data shed 
light on negative feelings and perceptions against IT staff and security controls (see: 
Section 6.3.4). Non-IT staff and managers viewed IT staff as minor supporters and 
security controls as unnecessary measures. The assumption lying behind this perception 
was that cyber security was not compatible with business management.  
 
Lastly, there was a knowledge disparity between IT professionals and non-IT staff. The 
knowledge gap and a lack of understanding of cyber security were identified as an 
underlying factor of negative perception on cyber security (see: Section 6.3.4). Technical 
mechanisms and jargons created a sense of difference between IT and non-IT staff. 
Bridging the knowledge gap is of pivotal importance (Rainer Jr et al., 2007) in that this 
can contribute to effective cyber security management by influencing decision-making 
processes (Asgharpour et al., 2007; Ben-Asher & Gonzalez, 2015).  
 
7.2.3.2 What are the key arrangements to deal with cyber security breaches? 
 
Cyber security breaches can be addressed from a preventative or responsive point of 
view. In other words, a SMEs’ approach to cyber security breaches can be divided into 
two phases:  
 
(1) pre-breach and  
(2) post-breach.  
 
The pre-breach phase denotes preparedness before a breach occurs, aiming to prevent 
breaches. On the contrary, the post-breach phase involves SMEs’ responses after a 
breach occurrence. The two phases are distinctive in that aims and objectives, 
management processes, and evaluation criteria at the pre-breach stage can be different 




Due to the organisational culture resistant to cyber security, most SMEs relied upon 
convenient types of software updates rather than an array of technical controls which 
required long-term commitment. Malware protection updates (74.4%) and software 
updates (66.5%) were widely used technical controls because users only needed to click 
on the screen following instructions (see: Figure 5.18). On the contrary, some other 
controls which required extensive managerial and budgetary support were not popular. 
This implies that SMEs preferred quicker and less expensive types of controls to 
systematic and procedural types of controls which entailed heavy costs.  
 
Interview data explained why it was difficult to make a long-term commitment for cyber 
security controls. Most of SMEs mentioned insufficient resources for cyber security 
(Bauer & Dutton, 2015; Harris & Patten, 2014; Kwon & Kim, 2017). Getting more 
financial support within a company entailed competition with other teams and fierce 
discussion among senior managers. In order to persuade an owner, IT managers had to 
provide clear justification as to why they needed to purchase a security control. A 
decision-making process regarding budget allocation was described as internal politics 
(see: Section 6.2.2). The second reason was that IT staff and managers did not have 
enough time to commit themselves solely to cyber security issues. Some interviewees 
complained of their heavy workload. Only less than half (43.8%, 7 out of 16) of 
interviewees from SMEs employed an IT professional and they were all medium 
businesses. Small businesses did not have resources to hire an IT professional. Although 
medium firms employed IT professionals, they were tasked with non-IT works alongside 
IT works. Cyber security was deemed as a side job within IT functions.  
 
(2) Post-breach  
 
Incident management processes and insurance are important preparatory set-ups to 
deal with breaches. The survey and interview data showed that the absolute majority of 
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SMEs (respectively, 94.5% and 93.8%) did not have incident management processes (see: 
Figure 5.19 and Section 6.2.3). This result showed that there were no established 
protocols or rules when SMEs managed breaches. The qualitative findings (see: Section 
6.2.3) demonstrated that the way SMEs handled breaches was impromptu and 
instantaneous rather than following a structured procedure. Responses depended on 
snap judgements of an owner and senior managers without sufficient discussions, 
because decisions on breach responses were made at the last minute when the breach 
should be acted upon.  
 
Therefore, the decision-making process was subjective in that even similar breaches 
ended up being handled differently. Also, cyber security decision-making was 
conditioned not only by the nature of the breach (i.e., harm or damage), but also by 
other factors such as available budget, perception of cyber security, or market 
conditions. An owner and senior managers made a decision considering situational 
factors as well as relevant information at hand, thus responses to a breach varied greatly. 
Similarly, 90.9% of SMEs did not have any insurance which covered breaches (see: Figure 
5.20). Compared to this, UK’s SMEs were more reliant upon cyber security insurance, 
with 38% of them being insured (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 
2017).  
 
In economic terms, insurance is a means of hedging against future financial loss. To 
purchase insurance, it should be justified that expected reduction of financial loss 
outweighs insurance premiums. A Korean SMEs’ reluctance to buy insurance reflected 
their expectation that future costs from breaches would not be greater than insurance 
premiums. This demonstrates SMEs’ perception that costs from breaches were 
acceptable.  
 
Another crucial aspect at the post-breach stage was the reporting mechanism. As 
suggested in Section 2.6.5, the UK reporting mechanisms consisted of public and private 
sector organisations as well as international partners. Wall (2007, p. 168) noted that 
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Police, governmental non-police agencies, ISPs, and other corporates engaged in 
Internet governance. Policing illegal behaviours in cyberspace requires the cooperation 
of a multiplicity of actors. This is a unique characteristic of cybercrime compared to 
traditional crimes. The plurality of reporting actors was also found in the quantitative 
data. When reporting a breach, SMEs were more likely to report to more than one 
organisation. Moreover, private sector organisations such as antivirus companies, banks 
or credit card companies, outsourced cyber security providers, and ISPs were sought 
after by SMEs as often as public sector ones (113.4% versus 98.8%) (see: Figure 5.21).  
 
Except for engaging in the formal reporting mechanism, SMEs depended heavily upon 
IT vendors when a breach or technical anomaly occurred (see: Section 6.5.2). In fact, 
SMEs made more contacts with IT vendors than with public or other private 
organisations for breach management. IT vendors were pointed out as an important 
communication channel on any IT matters, ranging from general IT consultations, 
through diagnoses of abnormal cyber activities to breach responses. SMEs viewed IT 
vendors as first responders to security breaches. The high dependency on IT vendors 
was a choice of convenience. As most SMEs used basic IT services from the vendors in 
any form, it was efficient for SMEs to contact them for cyber security matters.  
 
In this section, the quantitative findings supported two major themes from the 
qualitative findings: unstructured cyber security management (see: Section 6.2) and 
culture resistant to cyber security (see: Section 6.3). The unstructured cyber security 
management was identified in two dimensions:  
 
(1) approaches to risks and  
(2) responses to breaches.  
 
Both quantitative and qualitative data showed that most SMEs did not have a structural 
mechanism to prevent or mitigate risks before breaches occurred. It was at the post-
breach stage that SMEs’ countermeasures were taken. However, even the 
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countermeasures were improvised without reference to any established protocols. In 
addition, the countermeasures were not an outcome from considerations in respect of 
cyber security management, but from a snap judgement of senior management. 
Therefore, different responses were taken to the similar breaches, making the choice of 
responses unpredictable. This demonstrates that no proper cyber security management 
framework was adopted by SMEs.  
 
If the culture theory by Schein (2010) is applied here, the former theme or unstructured 
cyber security management (see: Section 6.2) is a collection of artefacts. Values and 
underlying assumptions behind these artefacts are summarised in the latter theme or 
‘culture resistant to cyber security’ (see: Section 6.3). The contrasting corporate values 
to cyber security (i.e., work efficiency, profit-making, and staff trust) were upheld by 
non-IT staff and managers, and these values were assumed to be incongruent with cyber 
security. These three levels, or artefacts, values, and underlying assumptions, composed 
resistant culture to cyber security. In conclusion, the unstructured cyber security 
management is a manifestation of the ‘culture resistant to cyber security’.  
 
7.2.4. Research question 4: What are the characteristics of external influences 
and initiatives in South Korea? 
 
Both quantitative and qualitative findings indicate that SMEs’ cyber security 
management was not found to be an isolated mechanism, but affected by external 
influences and initiatives. When cyber security managers and owners were on the verge 
of making a decision, they put internal factors as well as external factors on the table for 
discussion or consideration. This corresponds with Dojkovski et al.’s (2007) claim that 
cyber security management in Australian SMEs can be seen as “a result of national and 
cultural influences” (p. 1563).  
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First and foremost, it was of importance to identify what sort of external influences and 
initiatives were related to SMEs’ cyber security. Seven external influences and initiatives 
were discovered from quantitative and qualitative findings. These are: 
 
(1) insurance, 
(2) international and domestic standards,  
(3) government guidance and schemes, 
(4) IT vendors, 
(5) SMEs’ tough business environment,  
(6) ineffective penalty system and  
(7) client-driven contractual mechanism. 
  
Of those seven external factors, quantitative findings (see: Section 5.3) listed insurance, 
international and domestic standards (i.e., K-ISMS from KISA), and government’s 
guidance and schemes. The rest have emerged from qualitative interview data. Those 
which emerged were suggested as sub-themes under the two major themes: 
‘overdependence on private organisations’ (see: Section 6.5) and ‘influential external 
conditions’ (see: Section 6.6). The sub-themes carried a significant weight in this 
research in that they shed light on:  
 
 (1) new actors (i.e., IT vendors, criminal justice actors, and other businesses),  
 (2) SMEs’ relationships with the actors and  
 (3) socioeconomic factors.  
 
This exploration enlarged the scope of this research by enabling an examination beyond 
organisational boundaries of SMEs. 
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 (1) Insurance 
 
Insurance was not found to be a popular initiative to protect SMEs from cyber threats. 
The absolute majority of SMEs (90.9%) did not have insurance to cover cyber security 
breaches or attacks. This finding corresponds with another survey result which found 
only 6.1% of businesses in Korea were insured (KISA, 2011). In fact, the cyber security 
market in Korea was immature. There were only nine insurance companies which sold 
cyber insurance to businesses (Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, 2013). The 
unpopularity of cyber insurance was because both insurance companies and potential 
buyers were not sure whether the insurance costs were reasonable (Ministry of Science, 
ICT and Future Planning, 2013). The difficulty of setting the price was attributed to a lack 
of historical records as cybercrime was a new phenomenon (Gordon et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, SMEs did not have sufficient resources for cyber security and had 
distinctive organisational structures from large companies (see: Section 2.3.3). 
Therefore, to appeal to SMEs, cyber insurance needs to be customised based on 
organisational conditions and contexts of SMEs, but also a policy on the insurance cost 
needs to be substantiated by reasonable grounds. 
 
 (2) International and domestic standards / (3) Government guidance and 
 schemes 
 
In the survey less than half (44.8%) of SMEs did not have any awareness of the suggested 
schemes and standards (see: Figure 5.23). It is understandable that the ISO 27001 and 
Korean ISMS were quite well known to SMEs (31.4% and 44.8%) because of their high 
publicity. Compared to this, government guidance (6.7%) was not recognised by SMEs. 
The lack of awareness of the government’s schemes evidenced in this research also 
echoed the UK situation, where little over 10% of SMEs were aware of the government’s 
schemes, such as Ten Steps to Cyber Security guidance (15.9%) and Cyber Essentials 
scheme (13.5%) (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 2017).  
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However, there is a difference in structuring the guidance and schemes between the 
two countries. The UK government embarked on the NCSP from 2011 and published 
schemes, such as Ten Steps to Cyber Security and Cyber Essentials based on the 
programme (Cabinet Office et al., 2015). Although the business community had a low 
awareness of the schemes, the UK government’s schemes were well structured as part 
of the national cyber security framework. This demonstrates that there was a high level 
of alignment between cyber security strategies and operational schemes (see: Section 
2.6.4). The existence of the national framework is of significance in that the framework 
itself provides clear goals and objectives. As such, the affiliated schemes could be 
managed, evaluated, and updated in a structured manner based on directions and 
guidance from the framework.  
 
In contrast, the qualitative data showed that there was neither a publicised government 
framework for cyber security nor affiliated guidance and schemes in Korea (see: Section 
6.6.3). No interviewees from SMEs mentioned their awareness of any government 
guidance. These findings correspond with Jang’s (2014) claim that the Korean 
government did not have a comprehensive national cyber security strategy. The lack of 
a government framework is a reflection of the Korean government’s lacklustre approach 
towards cyber security.  
 
Qualitative findings demonstrated that relationships among the public organisations 
were fragmented (see: Section 6.4). Firstly, the public organisations in the cyber security 
domain was based on a weak cooperation model (see: Section 6.4.1). Rather, 
competitive milieu was identified. Secondly, no information sharing framework existed 
(see: Section 6.4.2). Information sharing took place occasionally to address an issue in 
hand. Thirdly, there were two different approaches to SMEs’ cyber security: (1) general 
cyber security and (2) technology information protection (see: Section 6.4.3). The public 
organisations involved in one approach did not interact with others in the other 
approach. These three sub-themes demonstrated that there was no coordinated 
approach to cyber security at a national level.  
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The fragmentation of the public organisations in Korea is in marked contrast to the UK’s 
cyber security structure. The UK structure was predicated upon a hierarchical 
consistency from the National Security Strategy down to Policing Vision 2025 (see: 
Section 2.6.1). The hierarchical consistency was maintained via a control tower, or the 
CGSD in the Cabinet Office. In order to realise these strategies, the UK government 
displayed its commitment by embarking on the NCSP with a substantial amount of 
resources. Also, the NCSP was evaluated for its progress by independent public 
authorities (see: Section 2.6.3.1). It is important to note that the higher body, the 
Cabinet Office, took the lead to establish a national framework which drove a 
coordinated approach to cyber security. This level of consistency was highly expected to 
increase cooperation and information sharing among the involved public organisations.  
 
 (4) IT vendors 
 
Qualitative findings (see: Section 6.5.2) revealed that IT vendors emerged as the most 
sought-after parties by SMEs. Over 90% (15 out of 16) of the SMEs relied on general 
services of IT vendors for normal business operations and the services themselves 
included some elements of cyber security. These IT vendors were already familiar with 
computer systems of the SMEs as they were in a contractual relationship. In this 
circumstance, benefits from using the services of IT vendors were obvious. It was 
efficient and convenient for SMEs to take advantage of its existing ties to the 
commissioned IT vendors. Most SMEs were satisfied with their responsive services.  
 
The dependence of SMEs on the existing ties is a reflection of two things. The first is 
related to a narrow perception of cyber security. SMES’ non-IT managers assumed that 
cyber security was just a part of IT issues, thus treating cyber security issues as purely 
technical. This assumption justified that the commissioned IT vendors were capable of 
handling any cyber security issues. However, some interviewees wished cyber security 
could be recognised as an independent area from general IT issues. In fact, cyber security 
had a broader boundary than IT protection. As discussed in Section 2.2, cyber security 
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aimed to safeguard humans and society alongside information resources (Von Solms & 
Van Niekerk, 2013). On the contrary, the IT vendors were only concerned with 
technological issues, not taking the protection of insiders and of society into 
consideration.  
 
Secondly, dependence on the existing ties for cyber security is seen as a realistic choice. 
Most SMEs did not have sufficient resources to invest in cyber security (Bauer & Dutton, 
2015; Harris & Patten, 2014; Singh et al., 2013; Truong, 2010). Budget constraints 
discouraged them from purchasing IT services which specialised in cyber security. Even 
for profitable SMEs with willingness to buy such a service, there were not many available 
cyber security services for SMEs. This indicates that cyber security market targeting 
SMEs were immature (see: Section 6.5.2). Instead, cyber security vendors marketed a 
variety of services customised to larger firms and public organisations. Both insufficient 
resources of SMEs and the immature market prompted SMEs to rely on the existing ties 
to IT vendors.  
 
Despite the SMEs’ high dependence on IT vendors, their services for cyber security were 
limited to technological aspects. Technical support by IT vendors was intended for a 
breach response or problem solution rather than proactive measures (see: Section 6.5.2). 
Recent studies (Singh et al., 2013; Singh et al., 2014) claimed that human factors and 
managerial support were vital prerequisites to implementing cyber security 
management, emphasising a holistic approach (see: Section 2.5.2). However, IT vendors 
with the existing ties did not provide advice or recommendations on human and 
managerial aspects of cyber security. It is necessary that professional cyber security 
vendors provide customised services to SMEs. This seems to be quite far from reality at 
present.  
 
Qualitative findings (see: Section 6.6) suggested that dynamics of cyber security 
management within SMEs were influenced by three socioeconomic factors:  
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 (1) tough business environment,  
 (2) ineffective penalty system, and  
 (3) client-driven contractual mechanism.  
 
The first two sub-themes are restraining factors for SMEs’ involvement in cyber security 
management, whereas the last sub-theme, client-driven mechanism, is an facilitating 
factor which puts pressure on SMEs to engage in cyber security management.  
 
 (5) SMEs’ tough business environment 
 
The qualitative findings argued that fierce business competition prevented investment 
in cyber security in SMEs (see: Section 6.6.1). Among these three sub-themes, tough 
business environment was also identified as a significant external factor from the 
literature. However, findings from previous studies stood in contrast to the findings in 
this research. Chang and Ho (2006) contended that environmental uncertainty had a 
positive influence on implementing cyber security management. In line with this, Kearns 
and Lederer (2004) argued that environmental uncertainty increased dependence upon 
information technologies. The contrasting results seemed to be derived from conceptual 
differences between tough business environments and environmental uncertainty. The 
former phrase used in this study was interpreted rather narrowly as a reflection of 
severe market competition. Compared to this, the later phrase in the previous studies 
incorporated a variety of dimensions, possibly including market competition, although 
it was not clearly defined in those studies.  
 
 (6) Views on the effectiveness of the South Korean penalty system 
 
To draw attention from senior management, it is of pivotal importance that the law 
effectively regulates inappropriate cyber security practices of businesses (Yoon, 2016). 
However, in general when Korean businesses were convicted of wrongdoings, they 
faced relatively low sentences in criminal courts (Park, 2004). This was also the case with 
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the law which governed substandard cyber security practices of businesses (see: Section 
6.6.2). The law stipulated lenient penalties against those subpar practices (Lee, 2016). 
In addition, the purview of the legal framework was narrow in that the law regulated 
cyber security practices mostly regarding customers’ personal information. This means 
that employees’ personal information and general business information were not 
protected by the legal framework.  
 
The importance of protecting personal information online has gained significant 
attention in recent years. Public and the media have been indignant at low penalties 
imposed by the courts on businesses which mishandled customers’ personal 
information (Lee, 2016). In qualitative findings, one in three government officials (33.3%, 
3 out of 9) echoed this public perception of the penalty system. They suggested that the 
penalty system was ineffective and discouraged SMEs from investing in cyber security. 
From a risk assessment point of view, it is a more economical choice for SMEs to accept 
the low penalty from courts than investing in cyber security. Interestingly enough, the 
argument about the ineffective penalty system was not mentioned by any single 
interviewee from SMEs. It may be that the researcher’s dual status (see: Section 4.6) 
prevented the SMEs’ interviewees from disclosing contentious aspects of criminal 
justice system against businesses.  
  
 (7) Client-driven contractual mechanism 
 
The last socioeconomic factor was predicated upon the predominant contractual 
mechanism among Korean businesses, which is called subcontracting (Cho, 2014). Large 
companies hire SMEs as subcontractors to do much of their important work. This 
mechanism can also be explained as one that hinges on supply chain contracts. It was 
noted that supply chain contracts can be used to require small companies to be certified 
to a standard (Philpott, 2015). Qualitative findings found that slightly over one third 
(37.5%, 6 out of 16) of SMEs identified themselves as subcontractors which sold their 
products or services to large companies (see: Section 6.6.3). It was a recent 
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phenomenon that clients required subcontractors to meet some standards on cyber 
security based on this contractual mechanism. The cyber security requirements were 
suggested as part of the quality control process. In fact, a very large percentage (83.3%, 
5 out of 6) of subcontracting SMEs experienced pressure for higher cyber security 
practices from their clients.  
 
In terms of types of requirements, quantitative data (see: Section 5.3.5) found that 
about two thirds (63.7%) of SMEs were not required to comply with any standards (see: 
Figure 5.26). This finding corresponds with the claim from some SMEs’ interviewees that 
their clients did not clearly mention a specific type of requirement. Rather, the clients 
tended to use ambiguous terms in the contract or set arbitrary criteria that SMEs were 
required to adhere to. It seems that even clients had no clear understanding of what 
needed to be done by subcontractors in respect of cyber security.  
 
However, mixed results were found between quantitative and qualitative findings. The 
quantitative data reported that government’s schemes (26.8%) were a relatively 
common type of requirement, but the SMEs’ interviewees were not aware of any 
available public guidance. In fact, it was found that in South Korea no government 
guidance was published on a similar scale to Cyber Essentials of the UK. As evidence of 
this, Philpott (2015) proposed the possibility of rolling out a UK standard which includes 
Cyber Essentials in Korea for small businesses. It could be that the survey respondents 
who chose government schemes interpreted them as a large concept which 
encompassed law, public regulations, and policy.  
 
On the other hand, the UK survey (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 
2017) captured a different type of contractual mechanism. The mechanism concerned 
relationships between SMEs and their suppliers. The UK survey reported that 21% of 
small firms and 30% of medium firms were concerned with the cyber security risk 
stemming from their suppliers. International standards, such as the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard (48%) or ISO 27001 (42%), were the most widely 
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accepted requirements placed on suppliers. On the contrary, government schemes, such 
as Cyber Essentials (6%) and Cyber Essentials Plus (2%), were the least popular. This 
survey result showed that the UK businesses placed relatively stricter and more 
structured standards on suppliers than Korean large businesses did to SMEs.  
 
These three socioeconomic factors (see: Section 6.6) demonstrate that SME’s cyber 
security management was directly or indirectly associated with external influences and 
initiatives. As far as the researcher is aware, the two sub-themes, ineffective penalty 
system and client-driven contractual mechanism, have not been studied much in 
relation to SMEs’ cyber security. This is why there was little literature to incorporate into 
the discussion. However, the lack of research in these aspects provided an opportunity 
to carry out this research. The fact that these sub-themes emerged from qualitative data 
can be considered as a contribution to the literature on cyber security management 
studies.  
 
7.2.5. Research question 5: What is the nature of relationships in South Korea 
between SMEs and other public or private sector organisations? 
 
As discussed in Section 7.2.4, SMEs’ cyber security management was influenced by 
external factors. The extent and scope of these influences can be better understood if 
the nature of relationships between SMEs and public or private sector organisations is 
made clear. SMEs needed to contact those organisations for various reasons, such as to 
acquire information, to report breach or cybercrime, and to purchase services. In 
contrast, public organisations attempted to reach SMEs for protection from cyber 
threats, and some private organisations (e.g., ISPs, IT security companies, and antivirus 
companies) provided IT services to SMEs.  
 
SMEs had weak relationships with public sector organisations. According to the 
quantitative findings (see: Figures 5.24 and 5.25), over half of SMEs have neither 
contacted nor been contacted by any public organisations (respectively, 57.0% and 
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50.6%). When seeking information, advice or guidance, SMEs were twice as reliant upon 
private sector sources as public sector ones (see: Figure 5.22).  
 
The qualitative findings (see: Section 6.5.2) in a similar vein presented a more detailed 
picture on this. It was IT vendors that SMEs relied upon the most in case of cyber security 
breaches or anomalies. As explained above (see: Section 7.2.4), SMEs took advantage of 
IT vendors based on the existing contractual relationship. Although IT vendors brought 
many practical benefits to SMEs, this generated some nervousness as well. The fact that 
IT vendors normally had full access to corporate systems was considered a high risk for 
some SMEs which paid extra attention to customers’ personal information or business 
proprietary information (see: Section 6.5.2). However, the nervousness did not seem to 
reverberate across the whole SMEs. Due to a lack of internal support and fierce market 
competition, they tended to opt for work efficiency and convenience at the cost of 
corporate information security.  
 
Another dimension worth examining is the relationship between public sector and 
private sector organisations. The qualitative findings (see: Section 6.5.1) disclosed that 
each public sector agency intended to maintain cooperation with an array of private 
companies, such as ISPs, antivirus companies, and IT security companies, adopting its 
own approach. Hence, the extent of the cooperation varied considerably due to 
different purposes and intentions of the agencies. The NPA and KISA attempted to 
maximise the extent of cooperation for different reasons. However, it was not the case 
with the SMBA because of its involvement in a different approach, technology 
information protection (see: Sections 6.4.3 and 6.5.1). This demonstrates that there was 
no comprehensive framework for public and private partnerships in South Korea.  
 
Dependence or overdependence is a core concept to understand the relationships of 
actors. According to social network theories, centrality on a certain actor by others is a 
good measure of the prominence or importance of the actor (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, 
p. 170). Both quantitative and qualitative data in this study indicated that both SMEs 
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and public agencies were significantly dependent upon private companies in a network. 
If this theory is applied here, private companies, especially IT vendors, were embedded 
in a central position within the network. The high centrality of IT vendors provided them 
with the prominence in the ties among relevant actors. A group of IT vendors can be 
called a hub in the relationships. In contrast, SMEs and public organisations were 
embedded in relatively weak positions. In social network research, it is generally 
assumed that the centralised position in the network generates power (Bonacich, 1987), 
as information is funnelled through an actor with high centrality. Power is a structural 
outcome in that the nature of relationships among actors determines where power 
resides (Frooman, 1999). Asymmetric relationships therefore cause power imbalance.  
 
Due to the power imbalance, the cyber security domain in Korea was more likely to be 
driven and shaped by those private IT companies. They were creators of new cyber 
security technologies as well as frontline users of these technologies. SMEs and public 
organisations needed to go through those private IT companies to embrace these 
technologies.  
 
This situation brings a critical policy implication. Those companies’ choices will confine 
not just what SMEs purchase, but also how public agencies use it as a way to control 
cyber threats. This can be a huge problem if a few private IT companies dominate the 
cyber security market. As a consequence of this SMEs and public agencies could lose 
their bargaining power. For SMEs, it will be difficult to expect a high-quality product 
compared to the amount paid, and public agencies’ practices will be conditioned by 
technical specifications of products or policies of those companies. One good example 
is police body cameras. In the US, three quarters of the body camera market is 
dominated by Taser International (Gelles, 2016). Due to its market dominance, most law 
enforcement agencies in the US have no choice but to accept the terms and conditions 
set by Taser and end up purchasing new technologies (e.g., data storage and facial 
recognition system) sold by the company (Joh, 2017).  
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If this situation continues or becomes worse, the cyber security domain will be 
dominated by market-driven initiatives. The private IT companies are more likely to 
churn out new products and services for business profits. This questions the role of the 
government. What should the government do within the cyber security domain? This 







CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1. Summary of the key findings 
 
Drawing on a mixed methods approach, this study used three research methods: 
documentary research, quantitative questionnaires, and qualitative interviews. Firstly, 
documentary research revealed that the government, large companies, and individual 
citizens were recognised as potential targets from cyber financial fraud as well as cyber 
terrorism perpetrated by North Korea (see: Section 3.3.1). In contrast, the government 
focused on protecting one third of SMEs which had high levels of technology. As a 
consequence of this, the majority of SMEs have not benefitted from the government’s 
initiatives (see: Section 3.4.3). 
 
Secondly, quantitative survey data found these: (1) Korean SMEs were highly connected 
to ICT, but perception of their significance did not correspond to the actual adoption of 
ICTs, (2) cyber security breaches affected all kinds of SMEs and costs were not clearly 
measured, (3) when it comes to approaches to risks, many businesses did not have a 
structural mechanism, (4) most SMEs were not prepared to deal with cyber security 
breaches, depending upon basic technical controls or actions, and (5) public sector 
organisations were not identified as a main contributor to SMEs in relation to 
information acquisition or information sharing (see: Section 5.4).  
 
Thirdly, qualitative interview data identified five themes: (1) unstructured cyber security 
management, (2) culture resistant to cyber security, (3) fragmentation of public 
organisations, (4) overdependence on private organisations, and (5) influential external 
conditions. The first two themes indicated negative points of view on the internal risk 
management mechanism within a business, and the remaining three themes shed light 
on intricate relationships among public and private sector organisations as well as 
external factors that influenced those relationships (see: Section 6.7).  
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In order to comprehensively understand cyber security management in Korean SMEs, 
findings from the quantitative and qualitative research were integrated with the existing 
literature, including the qualitative results describing the empirical field of enquiry. In 
conclusion, this research has found that SMEs did not have a structural mechanism to 
prevent or mitigate risks at the pre-breach stage (see: Section 7.2.3.2). Instead, they 
involved responses at the post-breach stage. This indicated that SMEs were not prepared 
from a preventative point of view. Furthermore, it was found that management of cyber 
security within a business was not an isolated mechanism, but influenced by external 
organisations and factors (see: Section 7.2.4). However, there was an insufficient role of 
public sector organisations in protecting SMEs. The lack of national leadership in the 
Korean cyber security governance (see: Section 3.4.4) resulted in weak public and 
private partnerships (see: Section 7.2.5).  
 
8.2. Evaluation of the research objectives 
 
In Chapter 1, four research objectives were introduced to achieve the research aim: to 
empirically explore and evaluate the current state of cyber security management in 
SMEs in South Korea.  
 
The first objective was to identify cyber security risks and threats against SMEs. Due to 
a lack of risk and threat assessment, this objective was intended to assess overall cyber 
security situations surrounding SMEs. It was addressed through the research questions 
1 and 2. In order to fulfil a thorough assessment, a wide range of cyber security elements 
as well as organisational characteristics and behaviours, such as leadership, 
communication, managerial support and culture have been incorporated in the analyses. 
Beyond this, SMEs’ perceptions on the significance of ICTs and the risks and threats have 
been examined in connection with security breaches. This approach sought to discover 
the extent and scope of the risks and threats against SMEs. The findings relating to this 
objective were discussed in Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.  
 
281 
The second objective was to examine whether SMEs are prepared to address the risks 
and threats. It was found that SMEs did not have a structured mechanism to prevent or 
mitigate the risk before a breach occurs, focusing more on post-breach responses (see: 
Section 7.2.3). This internal management of cyber security in SMEs was examined in a 
broader sense by incorporating environmental aspects (see: Sections 7.2.4 and 7.2.5). It 
was analysed in two ways: (1) how external organisations had a relationship with SMEs 
and (2) how external factors had an influence on decision-making processes in the SMEs’ 
cyber security management. This exploration could serve as a theoretical basis for the 
formulation of a conceptual framework in future studies.  
 
The third objective was to suggest policy recommendations to strengthen cyber security 
management of SMEs. The examination carried out for the first and second objectives 
implied a set of policy recommendations which could be taken by the South Korean 
Government (see: Section 7.2.5). This indicates that these recommendations were 
derived from the research findings. Hence, they are greatly applicable to the Korean 
context, but not to other sociocultural settings. It was also suggested that these 
recommendations should not be adopted individually, but need to be addressed as part 
of an overarching government framework.  
 
The fourth objective was to propose an effective framework for protecting SMEs from 
cyber security risks and threats. The comprehensive framework was suggested as an 
integrated model in Section 8.3.1 as a result of the investigation conducted in the study. 
The realisation of the research aim and the previous three objectives culminated in the 
proposal of the integrated model. As the final outcome of this research, this framework 
was produced through the research findings as well as rigorous research methodology. 
This model’s underlying concepts and constructs could provide theoretical implications.  
 
In conclusion, the overarching aim of this study has been successfully achieved in that 
the understanding of the cyber security management of SMEs has been enhanced 
throughout this study. The trustworthiness of the research findings and analyses rests 
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upon its scientific approach and design along with the research methodology adopted. 
The study’s research findings could be used in future research and programmes which 
seek to resolve the problems associated with cyber security management of SMEs both 




8.3.1. Integrated cyber security risk management model in Korean SMEs 
 
In Chapter 2, several risk management frameworks were suggested (see: Section 2.4). 
Main elements such as risk identification, assessment, responses, and monitoring were 
connected as part of an iterative process. Although these frameworks were concise, it 
was questionable whether they could be applicable to real situations of SMEs. Drawing 
on those frameworks, this research examined a comprehensive landscape of cyber 
security management of SMEs. Based upon the quantitative and qualitative data, how 
SMEs approached cyber security risks and threats and what sort of factors influenced 
SMEs’ approaches were thoroughly explored. The extensive exploration could be 
summed up as a model. Figure 8.1 below provides an illustration of the functioning of 
the ‘Integrated cyber security risk management model’, as a means of understanding 
the security management process.  
 
In this model, the term, integrated, implies that the approach being taken here 
combines a focus on the internal elements of the cyber security management process, 
in conjunction with external influences and initiatives. This integrated approach also 
signifies a holistic approach shared between public and private sector organisations 
involved in order to produce coordinated effects capable of addressing the associated 
risks and threats. This model is predicated on the two main arguments from this study: 
(1) organisational behaviours, such as culture, leadership, communication, managerial 
roles, decision-making, and group attitudes and perceptions have a direct influence on 
the cyber security management of SMEs and (2) external influences and initiatives have 
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significance in indirectly affecting the cyber security management of SMEs. Similar risk 
assessments may not lead to a choice of similar measures due to different organisational 
behaviours and external factors. In other words, although businesses may face a similar 
type of security threat with similar impacts, it is possible that those businesses decide 





   Figure 8.1 Integrated cyber security risk management model 
 
This model can be explained in this equation:  
 
 𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
= 𝑓(𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠) 
 
Compared to the internal mechanisms of SMEs which focused primarily on dealing with 
breaches with damages without addressing the risks (see: Section 7.2.2), this holistic 
model could be productive in that it can shift SMEs’ focus into prevention at the pre-
breach stage. This is mainly because this model places emphasis on risk. Since risk 
management concerns a future event which causes the adverse consequences, it shifts 
human attention from past or present to future. Fischer, Halibozek, and Green (2008, p. 
148) stated that security should be predicated upon analysis of the total risk potential 
to avoid one-dimensional and reactive approaches. As this model is conceptualised as 
284 
an iterative process which aims to prevent and mitigate the risks, the original intention 
of this model is to address the risks rather than to manage breaches. The iterative 
process within this model can be reviewed and applied to SMEs for assessment as well 
as for diagnostic purposes.  
 
This model, in itself, is the key recommendation for South Korean SMEs. This research 
found that South Korean SMEs were not ready to address cyber security risks and threats 
(see: Section 7.2.3.2) and there was no known guidance for SMEs from the government 
(see: Sections 6.6.3 and 7.2.4). This model incorporates a wide range of elements for 
effective cyber security management which constitute an iterative process. Therefore, 
SMEs’ owners and managers could take it as a conceptual map as well as guidance for 
the management of cyber security risks. More importantly, substantial gains can be 
made if SMEs consider how to change their organisational behaviours in a way that 
recognises cyber security as a core part of their business management.  
 
The integrated model in this section will be suited to fully utilise the resources and 
expertise in SMEs and related public and private sector organisations. This will be 
conducive to mitigating the level of cyber security risks and threats against SMEs and to 
modifying a business environment in South Korea, in which SMEs will be able to feel safe 
and secure to carry out their business. It should be noted that its research findings are 
confined to the research context that was investigated, namely, South Korea. However, 
the integrated model represents a dynamic framework which can be improved and 
modified according to changing external circumstances and conditions. It is therefore 
contended that the integrated model as proposed in this study can have a broader 
application as a conceptual framework for SMEs as well as for future studies. 
 
8.3.2. Recommendations for the government 
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There are several areas where the government could intervene in a constructive manner. 
Based on discussions in Sections 7.2.4 and 7.2.5, some recommendations are suggested 
here:  
 
Firstly, public and private partnerships should be strengthened. This is mainly because 
cyber security can be achieved within plural policing environments due to the 
distributed nature of cyberspace (Broll, 2016). The UK’s cyber security framework 
emphasised public and private partnerships (e.g., CiSP) for facilitating information and 
raising awareness (see: Section 2.6.3.2). It was of importance that the CiSP expanded its 
role in a way that supported SMEs by cooperating with Regional Organised Crime Units 
(Ring, 2013; UK-CERT, 2016). However, this research found that South Korean SMEs had 
weak relationships with public sector organisations (see: Section 7.2.5). Also, each public 
sector agency took its own approach to maintain cooperation with multiple IT 
companies without a comprehensive framework for public and private partnerships (see: 
Sections 6.5.1 and 7.2.5).  
 
Secondly, the government can create public schemes to provide guidance for general 
cyber security. The schemes need to be publicised so that SMEs can be aware of them. 
The difficulty of raising awareness of the schemes was found in both the UK and Korea 
(see: Sections 5.2.3 and 7.2.4). One effective way is to adopt a policy. The UK 
government adopted the influential policy which stated that any government suppliers 
applying for contracts regarding personal information and ICT services should have 
Cyber Essentials (Crown Commercial Service, 2014). This sort of policy could be a 
powerful tool for the Korean Government.  
 
Thirdly, the government could change the ineffective penalty system. Increasing 
penalties under law and strengthening sentencing guidelines will both raise the legal 
risks for SMEs (see: Section 6.6.2). This would be expected to shift SMEs’ decision–
making into more investment in cyber security agendas. Alongside the penalty system 
reform, the government needs to ponder over what sort of regulatory policies will 
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influence SMEs’ decision-making. However, it should be cautious since strict regulations 
may ignore a variety of differences among businesses, incurring unnecessarily heavy 
costs. The regulations need to be based upon a legal framework which is aimed at the 
comprehensive protection of SMEs from cyber security risks and threats.  
 
Fourthly, the government can influence the client-driven contractual mechanism among 
businesses. In most cases, SMEs as subcontractors were required to meet the criteria 
that their clients ask (see: Section 6.6.3). The problem lies in the fact that the clients 
used unclear and broad terms without specifying any known standards or schemes. It is 
possible that some large companies, to some extent, abuse their superior position as a 
client and unfairly transfer cyber security responsibilities to SMEs based on those broad 
terms. The government can take the role of overseeing this contractual mechanism. It is 
the Fair Trade Commission that regulates unfair business practices by large companies 
against SMEs. Therefore, it would be efficient if the Commission monitors the practices 
regarding cyber security by expanding its existing regulatory framework.  
 
These four suggestions were derived from both quantitative and qualitative findings 
(see: Sections 5.3.5, 6.5.1, 6.6.2, and 6.6.3), which allowed the researcher to propose 
relatively concrete suggestions. It is worth mentioning that there should be an 
overarching government framework which can include these four suggestions. This 
argument is based upon the finding from documentary research that there was a lack of 
national leadership in the Korean cyber security governance (see: Section 3.4.4). Cyber 
security policies and strategies will be more effective if they are structured under an 
overarching framework in a consistent manner as in the case of the UK (see: Sections 
2.6 and 3.4.4).  
 
8.4. Research contributions 
 
This study made distinctive contributions to knowledge of cyber security management 
studies. Previous research on businesses in South Korea tended to be technical in nature, 
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and very little research focused on cyber security management of businesses. 
Considering this, the social science approach taken by this study in this discipline is 
expected to provide researchers and practitioners with newly explored evidence 
relevant in the context of South Korea. It is also noted that this research is one of the 
very few comprehensive studies on SMEs’ cyber security management internationally. 
Although some security management studies on Korean businesses have been carried 
out, there is currently no specific research focusing on SMEs.  
 
In particular, this research differs from previous studies in that it has broadened the 
academic discourses by exploring the national context in which SMEs operate. This 
holistic approach was provided for an examination of cyber security management in 
SMEs in the national setting. This research investigated the nature of SMEs’ relationships 
with external influences and initiatives from the government, private entities, and 
surrounding environments. The national setting as to SMEs’ cyber security management 
has not been explored in the Korean context. As such, this study is the first primary 
research to be carried out on these issues on such a comprehensive scale in South Korea.  
 
In the study, the central focus throughout was on the vulnerability of SMEs, internal 
handling of cyber security risks by SMEs, and relationships among public and private 
sector organisations as well as external factors that influence the relationships. These 
matters are of great interest to academic researchers but also to policy makers 
responsible for cyber security and cybercrime.  
 
Firstly, researchers can benefit from this study. This empirical-based study shed light on 
how organisational behaviours and external factors interrelate with cyber security 
management. Findings and analyses discovered new patterns and associations between 
identified concepts or constructs. The integrated model (Figure 8.1) illustrates how 
those constructs and themes are associated. Although this study does not suggest any 
theory, it is recognised that this study contributes to the relevant field conceptually. As 
such, this study can provide some theoretical implications for future research.  
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Secondly, from the regulatory point of view this study provides policy implications for 
the government. There was the recognition that public sector organisations have a role 
to play in influencing the internal security management mechanisms within SMEs. As 
evidence of this statement, some suggestions for the Korean government were 
proposed in Section 8.3.2. The exploration of the role of public sector entities can be 
viewed as another contribution to this study. This indicates that cyber security breaches 
are not entirely SMEs’ faults and that it is also important to nurture a constructive 
environment which encourages the internal security risk management mechanisms. In 
addition, it was discovered that there were two separate approaches to SMEs’ cyber 
security (see: Section 6.4.3). Government agencies involved in one approach were 
unaware of the other approach and never considered overlaps or commonalities 
between the two approaches. It would change government policies if the possibility of 
engagement or collaboration between the two approaches were identified and carried 
out.   
 
In cyber security, industry research collaboration between nations is greatly important 
(Trim & Youm, 2015). Despite the differences in the environmental contexts between 
South Korea and other countries, this research may benefit an international readership. 
Since cyber threats are transnational risks that transcend national boundaries, other 
countries are likely to face similar problems. The integrated model (Figure 8.1) can be 
compared and contrasted to their national contexts, although it should be undertaken 
cautiously.  
 
8.5. Limitations of the study  
 
This research provides meaningful results and insights on protecting SMEs from cyber 
security risks and threats, yet several limitations are also recognised. Firstly, there was 
a shortage of relevant theories and previous literature on SMEs’ cyber security 
management. In cybercrime victimisation studies, a clear lack of attention is given to 
organisational victims, due to a difficulty in gaining access to businesses for data 
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collection (Holtfreter & Meyers, 2015). This, in part, has limited in-depth discussion of 
the existing literature in Chapters 2 and 7 and the construction of a research framework 
at the outset of this research. However, the lack of an extant literature provided a 
justification for advancing this research, thus prompting this research to be exploratory 
rather than representative.  
 
Secondly, research findings were not generalised because both the quantitative and 
qualitative phases used convenience sampling, generic purposive sampling and snowball 
sampling (see: Section 4.5.1.1). These non-probability sampling techniques do not 
guarantee the representativeness of the sample. Therefore, generalisation from a 
sample to a population could not be claimed. However, this research was intended to 
be exploratory rather than proving or disproving a theory, which indicates that the 
researcher did not aim to achieve robust representative outcomes.  
 
Thirdly, the researcher could not carry out focus group interviews for more exploration 
of the research questions. Focus group interviews were not intended when the research 
design was established before data collection. However, after completing the qualitative 
interviews the researcher felt the need to do so. For this reason, the researcher asked 
some interviewees whether they were willing to join focus group interviews, but 
virtually all of them gave negative responses. These responses were understandable in 
that Korean people are generally passive in terms of discussion or group talking. Also, 
this passive attitude may reflect the traditional and bureaucratic context of South Korea. 
Expressing individual opinions is not portrayed in a positive light in Korean society and 
it is preferred not to stand out in a group. In addition, costs and time constraints 
prevented further exploration of the research problem.  
 
8.6. Future research  
 
This study was based on the quantitative survey and semi-structured interviews 
conducted with managers and owners of SMEs and government officials. As was 
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suggested in Section 8.5, an inherent weakness of this research is that the findings of 
this study do not necessarily hold true for other national settings. However, it would be 
appropriate to apply the framework from this study to other studies with similar nature 
in different national contexts. The application to other settings will improve or refine 
the framework. Undertaking such studies is expected to highlight similarities as well as 
differences in the landscape of cyber security management on the international stage.  
 
Future research might, for example, incorporate additional variables which may be 
associated with cyber security management of businesses. The incorporation of 
additional organisational and external variables would allow for a more comprehensive 
exploration and analysis of cyber security management processes. Such organisational 
variables could include annual turnover, credit rating, management structure, type of 
customers, and proportion of export in businesses. On the other hand, external variables 
such as economic conditions, business-wide initiatives, co-operation between 
companies, and government support could be expanded depending on the research 
contexts. Although this study was exploratory, future studies could investigate causal 
impacts of variables on cyber security management. An examination of causal impacts 
could provide different types of theoretical or policy implications which could not be 
gained from this study.  
 
The emphasis on cyber security management has not, as yet, gained prominence in 
South Korea. Although small progress has been made with regard to policy guidelines in 
order to deal with emergency situations, the government was not prepared for 
addressing cyber security risks and threats from a preventative point of view. As such, 
there is now an urgent need for substantive and in-depth research to support businesses’ 
and the government’s preventative efforts. First and foremost, it is pivotal to monitor 
and evaluate mechanisms and processes of managing the risks and threats in businesses. 
In addition, broader studies using a macroscopic approach will be able to produce 
comprehensive recommendations for creating a desirable environment. This could 
contribute to mitigating cyber security risks and threats against businesses. The 
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opportunity therefore exists to carry out more research in this field with a potentially 
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Appendix 1 (Survey Questionnaires for Managers and Owners in SMEs) 
 
(Survey Questionnaire Guide) 
This is Jeyong Jung, a research student in the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies at the 
University of Portsmouth in the UK. I invite you to participate in an academic study of 
‘Cyber Security Management of SMEs in South Korea’.  
My study is part of my PhD research. The first aim of this study is to assess current 
situations of SMEs in relation to cyber security. This is because there is an obvious lack 
of situational assessment on SMEs in South Korea. Secondly, it is to identify 
organisational factors that have an influence on the implementation of security controls 
and vulnerability to security breaches. Investigating relationships or correlations among 
factors will help the researcher to prioritise the factors that may be used to increase 
cyber security. Finally, the researcher finally intends to devise an effective framework 
for protecting SMEs from cyber security risks and cybercrimes. 
Quantitative data for this research will be obtained from survey questionnaires. You can 
join this study by completing this web-based questionnaire. I do not need your name or 
any identifying details. The questionnaire is completed anonymously and all reasonable 
measures will be taken to ensure confidentiality. You will be asked about your previous 
experience of cyber security breaches or attacks. The breaches or attacks you mention 
should have been officially reported to and sanctioned by their organisations or the 
authorities. You should not disclose unreported cybercrime cases. Any such disclosures 
will be reported to the proper authorities. 
Withdrawal from the research is possible at any time during the survey without any 
reason. Responses from completed questionnaires will then be collected for analysis. 
Once this is finished and my thesis has been submitted then the data from the 
questionnaires will be destroyed. Until this phase, completed questionnaires will be 
saved electronically in my personal computer. 
I also invite you to join further interview. Voluntary participations for interview later are 
welcomed. If you want to participate in it, please contact me via email or phone (010-
4335-5057). If you have any concerns regarding this research please contact me 
(jeyong.jung@port.ac.uk), or my supervisor, Dr. Victoria Wang 
(victoria.wang@port.ac.uk). If there are any ethical concerns, you can also contact the 
Chair of the Faculty Ethics Committee (ethics-fhss@port.ac.uk).  
By moving to the next screen you display your agreement to participate in the survey. 
<NEXT SCREEN>  
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Section A : Assessment of SMEs’ situation 
In the following section, you will be asked about five themes concerning cyber security of your 
company. These questions will be used to assess current situations of SMEs. Please state any 
relevant answers regarding the following statements.  
1. Which of the following, if any, does your company currently have or use? (multiple 
choice) 
①Email addresses for your company or its employees ②A website or blog 
③Accounts or pages on social media sites (e.g. Facebook or Twitter) ④The ability for 
your customers to order, book or pay for products or services online ⑤An online 
business bank account your company pays into ⑥Other (           )   
 
2. To what extent, if at all, are online services a core part of the goods or services your 
company provides?  
①Not at all important ②Not very important ③Neutral ④Important ⑤Very 
important  
 
3. How many employees in your company use personally-owned devices such as 
smartphones, tablets, home laptops or desktop computers to carry out regular business-
related activities? 
①None ②1-20% ③21-40% ④41-60% ⑤61-80% ⑥81-100% 
 
4. Does your company currently use any externally-hosted web services, for example to 
host your website or corporate email accounts, or for storing or transferring data?  
①Never ②Not very often ③Neutral ④Often ⑤Very often 
 
5. How critical, if at all, are these externally-hosted web services to your company?  
①Not at all critical ②Not very critical ③Neutral ④Critical ⑤Very critical 
 
6. Approximately, how many cyber security breaches or attacks have you experienced in 
total over the last 12 months? 
①None ②Fewer than 5 ③5 to fewer than 10 ④10 to fewer than 15 ⑤15 to fewer 
than 20 ⑥20 to fewer than 50 ⑦50 or more ⑧Don’t know 
 
7. Which of the following have happened to your company in the last 12 months? (multiple 
choice) 
①Denial-of-service attacks ②Access to computers, networks or services without 
permission (i.e., hacking) ③Money stolen electronically (e.g. through online banking) 
④Money stolen through fraudulent emails or fake websites ⑤Personal information 
(e.g. customer data) stolen electronically ⑥People damaging or stealing software from 
your computers or network, even if accidentally ⑦People downloading unlicensed or 
stolen software to your computers or network, even if accidentally ⑧Computers 
becoming infected with viruses, spyware or malware ⑨Theft of intellectual property 
⑩Others impersonating company in emails or online ⑪Breaches from personally-
owned devices ⑫Breaches from externally-hosted web services ⑬Breaches on social 
media ⑭Other (  ) 
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8. As far as you know, who or what was the source of the breach or attack? (multiple choice) 
①Third party suppliers ②Activists ③Competitors ④Emails/email 
attachments/websites ⑤Current employees ⑥Former employees ⑦Malware 
authors ⑧Nation-state intelligence services ⑨Natural (flood, fire, lightening etc.) 
⑩Non-professional hackers ⑪Organised crime ⑫Terrorists ⑬Other (      ) 
⑭Don’t know 
 
9. Approximately how much, if anything, do you think the cyber security breaches or 
attacks you have experienced in the last 12 months have cost your company financially?  
①Less than £500 ②£500 to less than £1,000 ③£1,000 to less than £5,000 ④£5,000 
to less than £10,000 ⑤£10,000 to less than £20,000 ⑥£20,000 to less than £50,000 
⑦£50,000 to less than £ 100,000 ⑧£100,000 or more ⑨Don’t know 
 
10. How was the breach or attack identified? (multiple choice) 
①By accident ②By antivirus/anti-malware software ③Disruption to 
business/staff/users/ service provision ④From warning by government/law 
enforcement ⑤Our breach/attack reported by the media ⑥Similar incidents reported 
in the media ⑦Reported/noticed by customers/customer complaints 
⑧Reported/noticed by staff/contractors ⑨Routine internal security monitoring 
⑩Other internal control activities not done routinely (e.g. reconciliations, audits etc.) 
⑪Other (       ) ⑫Don’t know 
 
11. Thinking of all the cyber security breaches or attacks experienced in the last 12 months, 
have these impacted your company in any of the following ways? (multiple choice) 
①Stopped staff from carrying out their day-to-day work ②Loss of revenue or share 
value ③Additional staff time to deal with the breach or attack, or to inform customers 
or stakeholders ④Any other repair or recovery costs ⑤New measures needed to 
prevent or protect against future breaches or attacks ⑥Lost or stolen assets ⑦Fines 
from regulators or authorities, or associated legal costs ⑧Reputational damage 
⑨Prevented provision of goods or services to customers ⑩Discouraged you from 
carrying out a future business activity you were intending to do ⑪Other (        )  
 
12. Which of the following aspects, if any, are covered within your cyber security-related 
policy, or policies? (multiple choice) 
①What can be stored on removable devices (e.g. USB sticks, CDs etc.) ②Remote or 
mobile working (e.g. from home) ③What staff are permitted to do on your company’s 
IT devices ④Use of personally-owned devices for business activities ⑤Use of new 
digital technologies such as cloud computing ⑥Data classification ⑦A Document 
Management System ⑧Other (        )  ⑨No policy adopted 
 
13. How high or low a priority is cyber security to your company’s directors or senior 
management?  
①Very low ②Low ③Neutral ④High ⑤Very high 
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14. Over the last 12 months, has your company provided employees with internal cyber 
security trainings? 
①Never ②Less than once a year ③Annually ④Quarterly ⑤Monthly ⑥Weekly 
⑦Don’t know 
 
15. Which of the following governance or risk management arrangements, if any, do you 
have in place? (multiple choice) 
①Board members with responsibility for cyber security  ②An outsourced provider 
that manages your cyber security ③A formal policy or policies in place covering cyber 
security risks ④A Business Continuity Plan ⑤Staff members whose job role includes 
information security or governance ⑥Other (       ) ⑦None of these ⑧Don’t 
know 
 
16. Approximately how often, if at all, are your company’s directors or senior management 
given an update on any actions taken around cyber security?  
①Never ②Less than once a year ③Annually ④Quarterly ⑤Monthly ⑥Weekly 
⑦Daily 
 
17. Which of the following, if any, have you done over the last 12 months to identify cyber 
security risks to your company? (multiple choice) 
①An internal audit ②Any business-as-usual health checks that are undertaken 
regularly ③Ad-hoc health checks or reviews beyond your regular processes ④A risk 
assessment covering cyber security risks ⑤Invested in threat intelligence ⑥Other 
(        )  ⑦None of these 
 
18. Which of the following rules or controls, if any, do you have in place? (multiple choice) 
①Applying software updates when they are available ②Up-to-date malware 
protection ③Firewalls with appropriate configuration ④Restricting IT admin and 
access rights to specific users ⑤Any monitoring of user activity ⑥Encrypting personal 
data ⑦Security controls on company-owned devices (e.g. laptops) ⑧Only allowing 
access via company-owned devices ⑨A segregated guest wireless network ⑩Other 
(    )  ⑪None of these ⑫Don’t know 
 
19. It there any incident management processes in your company? 
①Yes ②No 
 




21. Who is a breach or attack reported to? (multiple choice) 
①National Intelligence Service ②Police ③Korean Internet & Security Agency 
④Antivirus company ⑤Bank or credit card company ⑥Outsourced cyber security 
provider ⑦Internet/network service provider ⑧Professional/trade/industry 
association ⑨Media ⑩Website administer ⑪Other (                   ) ⑫ No 
intention to report ⑬Don’t know 
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22. From where have you sought information, advice or guidance on the cyber security 
threats that your company faces? (multiple choice)  
①Business bank/bank’s IT staff ②External security/IT consultants ③go.kr 
④National Intelligence Services ⑤Police ⑥Korean Internet & Security Agency 
⑦Small and Medium Business Administration  ⑧Internet Service Provider 
⑨Newspapers/media ⑩Online searching generally ⑪Professional/trade/industry 
association ⑫Regulator ⑬Security product vendors ⑭Other companies ⑮Within 
your company – senior management/board ⑯Within your company – other colleagues 
or experts ⑰Other (       )   
 
23. Are you aware of any of the following initiatives and standards? (multiple choice) 
①International Standard for Information Security Management (ISO 27001) ②Any 
government’s guidance ③K-ISMS from KISA ④Security Operations Centre from SMBA 
⑤Other (       ) ⑥None of these  
 
24. Which any government agencies have you contacted in relation to cyber security? 
(multiple choice) 
①National Intelligence Services ②Police ③Korean Internet & Security Agency 
④Small and Medium Business Administration ⑤Other (     ) ⑥None of these  
 
25. Have you been contacted or provided with any information by any government agencies 
in relation to cyber security? (multiple choice) 
①National Intelligence Services ② Police ③Korean Internet & Security Agency 
④Small and Medium Business Administration ⑤Other (     ) ⑥None of these  
 
26. Which of the following, if any, do your clients require you to have or adhere to? (multiple 
choice)  
①A recognised international standard (e.g. ISO 27001/PCIDSS) ②K-ISMS from KISA 
③Any government’s scheme ④Other (       ) ⑤None of these  
 
Section B: Questions over your company and socio-demographics 
In the following section, you will be asked about background information of your company and 
yourself. These questions are used to identify various organisational features of your company 
and yourself.  
1. What type of industry is your company in? 
①Manufacturing ②Construction ③Wholesale/retailing ④Accommodation and 
food service activities ⑤Transportation and storage ⑥Real estate ⑦Financial and 
insurance activities ⑧Administrative and support service activities ⑨ Information and 
communication ⑩Education service activities ⑪Professional, scientific and technical 
activities ⑫Human health and social work activities ⑬Utilities ⑭Arts, entertainment 
and recreation ⑮Environmental service activities ⑯Repair and extra service activities  
 
2. How many employees are working in your company?    (         ) 
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3. When was your company established?    (           ) 
    
4. Approximately, how much was the annual turnover of your company last year? (    ) 
 
5. Approximately, how much did your company invest in cyber security last year?          
(                 ) or  (                ) % of the annual turnover  
 
6. How many ICTs (ex, desktop computers and laptops) does your company have? (    ) 
 
7. Do you think your company is vulnerable to cyber security breaches? 
(If Yes → Q8 / No → Section E)     ①Yes  ②No  
 
8. How much do you think your company is vulnerable to cyber security breaches? 
①Very low ②Low ③Neutral ④High ⑤Very high 
 
9. What is your position in your company? 
①Low-level manager ②Middle-level manager ③Senior manager ④Owner  
 
10. What is your gender? 
①Male ②Female 
 
11. What was your last education? 
①Middle School or under  ②High School  ③Community college ④University 
⑤Master’s degree ⑥ PhD degree 
 
 









This is Jeyong Jung, a research student in the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies at the 
University of Portsmouth in the UK. I invite you to participate in an academic study of 
‘Cyber Security Management of SMEs in South Korea’. 
The first aim of this study is to assess current situations of SMEs in relation to cyber 
security. This is because there is an obvious lack of situational assessment on SMEs in 
South Korea. Secondly, it is to identify organisational factors that have an influence on 
the implementation of security controls and vulnerability to security breaches. 
Investigating relationships or correlations among variables will help the researcher to 
prioritise organisational factors that may be used to increase cyber security. Finally, the 
researcher finally intends to devise an effective framework for protecting SMEs from 
cyber security risks and cybercrimes. 
Qualitative data for this research will be greatly obtained from face-to-face interview. 
Participation in my research is entirely voluntary and I anticipate that your engagement 
will require approximately 60 minutes of your time through face-to-face interview. 
Withdrawal from the research is possible at any time prior to the data I am collecting 
being analysed. You can stop the interview at any time. In any event, your contribution 
to my research will be in confidence and references in my final published research will 
be anonymous. It should also be noticed that the data belongs to the researcher and the 
University of Portsmouth. And the data cannot be used for human resources or 
employment progression issues. If your permission is obtained and no withdrawal is 
requested, the researcher will include material from the interview for the researcher’s 
PhD thesis and, possibly, other relevant publications.  
If you have a concern on any aspect of this interview or study, you may contact me via 
e-mail (jeyong.jung@port.ac.uk) or by telephone on 010-9370-5057 (South Korea) or 44-
75-2174-5683 (UK). If there are any ethical concerns, you can also contact my advisor, 
Dr. Victoria Wang (victoria.wang@port.ac.uk) or the Chair of the Faculty Ethics 
Committee (ethics-fhss@port.ac.uk). 
If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact me. Thank you for sharing 
your time for this interview. Your participation is greatly appreciated.  
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Cyber security management of SMEs 
Intro- 
duction 
Purpose and Nature of Study / Risk of Inadequate Disclosure Awareness  / 
Confirming Consent 
1 
Would you tell me about your company? (the number of employees, the 
number of ICT, business sector, importance of ICTs to business, etc.) 
2 What is your role in your company? 
3 
Has your company ever experienced any cyber security breaches? What 
sort of damage occurred? 
4 
What types of cyber-attacks are the most prevalent and dangerous to your 
company? 
5 
How did(or will) you deal with cyber security breaches when (or if) they 
happen(ed)? 
6 
What measures does your company employ to increase the standard of 
cyber security? 
7 
What does senior management think about cyber security? Do senior 
managers agree on the statement that cyber security requires more 
attention within a company? 
8 
Do normal employees understand the importance of cyber security? How 
do you approach them to share the understanding? 
9 Where do you usually get cyber security information? 
10 
Have you been contacted by any government organisations as to cyber 
security for information, alerts, or other supports? 
11 
What role do government organisations need to take? What is your 
expectation from the public sector? 
12 




Anything Else, Open Questions and Answers / Any Concerns regarding 




Appendix 3 (Semi-structured Interview Questions for Public Officials) 
 
(Interview Guide) 
This is Jeyong Jung, a research student in the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies at the 
University of Portsmouth in the UK. I invite you to participate in an academic study of 
‘Cyber Security Management of SMEs in South Korea’. 
The first aim of this study is to assess current situations of SMEs in relation to cyber 
security. This is because there is an obvious lack of situational assessment on SMEs in 
South Korea. Secondly, it is to identify organisational factors that have an influence on 
the implementation of security controls and vulnerability to security breaches. 
Investigating causal relationships or correlations among variables will help the 
researcher to prioritise organisational factors that may be used to increase cyber 
security. Finally, the researcher finally intends to devise an effective framework for 
protecting SMEs from cyber security risks and cybercrimes. 
Qualitative data for this research will be greatly obtained from face-to-face interview. 
Participation in my research is entirely voluntary and I anticipate that your engagement 
will require approximately 60 minutes of your time through face-to-face interview. 
Withdrawal from the research is possible at any time prior to the data I am collecting 
being analysed. You can stop the interview at any time. In any event, your contribution 
to my research will be in confidence and references in my final published research will 
be anonymous. It should also be noticed that the data belongs to the researcher and the 
University of Portsmouth. And the data cannot be used for human resources or 
employment progression issues. If your permission is obtained and no withdrawal is 
requested, the researcher will include material from the interview for the researcher’s 
PhD thesis and, possibly, other relevant publications.  
If you have a concern on any aspect of this interview or study, you may contact me via 
e-mail (jeyong.jung@port.ac.uk) or by telephone on 010-9370-5057 (South Korea) or 44-
75-2174-5683 (UK). If there are any ethical concerns, you can also contact my advisor, 
Dr. Victoria Wang (victoria.wang@port.ac.uk) or the Chair of the Faculty Ethics 
Committee (ethics-fhss@port.ac.uk). 
If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact me. Thank you for sharing 







Government policies that are related to cyber security of SMEs 
Intro-
duction 
Purpose and Nature of Study / Risk of Inadequate Disclosure Awareness  / 
Confirming Consent 
1 
Would you tell me about your job? How is it related to protecting SMEs in 
terms of cyber security? 
2 What types of cyber-attacks are the most prevalent and dangerous? 
3 
What do you think about current cyber security situations that SMEs face? 
(prevalent types of cybercrime, seriousness of impacts, vulnerable groups) 
4 
Which groups are identified as more vulnerable ones depending on 
business sector, size, etc? Is there any customized policy for the vulnerable 
groups? 
5 
What is the role of your agency in relation to cyber security? What are the 
main priorities? 
6 
What are the main strategies, tactics and policies to protect SMEs? 
(respectively, for prevention and response) How effective are they? How 
does your agency evaluate the effectiveness of the policies? 
7 
How does your agency cooperate with other agencies or private 
companies(e.g., IT security vendors or ISPs)? 
8 
What are the main difficulties in protecting SMEs? What is the uniqueness 
of protecting SMEs compared to securing other entities, such as large 
companies, individuals and public organisations? 
9 What should be done to improve the level of cyber security in SMEs? 
Con-
clusion 
Anything Else, Open Questions and Answers / Any Concerns regarding 
















Appendix 6 (Response Result of Online Survey) 
 
 
(The total number of responses and response rate / the first survey in the list which does 
not have a name was for Seoul.) 
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Appendix 7 (Coding Structure of Qualitative Data using NVivo) 
 
 
(The structure of themes and sub-themes) 
 
 
(The structure between analytic codes, sub-themes, and themes) 
